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ABSTRACT

Living Infrastructure: Being, Time, And Government In New York City
by
Stephanie Wakefield

Advisor: Cindi Katz

This dissertation is a critical empirical and theoretical study of New York City’s post-Hurricane
Sandy effort to build artificial oyster reefs off the coast of Staten Island, where it is hoped they
will act as ‘resilient infrastructure’ capable of attenuating future storm surge and remediating
polluted water in an urban environment now understood as a vast socio-technical-ecological
system. Using oysters as a 'window' onto our present moment in NYC, I track a transformation in
being, time and politics in the form of a new regime of government to manage systemic urban
risk in the age of climate change. Rather than leave on this note, the dissertation concludes by
considering how might we respond to and live within this new interconnected and turbulent
environment.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Oysters at the end of the world
It is the last weekend of the summer 2015. I am on Governor’s Island, crouched over a
plastic-coated rebar cage that I spent the afternoon making, trying, along with two guys I’ve just
met, to make a clove hitch knot which will attach our oyster test stations to the various piers we
plan to monitor over the coming years. I am here on the first ferry out to the island with 40 other
people also here for the weekend, to learn how to care for an oyster restoration station. My
partner explains why he came: “I don’t know… I was at happy hour last night and I told my
friend, ‘I'm going to become an oyster farmer tomorrow,’ and they said ‘why?!’ ‘I dunno,’ I said,
‘I read a bunch of books... In some idyllic future I'd like to do this full time, as a farmer. It
sounds peaceful.” Women of all backgrounds in flip-flops and manicured nails clutch pliers in
anticipation of working with the oysters. In the background, the freedom tower looms large.
Along for the ride is a journalist from CBS, there to record interviews on the new ‘oyster mania.’
Ann Fraioli, co-founder of Harbor School, says to him, ‘well, the future looks pretty grim, but
you know, when you’re here now trying to bring things back to life and make a difference, you
can be obsessed with the end of the world for a while, but...’ Although we have all just met, we
make plans to monitor these stations, together, over the coming years.
A few months later, from a bulkhead at the southern coast of Staten Island, I am
contemplating the future disasters projected for this exposed shore. Staten Island was hit hard
during 2012’s Hurricane Sandy and some city officials now say people were never supposed to
live along its southern shores. This place is also a key site in the city of New York’s efforts to
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develop new techniques for managing climate change and its effects. In 2017, it will become the
site of a large-scale real-time experiment in making the city resilient, when the state of New
York –in collaboration with an unusual collection of actors, including engineers, critical
infrastructure consultants, designers, and lawyers, together with oysters, concrete, steel, and
computer models— will begin building two miles of artificial oyster reefs. The project is one
among six winning designs in the US Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Rebuild
by Design competition, and part of a larger effort to attenuate future storm surges and remediate
polluted water in Raritan Bay. ‘Oyster-tecture’ or ‘Living Breakwaters,’ as the $60 million
Rockefeller-funded project is named, is today widely heralded as a cutting edge replicable
infrastructure adequate to the ‘new normal’ now faced by coastal cities across the world.1 In the
design’s projected future for this place, the seas will continue to rise. Hurricanes will batter the
city’s coast with increased frequency and strength. An array of fiber optic cables will connect
underwater livecams, trained on distant ECOncrete oyster reefs, to computer monitoring stations
on land.2 The plan is to use oysters reefs as infrastructure to attenuate waves’ costal impact. The
hope is that disaster will be managed, although it will never be fully stopped.

Statement of purpose
This dissertation is about oysters. More specifically, it is about a fundamental shift in how
oysters are understood, related to, and are being brought to exist today in New York City as
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For an overview of the Living Breakwaters project from the New York State Governor’s Office
of Storm Recovery, see http://stormrecovery.ny.gov/living-breakwaters-tottenville. See also
Rebuild by Design’s project page at http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/project/scape-landscapearchitecture-final-proposal/.
2
On ECOncrete, see Chapter 4.
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infrastructure. The argument of the dissertation is that examining the emergence and construction
of oyster infrastructure reveals a shift toward a new relationship between being, time, and
government today in New York City, and a novel way of periodizing the Anthropocene, our
contemporary geological-historical epoch. At first glance the state of New York’s experiment in
building oyster reefs off the coast of Staten Island may seem no different from other oyster
restoration efforts underway around the city. Or, due to the city’s well-known oyster past, the
project might seem like an effort to restart the oyster industry that once thrived in the region.3
However, the oysters with which New York State are concerned are neither. The oysters with
which NY State is concerned are being viewed as something entirely novel: as an 'infrastructure'
to govern storm surge, rising seas, and flooding along the city’s coasts. In this capacity, oyster
reefs are now valued for entirely different reasons from those of the past. Rather than their taste
or their ability to produce profit, oysters today are valued for their biological life processes. In
releasing millions of eggs, producing shells, attaching on top of living and dead oysters, and shell
upon shell, building massive coastal reefs, oysters are today seen as ‘nature’s wave attenuators’
(Orff 2010, n.p.). For these capacities, oysters are now viewed as paradigmatic of new modes of
urban resilience needed in the war against climate change and its effects on coastal areas. What
makes these oysters unique and novel then is that they are being incorporated into ‘government,’
part of the management of the city in a time when the urban environment has come to be seen as
a place of constant, pervasive, and naturalized state of emergency. This is not something oysters
have been asked to do before.
In this dissertation, I explore the processes and challenges of ‘enrolling’ oysters as
infrastructure. But my interest is not only technical. Through this empirical material, I show how
3

On the oyster industry, see Chapter 2.
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the use of oysters as 'emergent infrastructure' opens a window into larger questions about our
present historical moment, a new age of environmental crisis, global climate change, and
uncertainty that geologists call the Anthropocene.4 Oysters are being enrolled as infrastructure to
help ‘govern’ these new crises, a development that is new for oysters but which also represents
something novel for government. Where infrastructure usually brings to mind dams or bridges —
structures that themselves tell us something about the world in which they were created— using
nature as infrastructure is considered paradigmatic of the new brand of ‘resilient’ infrastructures
needed to manage cities in the Anthropocene.5 How should we understand this new
infrastructure, in which nature is viewed as a technique of government? How can we understand
the new modes of ‘resilient’ government in which such an infrastructure is being enrolled? What
kinds of life are being created by this mode of government? Furthermore, how should we
understand the relationship between this infrastructure and the lives it promises to protect? As
intimated in the scenes that open this dissertation, New Yorkers are very attached to oysters.
From the enthusiastic participants in oyster restoration trainings to a woman whom we meet in
later chapters who designed her own papier-mâché oyster hat to promote the Living Breakwaters
project, oysters represent hopes and dreams for many. What is the relationship of this
infrastructure to those hopes and dreams? My argument is that oyster infrastructure, like modern
infrastructure past, can help us see something about the politics, being and time of resilience that
we could not otherwise see. Oyster infrastructure is novel, I argue, not only because it is a new
definition of infrastructure as a living being with a life and a death. More significantly it is also
novel because it represents a new relationship between government and life. In the past,
government was tied to promises of the future and improved quality of life. Resilience as a mode
4
5

I discuss the Anthropocene in detail in Chapter 6.
On resilience, see Chapter 3.
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of government, I will show in contrast, tethers us to merely 'managing' catastrophe, and
'separates' us from our capacities. As such, far from an ecological savvy, it seeks the freezing of
history through the eternal repetition of the present. Like other infrastructures of resilience,
oyster infrastructure’s role is to manage and adapt to changing conditions of catastrophe, in this
case, those at sea, in order to secure the existing and unchanging economic and political mode of
life on land.
In short, my argument is that oysters are the perfect window through which to understand the
Anthropocene: the new modes of government being deployed to manage its effects, and the
transformed relationships to being, time, and politics that these entail. This is the ‘shooting star’
that runs through the different chapters, which I tie together in Chapter 6. There, my argument is
that while oysters help us see the being and time of the Anthropocene, in which history seems to
have stalled, they also tell us something about the possibility of reopening history, through the
experimentation with new forms of existence in a more-than-human world. Instead of finding
ever-new ways to survive or manage ‘apocalypse,’ the key to ‘reopening’ history, I argue, may
lie with accepting that we already inhabit an apocalyptic world, and beginning to create new
modes of life within those ruins.

The story of this dissertation
In the context of the Anthropocene –with its new risks and space-times– the way that the city
of New York is governed is undergoing marked transformation. This dissertation began as an
investigation into this phenomenon, as a study of the new modes of ‘resilient’ government being
stitched together to administer New York City in the Anthropocene (see Braun, 2014; Wakefield
5

and Braun, 2014). When I began, the questions I wanted to explore were: What modes of
ordering urban life are being developed to achieve resilience? What new technologies does
‘resilient government’ entail? What forms of human and nonhuman life are being created (or
prevented) by resilience as a mode of governing? How are ‘risk’ and ‘crisis’ now being
managed, and the ‘urban order’ that is late capitalist life in NYC being maintained? How and
what does this help us see about the possibility of creating other forms of life? What I wanted to
do was to understand what is happening here in New York, in the place where I live. I began by
studying several ‘experiments’ underway, in an effort to map resilient urbanism not as a coherent
object or plan made in advance, but as an ad hoc-arrangement of discourses, practices,
architectural forms, regulations, laws, knowledges, technologies and designs, that come together
in response to a crisis and that together and in their relations form what Foucault (2009) called a
‘dispositif’ or apparatus (p. 194).6 My intention in following Foucault’s framework was to trace
the dispositif of resilient urbanism being developed not as a great ecological savvy or longawaited harmonious eco-urbanism, but rather as a new regime for governing the city, in which
the relationship between the city and its management is undergoing significant transformations.
What became clear in my research was the increasingly prominent role of infrastructure in
contemporary governance. Today, infrastructure has come to the fore as what many see as
perhaps the political question. “’[S]ecurity’,” geographer Bruce Braun (2014) states, “is
increasingly about protecting ‘critical infrastructure’, and biopolitics is increasingly
infrastructural in form” (p. 58). But how, and in what way? For Michael Dillon and Julien Reid
(2009), infrastructure is key to producing and maintaining ‘the liberal way life’ as well as
preventing the emergence of other ways of life. If defending these physical and technological
6

The understanding of resilience as a ‘new urban dispositif’ that I use develops ideas in
Wakefield and Braun, 2014 and Braun, 2014. For further discussion of dispositif, see Chapter 3.
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systems has become so urgent for liberal governments today, according to Dillon and Reid it is
because, “liberal regimes have come to understand [them] as necessary for their vitality and
security in recent years” (2009, p. 130; see also Kaika, 2014; Anderson, 2011). For Dillon and
Reid, like many other critical infrastructure theorists, the central issue is understanding why
infrastructures are so often a target in war and why, especially since September 11 and the
formation of the Department of Homeland Security, the protection of ‘critical infrastructures’
have risen to the top of city and national government security agendas (Coward, 2009; Aradau
2010; Appel & Kumar, 2015). This is also true for critical infrastructure theorists like Martin
Coward (2009), who notes that infrastructure is targeted “because it is a constitutive feature of
contemporary urban life. Metropolitan life is marked by its constitutive relation to urban
infrastructure” (2009, p. 399; see also Collier & Lakoff, 2008; Walker & Cooper, 2011; Graham
& Marvin, 2001; Mitropoulos, 2012). As geographer Deborah Cowen (2014; 2010) argues, at
issue is not only the way of life supported by infrastructure, but also, and for her perhaps
primarily what is ‘critical’ about transportation infrastructures is the role they play in
maintaining the circulation of commodity supply chains and ensuring global flows of capital (see
also Graham, 2009; Bernes, 2013).
What my research showed however is how the Anthropocene and its new urgencies add
complications to these stories. Strategies and ideas on how to make New York ‘resilient’ to everincreasing categories of risk, planners, architects and city officials have redefined the city as a
dynamic self-healing meshwork of risk-bearing social, ecological, and technical systems. The
management of these systems requires yet more systems (see, e.g., City of New York, 2013).
Both more prominent and more explicitly a ‘matter of concern,’ infrastructures are now seen as
vulnerable to catastrophe, the source of catastrophe, and yet more than ever they are also viewed
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as carrying the hope of managing catastrophe (Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams, 2011; Belanger,
2009; Collier & Lakoff, 2011). Referring to the need to ‘reinvent’ infrastructure today, National
Public Radio author Adam Frank (2015) stated,
We aren't starting construction on a new infrastructure just because some new
technology is available. Instead, we need to make a switch because the old modality
is now recognized as a threat to the civilization it was supposed to support via the
climate change it's driving. (n.p.)
With modern infrastructure seen as outdated and implicated in present and future disasters, in the
name of 'resilience' to catastrophe, New York City is increasingly immersed in a broad sociotechnical retooling. Far from brick and mortar past, ever new spheres of life itself, from
waterways and the oysters inhabiting them to human communities, are being rebranded and
redefined as infrastructural systems, the modulation and management of which now seen as the
key to resilience (City of New York, 2013; FEMA, 2011). In addition to infrastructure’s
prominent role in government, what also became clear in my research was that, under the
heading of resilience, the nature of infrastructure itself is undergoing a transformation.
Nothing showed this better than the way in which one of the designs I had been studying—
the proposal to use oyster reefs to remediate area waterways— was transformed into a serious
infrastructural plan following Hurricane Sandy’s devastation in 2012. In the rush to find new
management solutions in the storm’s wake, a design by local landscape architecture firm SCAPE
to use oysters to filter polluted water and attenuate storm surge was taken on by NY State as one
of their most heralded ‘resilient’ designs for the Anthropocene. Faced with the unprecedented
environmental crises now seen as threatening the city, the year following Sandy the design
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moved from art exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art to a $60 million Rockefeller-funded
attempt led by New York State Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery to build two miles of
artificial oyster reefs off the southern coast of Staten Island, part of a larger effort to attenuate
(not block out) future storm surges and remediate polluted water in Raritan Bay. Instead of
building a sea wall, the State decided to enroll oysters as ‘living, growing’ infrastructure.
What this represents seemed so significant –and compelling—that I decided to focus my
dissertation entirely on oysters. In oyster infrastructure or ‘oyster-tecture,’ the relationship of
nature, infrastructure, and the city is changing. Unlike the past, this is not matter of constructing
ever more technological or ‘brick and mortar’ or even ‘technical’ infrastructures to manage
human life and nature in the city. Oyster infrastructure entails expanding the scope of
infrastructure to include nature and life itself, with nature ‘brought back in’ to the city not as a
‘resource’ to ‘provision’ or as water, food, energy (Gandy, 2002; Kaika, 2004), but a ‘living,
growing infrastructure’ that through its very biological processes also provides management
functions. This is something that has not been discussed in the literature on critical infrastructure.
Theorists have looked at the ‘liveliness’ or ‘agency’ of infrastructural systems (Bennett, 2007;
Latour, 2007), but they have not discussed how nature itself is today being asked to become
critical infrastructure, enrolled as one system within a broader ‘resilience strategy.’ What does
this mean? How can we understand this development? According to the city’s project’s storyline,
nature is infrastructure and has always been so. From this perspective, ‘oyster infrastructure’ is a
way of recognizing this fact and reconnecting what modernity long separated, thus reuniting
human and nature by uncovering the latter’s long-forgotten ‘potentialities.’ From this
perspective, the project not only responds to the specific urgencies faced by NYC—and the
search to profit off of them—but is also seen as representing the promise of healing the
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nature/culture divide seen by ecologists and urban theorists alike as a false and destructive divide
(Smith, 1990). As NYC-based architect and designer Ariane Lourie Harrison (2013) put it,
oyster-tecture is a ‘visionary,’ ‘posthuman architecture’ (p. 296). Lauded by the Buckminster
Fuller Institute for similar reasons, in 2014 Living Breakwaters received the Buckminster Fuller
Challenge Grand Prize (2014). It is, in fact difficult to find any account that is not purely
celebratory of this project (and those that are not see it as a technical matter, in which the
question is whether it will or will not ‘work’ (e.g., Grizzle & Coeh, 2013).)
The project is indeed significant, and this dissertation is not intended as a ‘critique’ of it. This
dissertation begins, however, from a different set of questions. These questions, not dissimilar
from those outlined above which helped launch this research, begin from the perspective that the
reefs in question are neither a simple technical matter nor the final, peaceful resolution of the
city/nature problem. Rather, the reefs must be understood as part of the broader effort to govern
New York in a new age of perpetual crisis, and are perhaps paradigmatic of the new modes by
which governance of that crisis is sought. Here I follow Braun’s (2014) argument that,
Governing through the naturalness of nature at the scale of the city must be
understood as a particular mode of government, one that may be less of a departure
from already existing modes than an extension of a particular apparatus in which
molding life is replaced by modulating natural processes, now extended to include the
non-human world itself (p. 60).
Whether or not the reefs will be built, or succeed, the incorporation of nature into the
administration of the city suggests that the problem has changed. Understanding the relationship
between government and life now requires understanding what it means when the two are seen
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as merged. This is something the critical infrastructure literatures have not addressed. What kind
of world have we been thrown into, where infrastructure is defined as living, and living as
infrastructure? What does this merging signify? This is what we must try to understand, and the
basic problem that drives this dissertation. If ‘oyster-tecture’ offers an especially striking image
of this development, it is certainly not alone. Wetlands, smart grids, and connected, resilient,
self-organizing human communities alike are portrayed with increasing frequency as ‘vital
infrastructures’ vital to disaster recovery. It is often said that New York City is where the future
comes to audition, where techniques of governing are first tested and then diffused globally.
With ‘’Living Breakwaters’ heralded as a cutting edge replicable infrastructure adequate to the
Anthropocene ‘new normal,’ perhaps this project itself paradigmatic of what is to come, the
direction in which things are heading. What kind of future is being auditioned in this
infrastructure? What kind of present does it represent? And what possibilities does it offer for
both?

Studying ‘living infrastructure’
In an attempt to answer these questions, I have followed the process enrolling oysters as
infrastructure. For this, as already mentioned I have followed Foucault (1980a) in the use of a
‘dispositif’ or ‘ad hoc assemblage’ method (see also Agamben, 2009). This method will be
explained and extended in Chapters 3 and 4. Throughout the dissertation I also followed a
‘phenomenological’ method, derived from the work of German philosopher Martin Heidegger
(1962). For him, we cannot know what it means to ‘be’ in advance –what it means to be an
oyster, to be a human. Being is ‘in the world,’ in the ‘assembling,’ and ‘coming together’ of the
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world. As such, it has no prior or inherent definition. Being is not a state or a fact but rather a
question, whose answers are rooted in space and time. According to Heidegger, a fatal, ongoing
error of western thought has been to forget this, and to imagine instead that the world is a set of
subjects who could objectively know a world of things (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 91-149). We will
see the consequences of that error throughout the dissertation. We will also see, as did
Heidegger, how much the opposite is the case. As Heidegger (1962) lays out in 1927 work Being
and Time, the understanding of the world, that is any theory we might have about it, derives from
‘being-in-the-world’ (pp. 78-91). From his perspective, there are not subjects and the world is
not an object first –rather, the qualities of the world are disclosed practically. The world is made
up of beings, but is fundamentally about how those beings come to presence, together and
themselves, in certain ways, in certain places. The way in which they do that, this phenomenon
of ‘hanging together,’ is what Heidegger (1962) calls ‘world’ (p. 91). Being-in-the-world is a
priori; it is constitutive ontologically, and temporally prior – ‘always already,’ between a past
that we inherit and a future into which we project (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 349-383).
What Heidegger gives us is not a theory of reality, but a method for orienting ourselves in it.
This method has consequences for what we do and how we think. If we want to understand
something in the world, this understanding has to begin from the world that process is taking
place, and not the other way around (see Critchley, 2008). This is in no way to say that theory,
science or philosophy are useless. Each helps us make sense of the worlds in which we are
thrown, and indeed is part of those worlds. That is the point. To put this otherwise, we cannot get
at the ‘phenomena’ of the world by adding together all of the ‘things’ that there are (human
things, natural things, human-made things, existing ideas) and then tracing those things back to
their ultimate foundation in nature, and then adding a scientific or theoretical definition of nature
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itself (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 128-149). To conceive of things in the world as ‘present at hand’
objects in this way is to disregard the existential contact of our ‘factical’ life, to disregard the
phenomena. It is, in the end, to imagine the world through our perception of it. As Heidegger
says, we should set aside our tendency to interpret, and instead first go to the world in which we
are ‘thrown’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 424-456). Beginning from the phenomena themselves—
oysters, water, people, words, even ‘moods’ (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 219-225)—we can, he argues,
then see where we are led, what is opened up and what patterns are made clear.
From Michel Foucault (1977) and Louis Althusser’s (2006) genealogical method and Alain
Badiou’s (2001; 2009; 2010) notion of an ‘event,’ to geographers Pauline McGuirk, Harriet
Bulkeley and Robyn Dowling’s (2015) concept of ‘configuration’ and Neil Smith’s (1984)
concept of the ‘production of nature,’ throughout the dissertation I follow different variations on
Heidegger’s intuition, in order to add to it. What unites these diverse concepts is an agreement
that being is constructed, practiced and configured in and from places, through ways of speaking,
behaving, and thinking that are social, geographical, and historical, assembled by beings in
worlds they do not control (however much they may think the opposite). Although I do refer to
oysters in different historical periods, I am not writing a linear, continuous history of oysters. I
am, rather, using oysters as a ‘lens’ or a ‘device’ that helps us to see something more about the
time we are living in. The methods I use to do this will become clearer as the dissertation
proceeds. For now, what matters is that each help us in different ways to demystify our
surroundings, to help us see in them a series of ‘worlds’ that have changed and will change
again, also teach us that the world, as it shows up for us, is one that can be remade. In the
concluding chapters, I suggest that this ‘being-in-the-world’ method of understanding the past
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and present may help us understand what it might mean to reclaim our capacity to live and build
a future in the Anthropocene.
Engaging with this process has led to a dissertation in which ultimately I do three things.
First, empirically I am exploring the emergence and construction of 'oyster-tecture' in New York
City. To do so, since 2014, I have visited Staten Island and Governor’s Island, where I have gone
on boat rides with instructors from the Billion Oyster Project and Harbor School. At the latter, I
watched high school student scuba missions while PBS and NOAA videographers filmed. I met
with landscape architects in SCAPE LLC’s office in the financial district. I read through history
and philosophy books, reports, lab data, design proposals. I visited art institutions. I led seminars
on oysters with students at Macaulay Honors College and Queens College in which we
experimented with filtration and monitored oyster restoration stations in Flushing Bay, Queens. I
Skyped with the CEO of Israeli coastal engineering firm Sea Arc, read pop food literature, and
watched YouTube videos for children on oyster biology. I attended post-Sandy think tanks and
town halls, wine tastings at SCAPE’s Buckminster Fuller Award ceremony at Wythe Hotel on
the Williamsburg waterfront. I have grown oysters, shown them to students who had never seen
or touched one, seen them die, and disposed of them.
Second, following the lines opened up by the empirical work, at theoretical level I am tracing
a new relation to 'being,’ and a new mode of governing the urban that I summarize in Chapter 5
with a twist on the phrase ‘living infrastructure.’ This notion is the result of the investigation I
engaged in and the concepts it revealed. Two years ago I would not have envisioned myself in
these situations or those scenes that open this chapter, with oysters in the water. Nor would I
have predicted the dissertation that came out of it. I thought I was writing a straightforward,
‘critical’ analysis of new techniques of governing the city. While that may be the case, what I
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encountered was something that actually pushed far beyond my emotional and mental
expectations. What oysters help us see about the world we are living in today demands a more
sensitive and thoughtful examination than ‘critique’ provides. Nature as infrastructure is an
invitation from the dead to the dead. Oysters represent the deep history of the earth, a past that
extends millions of years before humans existed (US Geological Survey, 2015; Mann, 2013, p.
323). They survived the extinction of dinosaurs (Parkinson, 2010, p. 53). Ancient oyster shells
form limestone strata (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 57). Oysters are part of our ‘inheritance,’ part of the
world into which human worlds have been thrown, the ‘gift’ we inherit (Clark, 2011). The state
of New York’s invitation to them to come live in New York’s waters again is an appeal to help
us ensure that we too might remain. This effort in engineering life offers no assurances against a
growing toxicity that may mutate their bodies, no guard against increasing ocean acidity that will
attack the lethal fragility of their shells, and no guarantee that the life that will grow will be the
life that is desired, no guarantee that life will take hold, or continue. Enrolling oysters as
infrastructure is not a utopian plan but rather, as SCAPE lead designer Kate Orff put it, “a way of
buying a little time” until climate change and its effects force more drastic changes (personal
communication, May 29, 2015). When I asked her how she imagined the south shore in 2100,
Orff replied, “dystopian… walls, towers, jellyfish” (personal communication, May 29, 2015).
Orff’s sentiment is not unique. Despite the promise the project seems to offer, for many
oyster infrastructure and the resilience dispositif in which it is enrolled coincide with a moment
of growing fear and uncertainty about the future and the place of life in it. To be clear: My
intention is not to ‘critique’ Living Breakwaters, or oyster restoration, or the oyster industry. I
am a part of this oyster restoration effort, and am clearly as ‘taken’ by oysters as some of the
people I describe in these chapters. The question I am asking is about what it means for oysters
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to appear at this moment, in this place, in this way, and what that helps us see about the world we
are living in. As such, this dissertation is a contribution toward exploring how we might think
about, respond to, live within (or against) this new mode of ordering life and things. We have to
understand our conditions in order to dwell in them. Like the ‘experimental’ approach that, we
will see, characterizes oyster infrastructure, perhaps what is needed, if we hope to find ways of
responding to our time that would be adequate, is not more critique—a theoretical attitude that
tends to locate the observer outside the world— but an experimental ethic that puts us back in the
world that we always already inhabit. Instead of an object to critique, from this experimental
perspective, the world is a place to figure out how to inhabit. Ultimately then this dissertation is
about understanding the present, in order to ask the question: how do we then live, in this
particular assembling of the present? How do we reopen the future, on a new basis—perhaps this
experimental basis —one that would not reproduce the metaphysical disaster we now inhabit? To
draw my arguments together and get at these last questions, the dissertation concludes by doing a
third and final thing, which is to offer a periodization of the Anthropocene –the name now being
given to the historical epoch in which we are living and that corresponds to modern capitalism
and liberalism. Rather than a linear historical time period, I propose that we can think of the
Epoch of Man — as the term literally means— as a set of three different yet overlapping
‘periods’ (A1, A2, A3) that are irreducible to linear line of succession, but that rather locate our
present as a Janus-faced moment, at once looking back, to a past (A1) that is not at all past, but
now emerging catastrophically in the present and transforming the future in previously
unimaginable ways. If governing apocalypse (A2) is the currently dominant response to this
situation, I imagine ‘A3’ as a possible other response based in an ethos of experimentation and
‘being in the world.’

16

A note on figures and images. The majority of the images I have included illustrate specific
details that I discuss in the text. In other cases, however, I use images that are intended to act in
contrast or supplementation to the text, in order to bring out a new sense through the conjoining
of image and text. In this, I am following a basic dialectical ‘montage’ method, such as that used
by Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein (1999). According to Eisenstein, it is not only a single
image or passage of text alone that matters, but also the way the ‘collision’ of the two generates a
third, new sense.

Outline of chapters
Chapter 2 begins Part I of the dissertation. The chapter helps us see what is so novel about
oyster-tecture, with an overview and history of oysters and their use and importance. To do so, I
return to an earlier moment in which oysters were understood and related to in completely
different ways. Here we are in New York’s Gilded Age, in which oysters were objects of
consumption and production, commodities at the center of a global oyster industry. In this
assemblage—which I refer to as ‘Oyster Mania 1’—brought together an urban landscape of
transport networks, waterfront industry, eating establishments, populated by laboring bodies and
practices, elite and working class habits, signs, oysters had a particular value –their taste, their
price—that pertained to what they ‘were’ (commodities, objects) and not, as today, what they
‘do.’ This assemblage, like any, was perpetually haunted by forces that threatened its stability,
and indeed by the beginning of the twentieth century New York’s oyster industry was completely
finished, taking with it the particular oyster produced in and through the conditions it assembled.
This chapter helps us understand just how much ‘today’s’ oyster is a completely different
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creature, born of a completely different and still emerging assemblage. To emphasize this point, I
conclude Chapter 2 with a discussion of history and method. Instead of a continuous view of
history that would assign a single essence to beings and then trace their adventures through time,
I highlight the utility of a genealogical method, which attends rather to the singular emergence of
beings in and through the assembling of particular conditions in space and time. This method
informs the whole of my dissertation, and is reprised again in Chapter 6 in the context of
exploring how to dwell in the Anthropocene. This chapter’s role is not only to show how
different ‘today’s’ oyster is, but also to represent the larger ‘urban order’ today’s oyster is
responding to (of which the ‘oyster mania 1’ stands as an example, not cause).
In Chapter 3, I track how oysters shift from being a means to produce ‘green urbanism’ to a
way of ‘securing’ life in the city around the ‘hinge’ of Hurricane Sandy. In this chapter I trace
the emergence of ‘oyster infrastructure’ by focusing on Sandy as a precipitating ‘event’ that
caused the city to be seen as shot through with risks in new ways. In the post-storm search for
solutions to manage infrastructural failure, rising seas, and flooding, I show the assembling
together of language, images, and forces into a burgeoning ‘dispositif of resilience,’ in which the
oyster was enrolled, and asked to do something it had never been before, to become an
infrastructure of security. To make sense of this, I bring the thought of French philosopher Alain
Badiou (2009; 2010; 2011) together with that of Michel Foucault (1980a). First, I reflect on the
former’s concept of the ‘event’ as that which scrambles old ways of knowing and doing and
reveals new horizons, problems, questions, while putting new things into relation. Sandy, I
argue, was an event composed of concrete moments and effects (storm surge, death, etc.) that
also ‘unveiled’ a number of things: a new ontology of pervasive risk, uncertainty, new space
times and a ‘nature that exceeds us.’ But, following Badiou’s assertion that an event is defined
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by the response made to it, I argue that the response we saw emerge as dominant in Sandy’s
wake was that of governing the event. To understand this, I turn to Foucault. Using his concept
of a ‘dispositif,’ I track the bringing together of previously unrelated elements under the new
rubric of resilience, and the assembling of a new ‘dispositif’ that would manage and secure the
city in new ways. What we see is that in this assembling oysters are asked to take on new
meaning, and posed as a new solution to urban risk.
Where Chapter 3 shows how oysters came to be seen as a risk management solution, Chapter
4 is about how getting oysters to appear in this way is itself something of an uncertainty, an
‘achievement’ that no matter how stable it might seem is always precarious. This chapter is in
other words about the work that was and is still required to create ‘nature as infrastructure,’ to
make nature be infrastructure. As such it is an effort to answer the question persistently posed to
me by my late advisor Neil Smith: who built the dispositif? In part one, I trace the work required
to establish the idea of oysters as infrastructure. Newspaper articles, TED talks, plans, discourse
and new vocabulary, mobilization of feelings, forms of measure and modeling led to the
stabilizing of the idea and culminated in the project’s winning the Rebuild by Design
competition, and more generally in a new notion of infrastructure that has begun to ‘make sense.’
Examining this work, I show that the new infrastructural imaginary of oysters being unfurled
today is not a coherent unitary, but works precisely through the drawing together of diverse and
often seemingly contradictory visions: cuteness and toxicity, longing and fear, emergence and
functionality, reality and imagination. I then ask, once this idea of nature as infrastructure was
‘stabilized,’ what needed and still needs to be done to ‘make’ it real? How to make nature do
what it does? Here I look at what it takes to make nature ‘be’ infrastructure. Making oysters into
infrastructure—something they have never been before— requires work still, by humans and
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oysters. Here I follow this ‘construction’ process, which, we will see, is itself drawing together
diverse elements: concrete materials, implementing bodies and funding, security and monitoring
its completion, planting $30 million worth of larvae, multi-ton artificially engineered concrete
‘armoring units,’ state regulations, fiber optic cable and mesh cages bolted to the ocean floor, as
well as, most importantly, what it takes to simply make a reef –oysters, and their living of life.
In Chapter 5, I move into Part II of the dissertation. Part II shifts gears away from the
empirical and toward the conceptual, and ‘zoom outs’ to see what oyster infrastructure tells us
about government, being, and time in the Anthropocene. Chapter 5 asks what it means not only
for nature to become infrastructure, but also for infrastructure to become nature, that is, the
nature of life itself. In this chapter, I am in conversation with political theorists Brad Evans and
Julian Reid, who argue that western liberal societies have entered into a new political era,
defined by the naturalization and omnipresence of crisis. Oyster infrastructure, I argue, is
paradigmatic of the forms of resilient government being deployed to manage the political era of
crisis described by Evans and Reid (2014). To explore the nature of this mode of government, I
compare oyster infrastructure with ‘modern infrastructures’ like bridges, dams, or electrical
grids. Where the latter infrastructures represented a promise of future progress and mastery, I
argue that oyster infrastructure seeks the deferral of the future, through the permanent and
continuous management of crisis in the present. In this way, I argue that oyster infrastructure and
resilience may be seen as playing the role of what Carl Schmitt called the ‘katechon’ –the
political power that defers future apocalypse— albeit one in which the meaning of apocalypse
and the future have been transformed. What oyster infrastructure helps us understand, I conclude,
is resilience as a mode of government, the way that it enrolls nonhuman and human life as ‘living
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infrastructure’ in such a way that we are separated from our capacity to create other possibilities
(see Katz, 2014 for a different view of resilience).
In Chapter 6 I zoom out further, to view the new relation to being and time discussed in
Chapter 5 at the scale of geological time. Here I propose a three-part periodization of the
Anthropocene, in which ‘Anthropocene 1’ refers back to the political-metaphysical order of
which Chapter 2’s ‘oyster mania’ and Chapter 5’s ‘liberal life’ stand as examples or ‘snapshots.’
‘Anthropocene 2’ refers to the new mode of government that we saw in Chapter 5, in which the
catastrophic effects of ‘A1’ are emerging in the present, and in which a new regime of
government is being deployed that says the only possibility left is to manage catastrophe. A
Despite its present dominance, my argument here is that ‘A2’ (governing catastrophe) is only
one possible ‘path’ in our current ‘threshold moment,’ and it very well does not have to be. Other
futures are possible. Here I suggest a third possible ‘Anthropocene’ (A3), which while not a
‘good Anthropocene’ (Hamilton, 2014; Revkin, 2014), would take seriously the possibility of a
life beyond managing apocalypse. ‘A3,’ I argue, could be a different response (than A2) to the
opening produced by the ‘event’ of the Anthropocene (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016). A3, I suggest,
requires that we ‘return to the world,’ in order to ‘dwell in the ruins’ of A1. Just as A1 and A2
were assembled as a set of practices and techniques, so too, I argue, A3, if there is going to be
one, will take a lot of work. It will also require a new orientation to being. Following the method
employed throughout the dissertation, I argue that rather than imagining there are two worlds, we
can begin living and acting in this world, which is the only one we will ever have (Agamben,
2012, pp. 12-13). ‘Returning to the world’ as I put it does not mean going back to the land or the
past, but requires inhabiting the multiple temporalities of the Anthropocene at once, facing up to
a post-apocalyptic world in which the past is present in all kinds of catastrophic permutations
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and the future is radically uncertain. Through a discussion of Agamben’s (2014; 2016) ‘politics
of use,’ I imagine ‘dwelling in the Anthropocene’ as an ongoing and pragmatic experiment in
creating new forms of life within the ruins of the present. Instead of simply managing
catastrophe, I argue that this ‘divergent trajectory’ offers a way of reopening the future and
creating happiness in the present.
I end the dissertation with a Coda, where I imagine two possible snapshots of what lies
ahead, in a future that is in reality impossible to imagine. In an imagined 2050 AD, I imagine the
life that could develop around a ‘water hub’ along Staten Island’s south shore. Conditions are
getting dark, but in this vignette we see that still it becomes a meaningful story. People are
creating meaning, together with oysters and each other. An existence that is not reducible to
crisis and its management is possible. Even in the face of imminent catastrophe, people are living
in ways they never imagined before, and refusing the blackmail of what I call ‘crisis
government.’ What is possible is a life that could be even more meaningful than in A1, when we
didn’t even see the catastrophe.
The second vignette is set in the same place, now 2100 AD. This vignette is from the
perspective of oysters in Raritan Bay. Sea and temperature levels have risen, and waters along
the East Coast have become five times more acidic than in the early decades of the twenty-first
century. The oysters are unable to form shells, they are exhausted, and they die. In this vignette
we are reminded that the living beings with which we seek to govern our world have worlds of
their own. These worlds go in directions that are not under human control. Our efforts to
construct our worlds are always indebted to their worlds, but also hampered and conditioned by
them. And for all of us, the future is a question.
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These vignettes are followed by a short Conclusion.

Chapter 2: Oyster Mania 1
The world of life… the world of history… gels at certain felicitous moments, with the
taking-hold of elements combined in an encounter that is apt to trace such-and-such a
figure: such-and-such a species, individual, or people. (Althusser, 2006, p. 194)

New York City, oyster capital of the 19th century
As stated in Chapter 1, this dissertation is about a fundamental shift in how oysters are
understood, related to, and are today being transformed into infrastructure. While today oysters
are celebrated as ecosystems services providers and keystone species (Coen et al., 2011; Coen, et
al., 2007; Orff, 2010), no one, in the nineteenth century, cared about the relations oysters
engaged in, but were concerned with optimizing their price, taste, and quantity. During this
period known as the Gilded Age, New York City was ‘the world’s oyster capital’ (Kurlansky,
2007, p. 113), a key center of a global oyster industry that stretched across the United States to
California and eastward to England and France (MacKenzie, 1984). During this time, oysters
were a central part of the life of New York’s elites, a commodity valued for its texture, size,
taste, and for what it signified: conspicuous consumption and wealth (see Figure 2.1). As Parks
explains, “no evening of pleasure was complete without oysters; no host worthy of the name
failed to serve ‘the luscious bivalves,’ as they were actually called, to his guests” (cited by
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MacKenzie, 1996, p.16). Amidst degraded living conditions for the workers on which it relied,
the Gilded Age was the time in which the bourgeoisie were solidifying not only their class
position but also way of life, exemplified by the lavish consumption of delicacies such as
oysters. In this vein, Beckert (2003) recounts:
Nothing quite expressed the confidence of the city’s merchants, industrialists, and
bankers better than the blossoming of social life among the economic elite’s wealthiest
ranks after the Civil War. Social events of this select and powerful group became more
elaborate and more public than ever before. The social season following the war… saw
600 balls, and the amount spent on dresses and jewelry for these affairs ran to about $7
million. Teas, receptions, intimate dinners, parties, balls, and cotillions kept upper-class
New Yorkers busy. In this “golden age of New York society,” some women would order
forty gowns from Worth in Paris each season – at a coast of $2,500 a dress. Meals would
consist of seven to ten courses. At a legendary dinner organized by Leonard Jerome at
Delmonico’s [the first upper-class oyster restaurant], each woman found a gold bracelet
hidden in her napkin…’year by year,’ commented May King Van Rensselaer, an astute
observer of New York’s social life, ‘the love of luxury, and the taste for excitement
increased’… Mrs. Stuyvesant Fish would on occasion throw a ‘lavish tea party’ for her
friends’ dogs or even seat an ape in the ‘place of honor at the dinner table (p. 154).
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of a 19th century ‘oyster supper’ for the rich. Reproduced in
MacKenzie, 1996, p. 17. Copyright Harry T. Peter Collection of the Museum of the City of New
York.

Within this broad socioeconomic context, oysters were a sign of privilege, central to the life
of the upper class. While workers toiled in the factories, New York’s bourgeoisie celebrated over
dinners and customs in which oysters were bound up in a further array of social practices and
symbolism, helping the emerging bourgeoisie to encase its revels in an increasingly meticulous
array of manners, ‘refinement,’ and ‘taste.’ The wealthy paid for the production of gilded china
plates for serving oysters at dinner parties, which they also displayed in dining rooms. They had
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special ‘oyster forks’ designed for special ‘oyster suppers.’ “As soon as a guest is seated, and has
taken his napkin and bread from his plate,” instructed Lida Seely, the head of a turn-of-thecentury employment agency for domestic servants in New York. Next, she wrote,
The butler puts down on it another on which are oysters, clams, or melon, according to
the season, neatly arranged on a small doily. Oysters and clams should be served on
plates of cracked ice, six or eight on each plate, with a quarter of a lemon in the centre.
Although the former are said to be better if eaten from their deep shell, for formal dinners
they look rather prettier on their flat upper one. The plates should be placed in the plates
already in front of each guest, after the napkins have been lifted. As the butler puts down
the oysters or clams, the footman should follow with a small silver tray on which are
black cayenne, liquid red pepper, and grated horseradish. Brown-bread sandwiches, cut
very thing and spread with unsalted butter, are also handed with this course (quoted in
Kurlansky, 2007, p. 244-246).

The social history, geography and ecology of ‘oyster mania 1’ in New York City and the
East Coast
Behind New York’s ‘great oyster craze’ (MacKenzie, 1996, p.16) lay a vast and complex
social geography and ecology, as well as a way of thinking about and relating to the nonhuman
world that was relatively novel. The center of the New York oyster industry was the south shore
of Staten Island, which in the nineteenth century was known as ‘oyster town.’ As Clute (1877)
states: “By far the most important of the industries of Staten Island is its oyster business, which
is carried on in several parts of this and the neighboring counties, where the sea shores offer the
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proper facilities” (1877, p. 329). Historically, the Raritan Bay –a triangular-shaped body of water
at the southern end of Lower New York Harbor between Staten Island and New Jersey, pictured
in Figure 2.2— was home to massive, miles-long natural reefs so big and ‘plenty’ they formed
obstacles to boats and yet were important to colonists as they yielded a harvest big ‘enough to
supply England’ (Bayles, 1887, p. 706). However, although during this period oysters were
harvested from the Raritan Bay, they did not begin their lives there.
According to New Jersey shellfish biologist and authority on Raritan Bay fisheries Clyde
MacKenzie (1984; 1992), much like the factory farms that dominate the Midwestern United
States, the oysters sold by New York companies were mass-produced in a practice of artificial
farming called ‘bedding.’ An unintended outcome of reef depletion, in effect cleared the
underwater slate, ‘freeing’ companies from limits previously posed by natural reef
agglomerations and ‘paving the way’ for the transformation of oysters into an industrial
economy of scale. The raw materials for this industry were large quantities of juvenile ‘seed’
oysters or “spat’ (larvae) purchased by Staten Island oyster companies from business located
along other waters, in order to plant them in large plots across the empty bottoms (MacKenzie,
1984, p. 35). Each spring companies sent schooners down to Chesapeake Bay to purchase
boatloads of spat (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 35). There, a simple choreography was enacted, as ships
looking to buy identified themselves by hoisting an empty basket up their mast, while, in
response, boats with spat to sell crowded around them, up to 20 at a time, and raised baby oysters
bushel by bushel up to the decks, where they were counted and the bill totaled (MacKenzie,
1984, p. 35). Oysters had their own standard unit of measurement —the bushel, which held 400500 seed oysters and cost $.15-$.35. On average each schooner hauled around 3,000 bushels (at
750 bushels of seed per acre, a schooner-load of 3,000 bushels of seed would cover four acres of
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bottom). Two men hand tonging in good weather could gather 125 bushels of seed in around 6 or
7 hours, and loading a full schooner usually took 2 days (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 41, Kurlansky,
2007, p. 122).
Transactions completed, schooner crews made the two-day trip back to New York ports as
fast as possible, sleeping on the boat and watering seed to keep it alive (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 35).
There, they planted the new ‘crop’ in oyster ‘plantations’ which as bedding industry proliferated,
extended from Tottenville to Prince’s Bay along Staten Island’s south shore (MacKenzie, 1984,
p. 41; Valentine Smith, 1970, p. 149). According to MacKenzie (1984), growers identified
conditions in the Raritan as especially conducive to ‘efficient’ oyster production –high salinity
level, which encouraged large size, diatom and protozoa-rich water for them to feed on, clear bay
floors— and centered their investment efforts there. By the nineteenth century, oyster seed was
imported in ever-larger quantities, with 300,000 bushels of seed imported to Raritan Bay alone in
1880 (p. 30). MacKenzie notes that in the 1850s “investment capital was in the millions of
dollars” (p. 54; Mitchell, 1951, n.p.).
Unlike today, where oyster restoration experts would give anything for a rocky substrate of
shells and reefs (oysters’ main habitats), at this time a barren surface was seen as a positive
thing, a blank canvas to arrange. The basic ‘planting’ process started with boats moving slowly
back and forth, crews used large rakes to methodically and evenly shovel oyster seed onto the
dead beds below. There, unlike wild oysters, which grow on top of each other, they were
“carefully laid out at a comfortable distance so that the shells have room to grow in a round and
ample shape” (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 138) and left to grow until once again harvested and sold.
Until the beds closed in 1925, every March and April “it was a simple transfer from one
Crassostrea virginica bed to another” (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 122). And every September the
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entirety of the spring purchase was harvested and newly grown beds dredged bare for a new
round of planting (Kurlansky, 2007, pp. 173-174).
None of this would have been possible without laws restricting public access to oysters and
water. During the era when the United States government was ‘giving away’ land –taken from
farmers and indigenous tribes— to companies building the first railroads, the city of New York
was awarding ownership over underwater space to oyster companies, which only added to the
disputes and informal practices of harvesting by poor oystermen already underway (MacKenzie,
1992, p. 31). During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries oysters and the waters in which they
lived were increasingly entangled in a growing web of enclosures, regulations, and control as the
city and the businesses it supported created ever-new ways to ensure returns and regulate contact
between people and oysters.7 Most important, the enforcement of a new underwater leasing
system gave oyster companies legal control over underwater plots and reefs. Whereas eighteenth
century reefs had been ‘enclosed’ via residency requirements, territorial demarcation and
stipulations on who could collect or sell oysters removed from existing reefs, in the nineteenth
century, bay waters and reefs themselves were subject to a further and more extensive round of
enclosures in the form of underwater property rights. What began as an informal demarcation of
property —in which companies staked out ‘plots’ of underwater territory with saplings and
declared spat planted between the cuttings their own— was transformed into a state-supported
system of property rights (MacKenzie, 1984 p. 43). Kurlansky notes that “cultivation rapidly
increased following the passage of this legal guarantee” (p. 124), and soon a vast quadrillaged
7

Regulations on contact with oysters did not necessarily originate in attempts to accumulate raw
materials. For example, Kurlansky (2007) describes an early ordinance created by in 1658 the
Dutch council that, at least according to its own description, aimed by curtail reef depletion
(visible just decades after the Dutch arrived) by banning collection of oysters directly at the
shore and requiring people to row out to reefs further off shore (p. 36).
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forest of hemlock saplings attached to 200-pound concrete blocks crisscrossed the bay’s surface,
marking the boundaries of leased plots in an aquatic pre-image of the city grid (see MacKenzie,
1984, p. 43; for the map produced by this assemblage, see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: Map showing Raritan Bay, and the leased oyster beds and commodity routes
that connected Staten Island’s oyster industry to seed suppliers in Virginia and Maryland
during the Gilded Age. From MacKenzie, 1984, p. 45.

This oyster assemblage also required a lot of labor power. The oyster industry was a business
built on mass harvesting and mass sale, and as MacKenzie (1984) recounts, “nearly all families
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in the southern half of [Staten Island] were involved in some phase of oystering, mostly handling
oysters on the beds and ashore” (p. 54). Harvesters were under pressure to collect as many
oysters as possible, as fast as possible. According to Ernest Ingersoll, naturalist commissioned by
the U.S. Fish Commission and Census Bureau to write studies of the shellfish industries of the
eastern coasts of Canada and the U.S., by 1881, "almost innumerable crafts, with trim sails,
crowd the bay on working days" (p. 120). During harvesting season, according to MacKenzie,
“the western end of Raritan Bay was said to have an 'uncountable number of skiffs and sloops
harvesting oysters from the beds amidst a forest of oyster stakes that were so numerous they
were difficult to sail through'” (1984, p. 54). In the second half of the nineteenth century, to
increase the rate of productivity in collection, companies developed new industrial technologies
to increase harvest rates.8 Dredging, for example, was designed to collect as much as possible as
fast as possible, and unconcerned with the environment surrounding oysters, dredging not only
removed every last oyster but all biota surrounding them as well, leaving behind a floor cleared
for the next round of planting (Mackenzie, 1992, p. 32; MacKenzie, 1984, p. 35).
Dredging and bedding produced mass quantities of oysters, and even in the height of the
industry, according to MacKenzie (1984), an oft-heard question was, "who is going to eat all
these oysters?" (p. 38). Thus beyond maximizing productivity, for oyster companies there was
the question of how to ensure the sale of the oysters they produced, which led to new methods of
mass standardization directed at the shape, taste, and texture of oysters themselves. After
customer complaints of finding mud on their plates, processes were attempted to inflate oysters’
value. Oyster companies developed the technique of ‘drinking’ or ‘fattening,’ that is, to ‘give
8

Hand gathering was replaced by dredging, sloops were converted to run on gas engines
(replacing wind) and equipped with power hoists (replacing physical labor to retrieve dredges)
(MacKenzie, 1992, p. 61; MacKenzie 1984, p. 47; Kurlansky, 2007, p. 249).
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them a drink,’ oysters were spread out on floats in the shallow waters of Lemon Creek or
Mariner’s Harbor, as well as the Passaic and Hackensack rivers, where they sat for a day getting
washed of mud, fattened by a third in volume through absorption of brackish water, whitened in
color and made milder in flavor (MacKenzie 1984, p. 58). And to create consumer desire, each
September oyster companies choreographed the opening of ‘oyster season’ into a spectacular
event via advertising blitzes and the decoration of oyster barges with American flag banners
along the waterfront (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 174).
As mentioned above, the growth of the oyster industry was coincident with a time of intense
class polarization in New York City, in which the city’s bourgeoisie emerged as a distinct and
self-conscious class (Beckert, 2003). According to historian Sven Beckert, in 1890, 1,103 of the
4,074 millionaires in the United States lived in New York City, and the numbers of the merely
rich were growing as well. On the other hand, the working class was also growing in size and
consciousness. The oyster industry reproduced this polarization, with, on one side, the
emergence of an oyster ‘elite,’ and, on the other, oyster workers. The elite, according to Mitchell,
was ‘dominated by old-settler Staten Island families,’ and, according to Valentine Smith (p.
150), during the mid-1800s, investment capital in Staten Island’s oyster industry was in the
millions. According to MacKenzie (1984), for a while, “the richest Staten Islanders were
oystermen” (p. 54), who, as New York journalist Joseph Mitchell (1951) describes, “put their
money in waterfront real estate… named streets after themselves, and… built big, showy
wooden mansions” (p. 38). ‘Captain’s Row,’ on Shore Road running through Port Richmond to
Mariner’s Harbor, was lined with such mansions adorned with “massive columns, spiraling
stairways, and intricate wooden or iron embellishments” (Valentine Smith, 1970, p. 150).
Families like the Tottens —which made its fortune in the shipbuilding and oystering industries—
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named streets (Totten Street, now Main Street) — and whole towns –Tottenville, 1869— after
themselves (Shepard, 2010; Mitchell, 1951, n.p.). A group of self-described ‘industrious,’
‘enterprising’ men made ‘fortunes’ off the business, through increasing both the productivity of
oysters and the workers harvesting them (Mitchell, 1951, n.p.).9
At every step, the oyster industry was made possible by a workforce hired seasonally and
employed for around eight months out of the year –‘oyster season’— to harvest and plant, fatten
and optimize, sort and cull, transport and load, clean and sell oysters. Workers were expected to
be strong and efficient, because the work was physical and intensive, much of it done by hand,
and required workers to be in the water during cold winter months.10 In the same way that
oysters were ‘optimized’ to maximize their value, so were the bodies of the men who toiled on
the boats, the reefs, and the stalls transformed into machines in which muscular labor power and
speed were what mattered. Oyster carriers were paid according to the number of oysters they
carried, and good shuckers were expected to open an oyster every three seconds. An industrious
carrier might make $30 a week and haul 30,000 oysters, while a skilled shucker working ten hour
days at $.10 per 1,000 oysters, might open thousands of oysters per week and make around $30
(Kurlansky, 2007, p. 180, 183). After fattening, harvesters filled boats to capacity and sailed to
the shore of lower Manhattan, where they anchored along the Hudson and East rivers and
unloaded the stock onto large 2-story barges, designed to make room for large-scale processing
and ‘conducting business’ (Kurlanksy, 2007, p. 173). On these barges —which, according to
Chiarappa (2007) were often described as “a little ship or factory or whatever it is” (p. 87)—
oysters were, as shown in Figure 2.3, processed, graded, sorted by size, and packaged for

9

For a few examples of these enterprising men, see Edwards & Critten, 1885, pp. 212-216.
For detailed description of oyster laboring and weather, see MacKenzie, 1984, p. 38
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wholesale (MacKenzie, 1984, pp. 31-34; Kurlansky, p. 172, 175). Optimized spat plantings and
optimized laboring bodies were two sides of the same order.

Figure 2.3: Photograph of workers shucking oysters in a New York City barge, circa 1890.
Copyright: Getty Images.

This class stratification was embodied in the places open for oyster consumption that covered
the city at a time of an exploding population (Beckert, p. 47, p. 146). Unlike the upscale oyster
dinners of the wealthy described earlier, for the city’s working class, primarily immigrants who
made up the majority of that number, oysters were sold in cellars, saloons, carts, and
lunch-rooms across the city, where they were sold cheaply and quickly (Lobel, 2010, p. 214;
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Kurlansky, 2007, p. 112). While at the outset of industrial New York, workers lived near their
work places and often returned home for lunch, by the mid-1800s this density had been broken
up and working class neighborhoods moved further from the work place, leaving little time for
workers to return home on short lunch breaks (Lobel, 2010). ‘Fast food’ —eaten quickly, on the
spot or to go— emerged as the form of eating proper to this situation. According to food
historian Cindy Lobel (2010), “the oyster cellars of antebellum New York were that era’s
counterpart to today’s pizza parlors” (p. 214). Served fast and eaten fast, according to design
historian Andrew Gardner (2014), during lunchtime rush the stands were frequented not only by
workers but also ‘busy’ stock traders and businessmen. Foreshadowing today’s all-you-can-eat
buffets, many oyster cellars advertised a six-cent all-you-can-eat oyster special (Kurlansky,
2007, p. 112). Often combined with brothels and bars, cellars were also working class hangouts,
which, as seen through New York Tribute reporter George G. Foster’s eyes, were places where
“men and women enter promiscuously, eat, drink and make merry, and disturb the whole
neighborhood with their obscene and disgusting revels, prolonged far beyond midnight” (quoted
in Kurlansky, 2007, p. 161).
Oysters were part of a larger assemblage, itself the sum of these different geographical and
social elements, a local and trans-local assemblage stretching out nationally and internationally
via railway lines and barges. In addition to a large local market, during the nineteenth century the
New York oyster industry was also the main exporter of oysters nationally and internationally.
Every day, oysters were packed in bushels or cans and sent out on barges or train cars alongside
other ‘freight’ –“agricultural produce, coal, lumber, brick, stone and other commodities”— for
sale in Midwestern and Western markets, and in metropolitan centers abroad like London and
Paris (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 38; see also Kurlansky, 2007; p. 132-133). The speed and frequency
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with which oysters were shipped long distance grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century
with the construction of transportation infrastructures, like the intercontinental railroad which by
1869 made it possible to circumvent limits previously set on barges by freezing rivers and open
up year-round sale of oysters across the western United States (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 63).

Nature as object and commodity
New York’s nineteenth and twentieth century ‘oyster mania’ was not however just a set of
material relations. It also implied ways of thinking, and a relation to being –both of which were
produced simultaneous with the assemblage. Oysters were valued, and brought into existence, in
so far as they were productive, generated value, and indeed were ‘disciplined’ to conform to the
traits asked of them. As with so many other things —apples, tomatoes, houses— during this
period the appearance of symmetry, perfection, and regularity became standards for oysters
(Spiekermann, 2011). ‘Wild’ oysters can live up to 20 years, grow up to a foot long in
asymmetrical shapes, and, as seen in Figure 2.3, cluster together in muddy globs, covered in a
gooey mixture of barnacles, worms, and grass which share their life (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 18;
Brooks, 1996, p. 21). However, according to Kurlanksy (2007) the most ‘marketable’ oysters
were those that matured rapidly, into plump, pale, and mild, standardized symmetrical forms (p.
138).11 Like so many other industries, oyster companies thus calibrated precise ways of
producing ‘standardized’ oysters, streamlining their growth timeline to produce ‘pleasing’ sizes
(3-4 inches) and ‘fattening’ them with water to make their taste milder and their size more
11

By most accounts large oysters were not considered ‘marketable’ not only because waiting 12
years for a profitable return is not profitable (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 138), but also, as one account
describes, eating a foot-long oyster was “like eating a baby” (Thackeray, cited by Kurlansky,
2007, p. 154).
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‘plump’ (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 138-139; MacKenzie, Jr., 1984, pp. 49-50). As part of this process,
workers were employed to remove any trace of the oysters’ lifeworld— to dilute the taste of salt
water, rinse off mud, separate oysters from each other, and scrub off any biota still clinging to
the shells.12

Figure 2.4: Photograph showing oysters as they look straight out of the water, covered in
barnacles and other biota. Source: Getty.

12

As in the processes of ‘proletarianization’ that removed human beings from lands,
knowledges, skills, and practices, reinserting them into a world of wage labor (Thompson, 1980),
so too did the processes described above give concrete reality to the then-ascendant notion that
the world was composed of isolated objects or atoms, by relentlessly denying the fact that nature
is not an isolated object. I discuss this view of the world at more length in Chapters 5 and 6.
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In this way oysters were literally stripped of their ‘world,’ and transformed into objects, a
stockpile of resources to be exploited and that could subsequently be measured for size and
quality, counted for price, exchanged via money for mansions, and shipped out alongside other
freight across the country.13 “One could,” notes Chiarappa, “scarcely overlook the structural
similarities between oyster barges and those hauling sand, hay, and coal” (2007, p. 88). This is
how early colonists saw the wild reefs around Staten Island, as supplying “constant fresh
victuals” (Bayles, 1887, p. 705)—in seventeenth century British settlers used the promise of
oyster abundance to advertise the region of south Staten Island for colonization: “there is
abundance of brave oysters;” “great plenty and easy to take;” “oysters, I think, would serve all
England” (Bayles, 1887, p. 706). The treatment of oysters was not dissimilar from that of clay
(for bricks), forests (for paper), cows (for food), and people (for labor). Oysters were seen as
objects, not part of a life cycle or connected to their surroundings. Rather than becoming the
basis for new life, a hard surface for new larvae to attach, as they had for millennia, discarded
shells of were instead used as inputs for a host of other industrial processes. As shown in Figure
2.5, shells were ground, burned, and sold to industry farms to neutralize acidic soil or fed hens,
crushed and used as mortar to construct walls and buildings or to fill in entire streets (Ingersoll,
1887; see also Kurlansky, 2007, p. 79-81; Waldman, 1999, pp. 41-42; MacKenzie, 1984, p. 49).

13

This is what Karl Marx (1993) called ‘real abstraction,’ the process of transforming things that
are qualitatively not commensurable into quantitatively commensurable objects or commodities.
On ‘real abstraction,’ see Sohn-Rethel, 1972.
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Figure 2.5: Oyster shells were burned and ground up to make lime. Image from the turn of
the century shows a 5-story shell pile outside Virginia oyster packing plant J.S. Darling & Sons.
Copyright Norfolk Public Library.

Over the years nature and the natural surroundings around New York had been many things
to many people. But during the nineteen and twentieth centuries, New York’s waterways and
natures were increasingly seen as a resource to be used, a ‘surrounds’ with which inhabitants
were connected only to harvest, extract, or dump on its resources (Gandy, 2003). Nature was also
seen as a source of disorder, and many efforts were made to tame, discipline, organize, or
exterminate the unruliness it posed (Gandy, 2003). A source of caloric intake for workers, a
source of symbolic status and profit for the rich, cargo to load for workers: abstracted from their
surrounds, oysters became a raw material to be shaped and used at will by the city’s companies
who gave little thought to the connections and worlds from which they came. As a New Yorkbased oyster export company from this period marveled, “the field may be said to be illimitable”
(Edwards & Critten, 1885, p. 246). This sentiment was not just that of a greedy oyster baron but
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evocative more broadly of the scientific-technological ethos that dominated life and its horizon
of possibility in industrial America (Gandy, 2003). The idea that Man’s field of action was
unlimited, and that, whatever the obstacles, such action would generate a future unfolding of
increasing ‘progress’ and ‘order’—such was the humanist ethos of civilization within which
oysters were brought to presence in the Gilded Age and that became hegemonic in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries in American cities.

Holding it all together
For all its semblance of order and civilization, this assemblage was also always on the verge
of falling apart, at the hands of threats both human and nonhuman. Making things into
commodities does not just happen overnight, after all, and it is one thing to call oysters a
commodity, but another to convince people to buy something they can freely access on their
own, as was once the case along NYC shores (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 36; 75). Early colonial
attempts to sell oysters were, in fact, a failure. In the early 1600s, according to Kurlansky (2007),
oysters were so abundant and accessible that people could easily take them themselves, and
barely anyone would pay them (p. 36). In addition, due to intensive colonial harvesting, forest
clearing, and agricultural plowing erosion increased and buried oysters in layers of mud,
suffocating adult and larvae alike (MacKenzie, 1992). By the early 1800s, all the large reefs
around Staten Island were depleted and the bottoms were transformed into ‘barren deserts’ after
less than 200 years of colonial habitation (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 121). Undeterred, the industry
countered such depletion through the use of science; through the ‘newfound powers’ of modern
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science, “man’s proclivity for destroying [oysters] was countered by the ability to re-create
them” (p. 121).
When yields were burgeoning, guarding and governing the beds was often precarious.
Despite the putting into place of property rights and legal restrictions, non-residents —often the
workers on boats, deck hands, dredgers, and skiffers from New Jersey— circumvented residency
laws by borrowing the boats of residents and using them to collect oysters to bring back to New
Jersey (New York State, 1917, p. 89). And as MacKenzie (1992) recounts, poorer leaseholders,
usually from New Jersey side of the bay, and those with no lease at all, would, at night, collect
from the beds of the wealthy in New York to plant in their own beds or to sell in the city; during
low tide, poor people would wade out to the beds and raked up oysters to eat at home (p. 71). In
response, across the bay in Keyport, NJ, in 1882 oyster planters formed a voluntary protective
association "to provide a collective means of policing the beds from oyster pirates. The
association maintained at least one watch boat on the beds every night to scare off pirates"
(MacKenzie, 1992, p. 71). Other companies hired watchmen to sit in boats anchored to the beds
all night (Mackenzie, 1992, p.78).14
The problem was not just humans. Nature, such as black drum fish, which ate oysters, and
severe storms, which at times buried whole reefs in thick layers of mud, was a threat as well
(MacKenzie, 1984, p. 43). Starfish and oyster drills were other main enemies of the oyster
industry. Starfish wrap their five points around the oyster, project their stomachs out of their
small mouths, and eat the oyster whole. Oystermen were often enraged by starfish, and when
14

As with all of capital’s ‘first encounters,’ the first capitalists on Staten Island entered an
existing situation, with its own practices and landscape, which, if their world was going to be
born, had to be transformed. People had to be trained to buy things, to think of nature as
something that could be bought and sold. This could have not happened! And indeed took a lot
of work.
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they found them would grab the creatures and rip them into pieces (not realizing of course that
when torn into pieces they simply regenerate and form as many new starfish as there were pieces
(MacKenzie, 1984, p. 43). Predatory sea snails also pose a threat to oysters, due to their
proclivity for drilling holes right through the oyster shell, and sucking the oysters out
(MacKenzie, 1984, p. 43).
But perhaps the greatest nonhuman threat to the oyster industry came from humans again. In
the early 1900s, New Yorkers started getting sick with typhoid fever (Mitchell, 1951, p. 39). By
1900, people had become suspicious of oysters, and began wondering if disease outbreaks were
linked to them. During the summer of 1916, it was confirmed by newspaper reporters that
typhoid fever was being contracted from oysters “bedded on West Bank Shoal, in the Lower
Bay, and it was found that sewage from a huge New Jersey trunk sewer whose outfall is at the
confluence of the Kill van Kull and the Upper Bay was being swept through the Narrows and
over all the beds by the tides” (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 55). By 1915, cases of typhoid fever,
cholera, hepatitis A and B, and other intestinal diseases from eating Raritan oysters sent patients
“hustled off to ghastly isolation hospitals on the harbor's disease islands” (Kornblum, 2002, p.
124; see also MacKenzie, 1984, p. 48). Over 150 people died and 15,000 became sick in a 1918
typhoid outbreak linked to eating shellfish from Raritan Bay (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 55).
While companies did not consider things connected in this time, they obviously were: At the
same time that Lida Seely was writing about manners —at the same time that oyster companies
were extracting over 1.4 billion oysters a year out of the bay, shipping them live to national and
international markets— 600 million gallons a day of raw sewage were being dumped into New
York waterways (Waldman, 1999, p. 83). According to New York Harbor expert and biologist
John Waldman (1999), historically raw sewage was dumped directly on top of most historic
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oyster beds, in effect replacing oysters with black ‘muck’ (p. 153). These were the same waters
in which oysters were farmed, and the waterways where planters ‘drank’ them were among the
most polluted in the region. According to MacKenzie, the oyster may have absorbed the strain
while they were being ‘fattened’ on floats in Lemon, Keyport and Rahway Creeks, Mariners
Harbor, and next to the oyster barges (1984, p. 55). Unmindful or unaware of the fact that when
oysters take in water, they also filter it, retaining toxins and particles while releasing clean water,
meaning oysters for sale were storehouses of toxins (Brooks, 1996, p. 14).
After the 1918 outbreak, oyster harvesting in the bay was temporarily closed and reopened
several times. With oysters identified as disease vectors, the New York City Department of
Health condemned one bed after another. The last remaining city plots in the Raritan were closed
in 1925, marking the ‘death’ of this formation, and with it, the oyster. By the 1920s, the industry
that decades earlier had birthed oyster millionaires was completely finished—marking the
second wave of depletion for oysters in the Raritan. As MacKenzie (1984) eloquently recounts,
“negative publicity caused the oyster wholesalers to abandon the Raritan Bay oyster industry
since they were reluctant to assume the financial risk for building boats and buying Chesapeake
Bay seed oysters. The industry limped along, threatened by pollution scares, until about 1925
when it more or less closed down” (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 55; see also Greenberg, 2014a, p. 34;
Waldman, 1999, p. 42). In this case, the oysters literally poisoned the order they had been
enrolled to support. And an order that prided itself on its ability to control the world was actually
far from it. The very way of thinking about nature as ‘object’ –forgetting what it does, and how
things are connected (both the oyster’s drinking, and how dumping waste into the water connects
to other natural cycles)— undermined the conditions in which oysters could be understood and
valued in this way.
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Genealogical vs. linear history
For all the power of this formation during its heyday, it is important to emphasize that the
oysters of the nineteenth century oyster industry have nothing to do with the oysters being
‘assembled’ today. The former oysters are dead —they died when their ‘world’ and its
conditions died, casualties of the “twentieth century oyster apocalypse” (Greenberg, 2014a, p.
56). Infrastructural oysters will be altogether different creatures, part of a different assemblage of
other conditions and other processes, which I explore in the following chapters. If that is the case
–if there is no continuous history of oysters, no biological or metaphysical ‘cord’ connecting
them throughout time; if oyster-tecture literally has nothing to do with past oysters, and could
easily be grown anywhere given the right conditions— why bother, then, looking at this past
oyster ‘assemblage,’ as I have just done? What is the purpose of returning to history? It depends
on what we mean by ‘history’ and how we approach it.
Many historians have written about oysters, and many books on oysters in NYC also exist.
There are, for example, several historical accounts of New York City oysters— of which Mark
Kurlanksy’s (2007) History on the Half Shell, which I cited extensively in the above pages, is
exemplary. There are even greater numbers of biological studies of oysters, including Samuel
Lockwood’s 1874 natural history of the oyster, as well as treatises on oysters as cultural artifact,
like literary historian Rebecca Stott’s 2004 cultural history, The Oyster. Despite their obvious
differences, these histories share the same underlying assumption that there exists such a thing as
‘The Oyster’ (as oysters are frequently referred to), a single creature with a single (biological,
spiritual, or physical) essence. What these stories then do is actually generate that creature, by

44

telling stories of its ongoing adventures throughout time and space – The Oyster in ancient
Rome, The Oyster in industrial NYC—or by recounting its essential traits –‘bivalve,’ ‘filter
feeder,’ ‘ecosystems service provider’ ‘stock,’ ‘protein source,’ ‘aphrodisiac’ (e.g., Stott, p. 3454). In these stories, even if the culture around oysters or even the taste of oysters is constantly
changing, something of oysters themselves seems to remain essentially the same, making it
possible to speak about them across great distances in space and time. It is as if there were, off in
some other sphere of reality —a more ‘true’ world as Nietzsche (1998) would say— a ‘pure’
oyster form existing separately from this world in which oysters actually appear and serving as
the origin for and link between the latter’s many polymorphous appearances therein.
As explained in Chapter 1 via discussion of Martin Heidegger’s (1962/2008)
phenomenological method, in this dissertation I am taking a different approach. Following
Michel Foucault (1977) —whose work echoed that of Heidegger as well as the latter’s own
inspiration, nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche— methodologically I
begin from the assumption that there is no one essence or meaning of a being. Rather, ‘essence’
or ‘meaning’ are themselves found in the way a being appears differently in space and time —
and not some fantastical prior origin, transcendent ground, or fate. From this perspective, as hard
as we might try, we can never dig down to The Oyster behind its various manifestations. Oysters
were not ‘Crassostrea virginica’ for the Lenape and Raritan Indians who had inhabited Staten
Island before European colonization (Grumet, 1989). This is not only because Latin taxonomic
classification was only invented in the eighteenth century, but also because oysters simply had
entirely other meanings and entirely other uses in other times and places (i.e., burial, snacks,
weapons (Kurlansky, p. 16, p. 37; Hitakonanu’laxk, 1994; see also Kraft, 1977, 1986). And, as
noted in the beginning of this chapter, while today oysters are celebrated as ecosystems services
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providers and keystone species, no one, in oyster industry, cared about the relations oysters
engaged in, but were concerned with optimizing their price, taste, and quantity. In that web of
meaning and practice, a specific oyster emerged. ‘That’ oyster ‘was,’ in and of the boats
transporting it from Chesapeake Bay to Staten Island ports, bushel baskets, notions of Man and
Nature, ways of counting, porcelain dinner plates, digestive tracts of the rich as well as poor, the
rocky substrate and the brackish waters. In and through those conditions, ‘the oyster’ became
what it ‘was’ –a commodity, an object of consumption, a supply of resources.
This view of reality implies a corresponding method of research, what Foucault (1977) called
‘genealogy.’ Genealogy is a way of studying a given formation —whether a body, geosocial
formation, or thought— in which what is looked for are a formation’s conditions of possibility
and emergence, in order to understand it as the appearance of something new in the world.
Rather than a linear history that shows the progressive development of something that already
exists, a long punctuated line that continues forever, genealogy pays attention to discontinuous
assemblages as they come together in space and time, how they hold and are held together for a
while, and how they collapse. Rather than beings themselves, what it tracks are the composites of
meaning, technique, bodies or words —the ‘worlds,’ to put it simply— in which beings are
born, and in which, someday, they all die.
Just as there is no ‘Being’ behind beings, the genealogical method also rejects the idea that
history is unfolding according to a single plan or telos. What Foucault shows is how the
‘formations’ that to us may seem so stable were in fact born of the accidents, coincidences or
crises of history, as much as they may have been the product of conscious human intentions
(1977; 1980a). While it is true, for example that the objectification of oysters occurred due to the
strategic attempts by capitalists to accumulate profit, it is also true that the oyster’s becoming an
46

object happened due to other actions with different origins. Illustrating the former, as we have
seen, some reef enclosure happened because companies sought a monopoly on beds so they
could harvest them relentlessly without interference from poor people. But illustrating the latter,
other enclosures were enacted to conserve oysters and only secondarily had the effect of
separating people from them.
Thus what is important here is not the ‘elements’ themselves—oysters, boats, men, sand—
but that they come together, and how they come together. What matters, as Foucault’s student
Althusser (2006) put it, is the conjunction, the encounter, itself—not the ‘things.’ That which
history usually takes as its starting point –‘things’ (beings, bodies, animals, rocks)— in fact
become what they are –become meaningful— only in and through the ‘encounter’ and the world
it inaugurates. These ‘encounters’ are contingent. They did not have to happen. And the fact that
they did, does not mean they will endure. They might not ‘happen’ any more. “Every encounter
is aleatory,” Althusser writes, “not only in its origins (nothing ever guarantees an encounter), but
also in its effects…nothing in the elements of the encounter prefigures, before the actual
encounter, the contours and determinations of the being that will emerge from it” (Althusser, p.
193). This perspective can be used to look at history, as I have done here, but also, as I do in
coming chapters, to study the emergence of new forms of meaning in the present.
It is with this method in mind that I have sketched this historical ‘snapshot,’ which I consider
useful to the dissertation in two ways. First and foremost, returning to the oyster industry allows
us to see the truly novel quality of the present. Looking at an earlier moment in which oysters
were related to in a completely different way, within a completely different assemblage, helps us
see just how new today’s oyster and its world is. In this assemblage, oysters were never thought
about in terms of what they did, but only in terms of what they were: commodities and objects.
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Despite the fact that oysters were enmeshed in an expanding network of practices, transportation
routes, and exchange, during this assemblage there was no conception of oysters in terms of their
relations—no one cared about this, or even noticed it, save for setting up the networks to
facilitate the sale of oysters across ever-greater distances. What did matter when it came to
oysters –what made them ‘valuable’— was their size, texture and taste, the social status they
helped signify.
Second, the oyster industry stands in as a ‘snapshot’ of the broader metaphysics of order and
disorder that, in chapter 6, I call ‘Anthropocene 1.’ The importance of this will become clearer as
the dissertation proceeds, in particular in chapter 6.

Conclusion
For all its fanfare, ‘oyster mania’ lasted only a few decades, a blip on the radar. Today the
only remaining traces of the once-booming industry are spectral: "place names for oysters,
pearls, and conches,” (Jackson, et al., 2001), “conjure up other ecological ghosts of marine
invertebrates that were once so abundant as to pose hazards to navigation, but are witnessed now
only by massive garbage heaps of empty shells” (p. 629). “Nowadays,” writes Mitchell, “in
deepening and widening Ambrose Channel, Chapel Hill Channel, Swash Channel, and other ship
channels in the Lower Bay, dredges occasionally dig up the tube-worm-incrusted stumps of old
boundary poles” (1951, n.p.). Men, some grandsons of the former bed owners, occasionally
sneak out at night to harvest the surviving remains of outlawed reefs, whose oysters they
describe as now tasting like copper (Mitchell, 1951, n.p.). In most places the Raritan is often
covered in algae blooms and oil slicks, its sides flattened or walled, its floor covered in ten or
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more feet of toxic hypoxic mud and silt (Waldman, 1999; USACE & PANYNJ, 2009).
Meanwhile, on land south Staten Island is a patchwork of scars that trace the twentieth century.
Mile after mile of highway, seven lanes wide in each direction, cuts across the island. To the
west, smoke stacks rise from oil processing plants on the New Jersey side of the water. To the
east, a park turned solar energy plant covers thousands of acres of landfill. The smell of burning
plastic wafts through the air, and graffiti covers disused industrial control structures. Alongside
these sit ghost shipyards, a tangle of strip malls, and cheap mixed martial arts gyms. As for the
oyster millionaires, Mitchell (1951) writes:
A half dozen [oyster] mansions still stand in a blighted neighborhood in Mariner's
Harbor, in among refineries and coal tipples and junkyards. One has a widow's walk, two
have tall fluted columns, all have oddly shaped gables, and all are decorated with scrollsaw work. They overlook one of the oiliest and gummiest stretches of the Kill van Kull.
On the south shore, in the sassafras barrens west of Prince's Bay, there are three more of
these mansions, all empty. Their fanlights are broken, their shutters swag, and their yards
are a tangle of weeds and vines and overturned birdbaths and dead pear trees (n.p.).
The ostentatious home built by the Seguine oyster family is also abandoned—save for a large
group of enormous, vividly colored peacocks, who have made themselves at home in the
mansion’s porches, gables, and rotting gardens. The oysters of ‘oyster mania 1’ are, in other
words, dead. They died when their ‘world’ and its conditions died. Infrastructural oysters will be
altogether different creatures, part of a different assemblage of other conditions and other
processes, which I explore in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3: Reimagining Oysters
Hurricane Sandy was a watershed event for New York City and Long Island,
revealing the vulnerabilities of our infrastructure. (Brookhaven National
Laboratory Director Doon Gibbs, cited in City of New York, 2015, n.p.)

Hurricane Sandy brought New Yorkers face to face with our changing climate,
and showed us that the future is now. (City of New York, April 30, 2015)

A new ‘oyster mania’
The last several years have seen a veritable deluge of oyster-themed articles and projects
around the city. In 2013 alone, the New York Times (NYT) printed at least three pieces on oysters,
each of which intermixed romanticized and rustic close ups of oyster shells, scornful accounts of
industrialization’s devastation of NYC’s waterways, the rediscovery of the city’s great oyster
past, and the urgent need to bring back the ‘tenacious’ little bivalves (Quenqua, 2013; Fountain,
2013; Hu, 2013). Attempting to do this, restoration groups like NY/NJ Baykeepers and the
Billion Oyster Project have launched small-scale experiments in growing oysters along the city’s
docks, piers, and schools to see if it is possible to grow oysters in the area’s polluted waters.
There is a film (Driscoll, 2012), there are oyster festivals, and there is the New York Harbor
School, a high school whose curriculum centers on the Billion Oyster Project, where Google
sends office trust building trips, where volunteers come out to shovel shells and build cages for
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the charismatic bivalves.15 This renewed ‘oyster mania’ is also underway in the now-ubiquitous
oyster barns/bars that line the streets of gentrified neighborhoods like Williamsburg, Brooklyn,
where office coworkers crowd together under the dim lighting of Edison bulbs and chalkboard
signs advertising $1 oyster happy hour. While the neo-Victoriana aesthetic in this new ‘oyster
mania’ recalls the New York’s oyster ‘golden age,’ the current oyster fixation is not an attempt
to restart the dead oyster industry.16 As we have seen, oysters growing in New York City waters
are toxic, and it is illegal to harvest or sell them. Today, no oysters served in the city’s many
oyster bars come from New York waters, but are more likely shipped in from remote farms in
Maine, Long Island, Virginia, Cape Cod, or the Pacific Northwest.
At the heart of the new ‘oyster mania’ is a new vision based on the idea that oysters have
valuable capacities or services that can be ‘harnessed’ and put to use to help remediate parts of
the city (Oyster Restoration Research Project; 2013, p. 4; Coen, et al., 2011; Coen, et al., 2007;
Orff, 2010).17 Along these lines, for some years now oysters have been reimagined as a vital part
of a future ‘green’ NYC, hailed as a means of ecological remediation and couched in an aesthetic
of old-timey life styles connected to the harvest and consumption of ocean resources. One of the
first public displays of this vision, entitled ‘Oyster-tecture,’ was launched at the Museum of
Modern Art’s 2010 Rising Currents exhibition, which featured ‘soft’ architectural responses to
rising sea levels, infrastructural obsolescence, and the desire to reconnect NYC with its harbor
(installation view shown in Figure 3.1).18 The plan was projected for the Gowanus Canal
15

See Oyster Week, 2016. The Billion Oyster Project (BOP) is an NYC organization whose goal
is to restore one billion live oysters to NY Harbor. I discuss BOP again in Chapter 4.
16
The Gilded Era aesthetic is likely also related to what the New York Times has proclaimed a
gilded age revival, aestheticized attempts to grasp at a vanished past in which, unlike today,
things seemed ‘solid’ (Perrottet, 2015).
17
For a genealogical study of ecosystem services, see Nelson, 2014.
18
For further discussion of Rising Currents, see Braun (2014).
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Superfund site adjacent to Brooklyn’s Red Hook neighborhood, designed by the landscape firm
SCAPE.19 Set against a post-industrial backdrop of new condos, renovated warehouses and water
taxi stations, SCAPE’s design delegated to oysters the role of cleaning polluted waterways,
enabling the growth of other marine life, and buffering the shores of Red Hook from occasional
high water.20

Figure 3.1: Installation view of ‘ZONE 4: Oyster-Tecture’ exhibition at the Museum of
Modern Art, New York, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.scapestudio.com/projects/oystertecture/. Copyright 2010 SCAPE/Landscape Architecture PLLC.

19

Designer Kate Orff first proposed ‘oyster-tecture’ in Nordenson, et al., 2010.
On ‘creative class,’ see Florida, 2003; on green gentrification, see Gould and Lewis, 2011; on
NYC gentrification, see Zukin, 1987; Smith, 1996; on park restoration as “aesthetic veneer for
the processes of gentriﬁcation of the contemporary city,” see Gandy 2003, p. 1026.

20
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What dominated the exhibition was the ‘reef-culture’ oysters helped facilitate: rehabilitating
a former wasteland via water-based localism, forgotten arts of oyster grilling, boardwalk jogs
alongside new reefs and wetlands, and a ‘Soong Shuck Shack’ advertising oyster po' boys and
Sixpoint Sweet Action beer (see Figure 3.2).21 In sharp contrast to the urban order we saw in the
previous chapter, instead of trying to excise nature from the city, the MOMA exhibition imaged
oyster-tecture as a means to reconnect the city with nature, as part of an affluent, green, postindustrial urbanism, “a blue-green watery park for the next watery century, so get your TEVAs
on!” (Orff, 2010). The message to urban dwellers was a call to rediscover nature through the
presence of oysters reimagined as cute and friendly. Exhibit boards designed oyster garden cages
attached to the underside of recreational boardwalks, up close and accessible to joggers and
families –the imagined residents of this green enclave— curious to get to know the ‘tenacious
bivalves.’ Annual oyster FLUPSY parades were imagined, ritualistic processions of baby oysterfilled floats to the nearby Bay Ridge Flats (Orff, 2011, p. 91; for parade, see Figure 3.3).22
Connecting with the city’s other water-overwhelmed systems, the exhibition depicted
AUTOCAD figures watering shoreline gardens with sewer overflow. Oysters were imagined as a
kind of purge and penitence: maybe the crowded, toxic city itself could be cleansed with nature,
using oysters as ‘re-mediators’ to facilitate the water's re-entrance, helping urban dwellers
rediscover nature and themselves in the process. Most likely, an additional layer of prospect
played into the process as well, one that would help make trendy a new area, and support other
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Bergdoll & Opeenheimer 2010, p. 90; on spaces of conspicuous consumption and urban
development, see Gandy, 2003; on class differentiation by presence of green space see also
Heynen, 2003.
22
FLUPSY is short for ‘Floating Upwelling System,’ a baby oyster nursery (Bergdoll, p. 90).
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kinds of investment and habitation, increasing property values and so on.23 Perhaps the
nineteenth and twentieth century treatment of nature (exemplified in Chapter 2) could be atoned
for, cleansed, using oysters in a large-scale cleanse. “By 2050,” SCAPE lead architect Kate Orff
(2010) had even hopefully proclaimed, “maybe you can ‘sink your teeth into a Gowanus oyster’”
(09:12). Above all what this vision imagined was a city in which things might still be ‘okay,’
with oysters helping usher in what designers imagined as “a more sustainable, a more livable,
and a more delicious future” (Orff, 2010, 09:30).24

23

The term ‘spatial fix’ refers to geographer David Harvey’s explanation for the way that capital
temporarily tries to resolve the contradictions inherent to its accumulation process by
transforming space and the built environment. For more on this concept, see Harvey 2003. For a
discussion of sustainable urban parks as ‘spatial fix,’ see Birge-Liberman, 2010.
24
‘Oyster-tecture’ could certainly be seen as another example of what Birge-Liberman (2010)
has identified as the widespread phenomenon of using sustainability in parks and other kinds of
urban restoration as a ‘spatial fix’ and a form of marketing that effectively covers over the class
conflicts that actually define urban life.” As he writes, “The sustainable park is merely part of the
post-industrial, urban spectacle, and the park is ‘reduced to the play of pure imagery’ used to
market ‘leisure-time lifestyles’ and commodify urban space” (p. 1401). For more on green
urbanism as a means of capital accumulation, see Caprotti, 2014. On ‘ecological enclaves,’ see
Hodson & Marvin, 2010.
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Figure 3.2. Mockup of the ‘reef culture’ imagined by design firm SCAPE as part of their
2010 ‘Oyster-Tecture’ exhibition. Retrieved from http://www.scapestudio.com/projects/oystertecture/. Copyright 2010 SCAPE/Landscape Architecture PLLC.
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Figure 3.3. FLUPSY parade mock-up from 2010 ‘Oyster-Tecture’ exhibition. Retrieved
from http://www.scapestudio.com/projects/oyster-tecture/. Copyright 2010 SCAPE/Landscape
Architecture PLLC.
Hurricane Sandy
All this would change after Hurricane Sandy hit New York in the fall of 2012. Were it not for
the storm, oyster-tecture might have remained one idea amongst millions on a shelf. The storm
and its treatment after the fact generated a climate of urgency and set in motion a widespread
search for solutions, in response to which oysters were again reimagined, this time as a solution
to the problem of governing risk in a new age of crisis.
When Sandy struck New York City on October 29, 2012, it brought record 13.88 foot storm
surges heaving over coastal walls, propelling water into the city’s streets, submerging cars and,
as shown in Figure 3.4, filling underground subway tunnels with corrosive salt water (Duke,
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2012, n.p.). Swelling from New York Harbor and Long Island Sound brought crushing walls of
water, drowning entire neighborhoods, and destroying beaches and boardwalks, as the waves
tore houses off their foundations and hurled boats into trees. Manhattan was plunged into
darkness, especially south of 39th Street, along with many other parts of the city as the storm left
the majority of the boroughs in blackouts for days (De Chant, 2012). In what Metropolitan
Transportation Authority chairman Joseph J. Lhota named the “worst disaster in the subway’s
history,” the city’s subway system was shut down for days (as cited by NYT, 2012, October
28).25 Sandy caused $19 billion in economic damage to NYC, while spreading $71.4 billion of
economic destruction across the Tri-state area (City of New York, 2012, p. 11; NOAA, 2015).
More than 43 people died, with 23 dead in Staten Island’s coastal neighborhoods alone (City of
New York, 2013, pp. 13-14). While local electrical utility Con Edison brought in manpower
from as far away as San Francisco, still whole swathes of the city were left without power for
weeks and, in some parts of Queens and Brooklyn, months (Barron, 2012; City of New York,
2013, p. 15).26 In the hardest hit areas government agencies and relief organizations were slow
to appear, leaving communities to self-organize their recovery.27 In a cruel ironic turn, mega
corporations stayed open as they had their own power grids. In an effort to stay afloat, so to

25

For more detailed information on Sandy’s impact on the city’s subway infrastructure, see
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 2013.
26
Con Edison’s response effort transformed Manhattan’s Union Square into a massive
emergency command center for the electrical utility’s recovery operation. In an unprecedented
sight, the square’s normal occupants – skateboarders, chess players, and farm stands--were
replaced by hundreds of white utility vans and generators, lit up by towering flood lights. For
video footage of pre-storm preparation, see ConEdisonNY, 2012.
27
On what many perceived as the failure of ‘traditional’ government response efforts (and
success of grassroots relief), see United States Department of Homeland Security, 2013; Smith,
2014; see also Siegel, 2012; Friedman, 2013.
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speak, billionaire Mayor Michael Bloomberg rang the Stock Exchange bell just two days after
the blackouts hit (Bloomberg, 2012a).28

Figure 3.4: Flood waters pour into Hoboken, New Jersey PATH station during Superstorm
Sandy, October 29, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2012/10/hurricanesandy-after-landfall/100396/. Copyright 2012 AP Photo/Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey.

Sandy’s impact brought the city to a halt. In the suspension of the infrastructures and patterns
that normally oriented life, New Yorkers were compelled to look at the city anew.29 Amid the
post-storm wreckage a new image emerged of a fragile city menaced by myriad risks –
28

For more detailed information regarding Sandy’s impact on NYC, see City of New York,
2013, pp. 10-18; New York Times, 2012, October 28; Sobel, 2014; Galinas, 2014.
29
As I will discuss further in chapter 6, Sandy led to many different revelations, for different
groups of people –not just Bloomberg’s ‘Fix&fortify’ resilience elite.
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hurricanes, rising sea levels, heat waves, technical failures – each of which threatened to
interrupt transportation systems, financial institutions and energy networks in a cascading series
of uncontrollable catastrophes. The question that quickly became dominant was, how to govern
the news risks now facing the city?

City of risk and security
The notion of the city besieged by perpetual risk is not a new phenomenon. Since the 1960s,
due to structurally-led disinvestment and ghettoization, New York has increasingly been
construed in the minds of managers, sociologists and governments alike as a place of crisis under
perpetual ‘risk’ that must be ‘managed’ and ‘secured.’ Working through what urbanist Mike
Davis (1998) calls an ‘ecology of fear’ –in which everything from garbage to graffiti, striking
workersm and panhandling were recast as threats— new forms of social control were devised
based heavily on embedding security into the urban environment. According to geographer Neil
Smith (1996), this effort was an attempt by bourgeois to reassert control through a sustained
warfare on the marginalized poor and working class population through ‘militarized’ redesign of
public space, public and private-led gentrification, embedded surveillance, backed by intensified
policing (Greer, 2012, Beckett & Herbert, 2008). Instead of trying to normalize or include the
city’s working class and marginalized populations, this ‘revanchist’ assault brought forth a new
‘sterile’ New York geared toward commuting, tourism, and investment (Smith, 2001, 1996,
Greenberg, 2008; Eisinger, 2000). Instead of trying to normalize or include the rest of the
population. Ultimately, as Davis (1990) states it, “the old liberal paradigm of social control,” was
“superseded by a rhetoric of social warfare” based on constant security, ever-intensifying
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policing, and management of undesired populations, pushing them ever closer to the margins, to
prisons, or death (p. 223).30
More recently, with the rise of what urban geographer Stephen Graham (2001) calls
‘networked societies’ and the post-September 11 ‘war on terror,’ it is also technical systems that,
like unruly human populations, are increasingly seen by governments as posing a source of
uncertainty and potential menace to urban orders.31 Whereas in the 1960s companies automated
their ‘critical infrastructures,’32 today, interconnected infrastructures are now seen as terribly
vulnerable to threats coming from ever-expanding list of outside threats –terrorists, hackers, ecosaboteurs, bored kids, and revolutionaries not to mention internal connections themselves, within
broader infrastructurally-comprised environments.33 As geographer Kevin Grove (2013)
describes it, “a qualitatively new form of insecurity emerges here: ‘critical infrastructure’ is
vulnerable because society’s reliance on it makes it an inviting target for air attacks; society is
consequently vulnerable because its quality of life – indeed its very existence – depends on
30

Each of these themes has its own broad and varied literature in Urban Geography. For one
description of the new urban paradigm as that of a ‘city of panic,’ see Virilio, 2007. On
governing risk, see Lentzos and Rose, 2009; Davis, 1990; Parenti, 2001. On neoliberal
restructuring, see Harvey, 2007. On new forms of policing as effort to contain neoliberal
dislocations, see Wacquant, 2010. On post-1970s political-economic restructuring of New York
City, see Freeman, 2001, see also Moody, 2007. On post-industrial social control through
environments, see Beckett and Herbert, 2008; ‘militarized’ redesign of public space, see Johnson
2002; Graham 2005. On public and private-led gentrification, see Smith, 1996. For more on the
development of new forms of social control after the 1970s, see Parenti, 2001. On the growth in
prisons and ‘hyperincarceration,’ see Wacquant, 2010. On securing networked cities, see
Graham, 2011. Se
31
Governmental concern over ‘brittle infrastructure’ began even earlier however, with the
Pentagon’s 1982 study of domestic energy infrastructure’s vulnerabilities (Lovins & Lovins,
1982).
32
1960s automation involved networking grids and pipelines via computerized systems, which
increased profit rates but also created systems able to maintain function amidst strikes (Noble,
1984).
33
In recent years the notion of infrastructure as a key site of political intervention has grown
significantly. For different perspectives on this matter, see Bernes, 2013; Cooper, 2011; Klein,
2015; Mitchell, 2013.
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material and cybernetic networks supported by exposed infrastructure” (p. 26; see also Collier
and Lakoff, 2008). But what governments and companies now seek are ways to defend these
complex infrastructural systems not only from the outside but from themselves (Lovins &
Lovins, 1983). As during Sandy or the 2003 northeastern blackout in the US, a very small
incident such as a downed power line or faulty switch can now rapidly generate cascade effects,
“that produce a chain of events that cross geography, time, and various types of systems” whose
“surprise effects are unexpected events that arise out of interactions between agents and the
negative and positive feedback loops produced through this interaction” (Dunn Cavelty, 2011,
para. 5).34
Efforts to govern these threats have also been largely focused on infrastructure and urban
environments, with infrastructures themselves posited as solutions to infrastructural
vulnerability. Under the heading of resilience, notes urban geographer Jon Coaffee (2008),
“cities and regions are attempting to embed security and risk management features into their built
environments and their systems of governance as part of a drive towards more ‘safe’ and
sustainable communities” (2008, p. 4633). Through strengthening existing infrastructural
systems and creating new and more systems the drive to "the 'securitization' of network-based
urban societies,” writes Graham (2006), “becomes such an overpowering obsession that it is used
to legitimize a re-engineering of the everyday systems that are purportedly now so exposed to the
endless, sourceless, boundless threat" (p. 261-262). “Everything,” continues Graham, “from the
design of subways, through the topology of water networks, to the thickness of airplane doors
and the software that makes electricity systems work, becomes a site of subtle militarization....
discourses of 'security'... saturate, and militarize, the tiniest details of everyday urban life" (p.
34

For more perspectives on the government of emergence, see Massumi, 2009; Dillon, 2007;
Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams; Bennett, 2007
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261). Today systems are increasingly seen as vulnerable to catastrophe, the source of catastrophe,
and yet more than ever they are also viewed as carrying the hope of managing catastrophe
(Collier & Lakoff, 2011, Dillon and Reid, 2009; Walker and Cooper, 2011). What the depiction
of everything and everyone as a risk does, beyond promoting a constant low-level sense of
anxiety, is to justify a continual stream of security interventions into such perceived risks as part
of what science and technology studies theorist Melinda Cooper (2006) calls permanent warfare
on ‘emergent’ threats of all kinds (p. 121; see Katz, 2007)). Alongside forms of biosecurity based
on fear of biowarfare and pathogenic outbreak, the result is a hyper-securitized ‘city of risk,’
where discourses of risk interchange with techniques of security, the one folding back into the
other, feeding into and augmenting one another in an ever-expanding environment of paranoia
and fear.35 The ‘new’ New York resulting from this logic is perhaps epitomized most recently in
the City’s new integrated ‘Domain Awareness’ surveillance system, which, as shown in Figure
3.5, integrates over 3,000 closed circuit television cameras around the city with Microsoft
software allowing NY police to crosscheck and monitor criminal databases, measure radiation
levels, scan license plates and even human faces.36

35

On biosecurity, see Braun, 2007; see also Cooper, 2008
For further information on the NYPD’s Domain Awareness system, see City of New York,
2012; Greer, 2012; see also Coscarelli, 2012.

36
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Figure 3.5. (L to R) New York Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Ray Kelly,
Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and President of Microsoft Americas
Services (Retired) Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie hold press conference announcing
the City’s integrated ‘Domain Awareness’ surveillance system. The system, which cost the
city between $30 and $40 million, gives the NYPD unprecedented ability to surveil and track
diverse activity across the city in real-time. Retrieved from
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/michael-bloomberg-now-master-your. Copyright 2012 Keith
Bedford/Reuters.

63

Sandy introduced new dimensions to this imaginary. As the harbor filled the city’s tunnels
and streets, many exclaimed –as if waking up from a dream— that New York City is an island.37
A slew of facts situated New York in space and place, not as an ecological matter of getting back
to nature, but of facing up to water as an unavoidable presence. “It would be nice,” confessed
Bloomberg (2012b), “if we could stop the tides from coming in, but King Canute couldn’t do it,
and neither can we” (n.p.). Also emphasized were the threats that New York’s coastal position
brought: storms like Sandy or tsunamis, and the effects they can cause (Florida & Johnson,
2012). The city’s geomorphological vulnerability became the emphasis: that as one news article
titled ‘Hurricane Sandy: A Glimpse at New York's Scary Future’ explained, “the city's location,
which is positioned at the peak of the right angle made by Long Island and New Jersey,
contributes to its vulnerability because storm winds travel counterclockwise and so push water in
the direction of New York and New Jersey” (Parry, 2012). This vulnerability would be
exacerbated, other post-Sandy stories reminded readers, due to New York’s position as a ‘hot
spot’ in the uneven global rise of sea levels, with levels predicted to rise three or four times faster
over the next century than global averages (Sallenger Jr, Doran, Howd, 2012; US Geological
Survey, 2012). But the new orientation was perhaps best summed up by Nature magazine’s
(2013) post-storm cover: ‘New York vs. the Sea’ (Tollefson, n.p.).38
As waters receded from the city’s storm-battered infrastructures, a second and related
epiphany emerged: New York is not only next to water, but is connected to its natural surrounds.
37

Along with recognizing environmental surrounds as a risk, they were also welcomed. In the
days after the storm, Bloomberg (2012b) championed the same waters against which he had
proclaimed war, stating, “New York City has 520 miles of shoreline – and it is some of the most
beautiful, dynamic shoreline in the world, with the most beautiful views. Robert Moses built the
roads along our coastline, separating us from this natural resource and we have worked very hard
to try reconnect back to the most wonderful asset that we have” (n.p.).
38
For a more detailed discussion of New York’s coastal vulnerability, see also City of New
York, 2013, p. 7.
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These latter, once seen as an inert trash dump, were now understood as having an effect on the
city. With increasing frequency, we were told that the city is a system, an ‘entangled’ network in
which nature, technology, and society could no longer be seen as separate systems. These
networks, it was further emphasized, connected systems not just at the local level, but set New
York in mutually reinforcing relations to global environment systems (Braun, 2014). These
loops, it was increasingly understood, were not only spatial but also temporal: the effects of
industrial processes that took place in England in the eighteenth century were bubbling up in
New York’s present in the form of global warming and rising seas. Now it was not only
interconnected technological systems that were seen as threats, but urban system itself, and
indeed the urban-global, crossed as they are in multiple temporalities. Whereas before the storm
it was possible to imagine climate change effects as a somewhat obscure catastrophe waiting in
the future—or to ignore climate change, conceived as a matter for ‘environmentalists’— with
Sandy that timeline folded in, bringing rising seas, global warming and natural disasters into the
heart of the city. Scientists were tapped to explain the connection between the storm and climate
change, while rising seas and the warming atmosphere became dinner conversation topics
(Tollefson, 2012). As the disaster touched the city momentarily, many, including New York
Governor Andrew Cuomo and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, began
discussing Sandy’s devastation not as a freak, once-in-100-year occurrence, but rather as ‘the
new normal’ in which as the Atlantic warned, “we don’t have decades before the next Sandy”
(Florida & Zolli, 2012, n.p,).
Connected locally and globally, the urban system now imagined was not that of a
harmonious, balanced network of interconnection (as in the ecosystems and closed loops of the
1960s, or the blue-green urban nature of ‘Rising Currents’ exhibition), but that of an out-of-
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control, careening landscape of complexity, uncertainty, and risk. Global transformations
(warming oceans, melting ice) were creating local hazards (rising seas, stronger storms),
themselves portending cascading disaster within urban systems themselves (downed power lines,
transportation bottlenecks, flooded tunnels, and neighborhoods). Endlessly enmeshed, the same
systems seen as under threat were simultaneously posited as the source of chaotic devastation.
Flying in the face of the effort to secure urban order, what Sandy revealed was an image of a
fragile city in peril. The new dangers it brought to the fore were not just those of disorder —the
kinds used to justify the security city— but very real matters of life and death. Instead of hunter
green eco-urbanism, coastlines and neighborhoods were cast in varying shades of red, orange,
and yellow levels of risk and the cityscape marked in varying degrees of vulnerability. These
new landscapes referred to the households without power, flood areas and casualties caused by
Sandy, but they also painted a picture of New York’s apocalyptic new future: NYC’s Office of
Emergency Management and FEMA’s revised flood maps doubled the number of homes in the
high flood risk zone. The NYT’s interactive guide to sea level rise titled ‘What Could Disappear’
enabled readers to envision major American coastal areas according to various levels of sea rise
(Copeland, B., Keller, J., & Marsh, 2012). Perhaps most dramatically, National Geographic
(Folger, 2013) featured a cover story on ‘Rising Seas’ with the Statue of Liberty halfway
underwater (see Figure 3.6).39

39

See also New York City Panel on Climate Change, 2013.
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Figure 3.6: National Geographic’s September 2013 cover story offered a striking —though
far from unique— example of the apocalyptic lens through which media began to portray
New York’s future after Sandy. Retrieved from
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/09/rising-seas/folger-text. Copyright 2013 National
Geographic.

What emerged, in short, was a landscape of heightened risk and deep vulnerability. As we
will see, this imaginary of ubiquitous crisis ushered in a new set of management techniques to
further ‘secure’ the city.
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Sandy as event
In Chapter 2, I discussed how the oyster as commodity object was born in the coming
together of myriad elements (ideas of nature, class polarization, commodity routes, etc). Here I
extend that thought, by considering how such ‘conjunctions’ can, sometimes, take place, for
example in the wake of historical events. With the term ‘event’ I am drawing from the efforts of
French philosopher Alain Badiou (2001; 2007; 2009; 2011; 2012a; 2012b) to conceptualize
moments of profound rupture and transformation in history. For him, ‘events’ are ‘ruptures’ that
emerge unexpectedly to interrupt the dominant ‘state of the situation.’ That is, events ‘scramble’
established grids of intelligibility, value, and order, thereby rearranging what was previously
possible or impossible (Badiou, 2001, p. vii).40 As such an event is an ‘unveiling,’ not of
something that was previously present but hidden, but of something new that previously did not
exist: a new field of possibilities. “The event is the sudden creation, not of a new reality, but of a
myriad of new possibilities. None of them is a repetition of what is already known” (Badiou,
2011, n.p.).
In Badiou’s writing, events most often are portrayed as a ‘positive’ thing, with examples
including the Paris Commune, musical inventions or falling in love (Badiou, 2001). But, looking
back, at the storm and the reconfigurations it set in motion, could we not see how a destructive
phenomenon like Sandy was also an event? There have been many ‘natural’ disasters before—
indeed Hurricane Irene just one year prior— but in New York it is common now to speak of
Sandy as a ‘tipping point’ or ‘watershed,’ and of a ‘before’ and an ‘after Sandy.’ It is not that
people never thought about urban systems before (Braun, 2005). There is a whole host of
theorists working in ‘more-than-human geographies’ who have recently sought to ‘re40

For a geographical use of Badiou’s concept, see also Woodward, 2010.
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materialize’ urban networks and to ‘render visible’ the pipelines, roads, parks and waterways that
constitute urban metabolisms (Graham & McFarlane, 2014; Heynen, Kaika, & Swyngedouw,
2006; Kaika, 2004; Gandy, 2003; Bennett, 2007; Latour, 2005). But Sandy was something else.
Sandy literally materialized these connections, transforming what for many had been abstract or
background concepts –climate change, global environmental systems — into sewage rushing into
basements, trees crashing into cars, water in subway tunnels (see Figure 3.4). As Bloomberg
(2012b) stated in a post-Sandy press conference,
You can argue about what caused the weather to change, but there is no question – you
can measure the temperatures of the ocean, you can measure the amount of moisture in
the air, and that just leads to the kind of aberrations that we’re seeing: snowstorms where
we didn’t have them before, droughts where we didn’t have them before, hurricanes that
take different paths, go in different directions and have different strengths. (n.p.)
The storm, in other words, made previously abstract data real, and brought a new way of seeing
things into view: a city connected to a threatening array of environmental surrounds, the fact of
climate change made real and present and raising an alarm that the city’s current way of life
needed to change.
For Badiou what matters most is what happens next, what an ‘event’ sets in motion and how
people respond to the possibilities revealed. Like the ‘aleatory encounter’ of which Althusser
(2006) spoke, events may open up a breach in being and time –but nothing is guaranteed. A
political uprising could set in motion a massive transformation of life, or it could vanish into thin
air. What determines if an event is to be an event, from Badiou’s perspective, is the response to
the opening thus created. Truth is discovered after an event, in the response to it (see, e.g., 2007,
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pp. 199-262). This is Badiou’s point: events are not simply ‘ruptures’ with an existing order, they
must also give birth to the creation of new orders, things, and subjects (Badiou, 2011). In this
way an event is a revelation, not of something that was previously absent now made present, but
which did not preexist the encounter.
If Hurricane Sandy was an ‘event,’ this is not only because of its disruptive and ‘scrambling’
effects. Thinking Sandy as an event requires thinking the response launched to the possibilities it
opened up. Sandy’s devastation set in motion a number of possible trajectories, possible
responses. Think, for example, of the outpouring of volunteer and community disaster relief that
brought New Yorkers en masse by bike and foot to the city’s hardest hit areas to cook food for
hundreds, share supplies, shovel sewage out of strangers’ basements, etc.41 One could very
soberly imagine those experiences having led those who experienced them to very different
decisions, for not to continue with this way of life anymore, following a different trajectory
based on living with systems, with environment, instead of managing (a different possibility that
I explore in Chapter 6).
This is not what happened. Instead, what we saw emerge as dominant in the response to
Sandy was a slew of novel designs, approaches and visions geared toward governing crisis.
These approaches were geared toward getting things back to ‘normal’ and maintaining the
current arrangement of things that had been interrupted. Far from denying the event of Sandy and
the new realities it produced, the governmental assemblage that emerged grasped them and
shaped them to its purposes, quickly positioning the city as a global leader in a new war on the
‘unknown knowns’ of the future in which ‘resilience’ became the dominant strategy.
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For more on community-organized relief after Sandy, see Smith, 2014.
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Dispositif
Unlike the examples given by Badiou, the response to the event of Sandy was one of
management, in the form of new techniques to secure the city. To understand Sandy as an event,
therefore, requires we move beyond Badiou’s framework for understanding an event.
Understanding Sandy as an event, I argue, requires bridging Badiou’s theory of the event and
Foucault’s concept of government as an ad hoc arrangement, what he called a ‘dispositif’
(1980a).42 Foucault (1980) used the term ‘dispositif’ to describe the network of discourses,
practices and institutions, different across space and time, by which life was governed. For
Foucault, government was not just a matter of governments, or a sovereign power imposed ‘on’
life from the outside.43 Writes Foucault (1980a),
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions,
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and
philanthropic propositions–in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements
of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established
between these elements. (p. 194)
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Dispositif is often rendered in English as ‘apparatus,’ as in translations of Agamben’s work
(e.g., 2009), but has also been translated as ‘deployment’ by Robert Hurley in his translation of
Foucault, 1978. This section on dispositif and subsequent discussion of resilience as dispositif
builds on arguments made in Wakefield & Braun, 2014. The idea of ‘ad hoc assemblage’ is
explored in more depth by Braun, 2014.
43
This and the following paragraph expand on Wakefield & Braun, 2014.
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For Foucault, more important than the particular elements in a dispositif were the relations
and networks drawn between elements. Crucially, for Foucault there was neither an essential or
authentic life that existed prior to, or outside, the elements and relations of a particular dispositif,
nor was the ‘life’ a constructed one that followed a plan or intention set out in advance. Rather
government is posited as an ad-hoc arrangement that comes together in response to crisis or
impasse:
[A dispositif] has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to
an urgent need. The dispositif thus has a dominant strategic function. (Foucault, 1980, p.
194)
Surveillance systems, militarized architecture, urban sanitation, street lighting, policing
practices: so many of the security techniques discussed in the previous section were in fact
responses to other actions and forces: riots, disease, crime, terrorism. Individually and together
these governmental forms can be read as a history of attempts to manage crises—and specifically
crises from the perspective of the regimes that seek to maintain power— provisionally stitching
together disparate knowledge, practices and designs in order to cope with situations as they
arose. As such, as Braun (2014) puts it, government must be seen as
an ad hoc assemblage that… proceeds in a relatively aimless fashion, introducing
‘management’ into diverse sites and practices in a piecemeal and contingent way in
response to a dynamic and changing world. (p. 5)
From this perspective, government is not ‘order,’ but rather is an ongoing activity or
operation: to manage, to administer, to respond, to order. Like a centuries long chess game,
techniques of government are always forced and contingent, reordering an order that is always
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out-of-order. Only retrospectively and with a view to the ‘system of relations’ formed between
them do those sites or practices appear as part of a plan devised in advance or a coherent unity
(an ‘urban security dispositif,’ for example).44
There is a resonance here with Badiou’s view of ‘events.’ Events for Badiou happen in the
‘futur antérieur,’ by which he means that, they can only be identified retrospectively.45 This
makes it possible to look back at some point and identify when the ‘event’ ‘began.’ As Badiou
writes (2015), on March 18, 1871, the day historians now say the ‘Paris Commune began,’ after
initial clashes between government troops and Parisian workers, many things could have
happened. But what did happen was that the National Guard mutinied, the government fled, and
workers organized to assume control over the city. While it was happening, no one would have
known that they were beginning ‘The Paris Commune.’ But in all the diverse measures taken by
the ‘communards’ in response to that initial event of March 18 —transforming workplaces into
cooperatives, declaring Paris an independent commune, forming citizen defense units— a new
reality was formed. In retrospect, it is the sum of those diverse measures that constitute what we
now call ‘The Paris Commune.’46
Bringing Foucault and Badiou together, I argue that alongside such ‘happy’ scenarios
discussed by Badiou, to govern is also a way of responding to an event. Indeed, in our presentday capitalist and securized world, ‘giving form’ is done predominantly by governing and
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Agrees McFarlane and Rutherford (2008), “in the case of largely unforeseen crises, it is often
in the responses of local governments and infrastructure managers that we can analyse the
reinforcement or transformation of power relations” (p, 368).
45
See also the similarity to Foucault’s genealogical method discussed in Chapter 2.
46
For more on the Paris Commune as an event, see Badiou 2015, 2012b.
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managing.47 Perhaps we can say that an event opens up the possibilities that the dispositif then
seeks to govern, which it does by putting things together in a certain way so as to manage the
event. The ‘governmental’ way of responding to an event, that is, is to create a dispositif.48
Whereas events open the possibility of new paths and new directions, the role of the dispositif is
to manage the situation, and ensure that such paths are not followed. The dispositif’s role, we
could therefore say, is to maintain and secure the existing social and political order that was
disrupted by the event (and to make that order appear as the single, only outcome).
Looking at what has transpired since Sandy suggests that this is indeed what is occurring in
New York. As I argue in the following section, what has emerged since 2012 is what may now
be called a ‘resilience dispositif,’ composed of the myriad efforts underway to secure the city
against the risks revealed by Sandy, in particular climate change and its effects. What we will see
is that, in the assembling of this new dispositif, oysters were asked to take on a very different role
than that asked of them before the storm.

Back to the storm-battered city
In New York, the stakes after all were clear: “we have to do a better job,” then-mayor
Bloomberg declared after the storm, “not only keeping our networks up, but keeping our markets
and businesses open, come hell or high water” (2012). Days after the storm, the air still heavy
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As I will argue further in Chapter 5 and 6, in late capitalist society, ‘governing’ has become
the dominant way of understanding what it means to ‘give form.’ But this, I will also argue, does
not have to be the case.
48
Perhaps making a dispositif a kind of ‘counter-event.’
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with the feeling of calamity, Bloomberg (2012b), in an old naval facility recently converted into
a greenhouse, gave a press conference akin to a wartime address in which he declared,
Make no mistake. This is a defining challenge for our future, and if anyone is up to the
task of defending and adapting the city they love, it's New Yorkers. This is too important
- and it's up to all of us to work together to accelerate our progress…This is New York
City. We've always turned challenges into opportunities. Sandy was a temporary setback
that can ultimately propel us forward, if we think big and seize the moment. (n.p.)
Instead of trying to prevent more disaster—whether through cutting emissions, or sea
walls— the question that began to dominate was, how to govern these new risks so as to
maintain ‘business as usual’? How to keep the city afloat amidst the new world of crisis? Toward
this end, a steady stream of articles and opinion columns appeared in local newspapers devoted
to debunking old approaches of prevention -and control. The city’s papers again and again
welcomed readers to the ‘new normal,’ in which they must abandon dreams of total mastery and
equilibrium –“the world doesn’t work that way,” wrote resilience pundit Zolli (2012) in the NYT,
calling instead for new ways “to manage in an imbalanced world…in constant disequilibrium”
(n.p.). Instead of making the city smart or sustainable they now asked, how to make New York
‘resilient’ in this new world of omnipresent risk and uncertainty.49 While sustainability, many
experts agreed, is an impossible quest “for ways to put the world back in balance,” resilience is
seen as realistic. "We're not going to make the mistake of fighting the last war,” Bloomberg said
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Many observers noted the inability of ‘sustainable’ infrastructures to stop Sandy’s destruction,
highlighting for example how, despite having the largest number of LEED certified buildings in
the world, the financial district was still underwater and in the dark (Florida & Zolli, 2012).
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(2013, n.p.).50 Instead of continuing to ‘block out’ nature or disorder, resilience was lauded as a
new approach that would welcome both.51 City planning commissions, gallery exhibits and
newspapers (and other organs of the city’s elite) cited each other with increasing frequency,
creating a virtuous circle that worked to reinforce the new approach to disaster management:
“forget sustainability,” cried the NYT, “it’s about resilience” (Zolli, 2012).
Coined by ecologist C.S. Holling in 1973, resilience is defined in contrast to ‘stability’ as an ecosystems approach to management.52 Instead of top-down command by an external controller
operating within a setting defined by a division between nature and culture, resilience views the
world as made up of dynamic, interconnected, self-organizing systems. Unlike ‘stability’
approaches to management, which seek to prevent crisis or change and preserve stable systems,
resilience views crisis as inevitable and aims to develop systems’ capacities for ‘thriving’ or
‘surviving’ amidst it. According to the Resilience Alliance (2016), an international research
network founded by Holling,
Resilience is the capacity of a social-ecological system to absorb or withstand
perturbations and other stressors such that the system remains within the same regime,
essentially maintaining its structure and functions. (n.p.)
After Sandy, ‘resilience’ became a buzzword amongst planners, designers, municipal and
funding bodies in New York, for whom it quickly came to replace sustainability and ‘green’ as a
priority and a method. The term has become a broad heading able to bring administration of
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Led by then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg, chair of C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, the
City of New York had even before Sandy commissioned a spate of climate resilient initiatives,
perhaps the best known of which was the green roadmap PlaNYC2030.
51
Many acknowledged that sea barriers do not deal with water, but just try to move it someplace
else (NBC News, 2012).
52
Stockholm Resilience Centre 2011; Gunderson & Holling, 2002, Walker et al.. 2004.
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previously disconnected phenomena together under a single umbrella. "This isn't just climaterelated," explained Rockefeller Foundation president Judith Rodin. "We're not just thinking
about hurricanes or floods; we're really thinking about any vulnerability to the system that could
take it down, and how to build against that" (n.p.). For Rodin (2013), the stakes of resilience are
simultaneously political and pragmatic:
We can't control the next disruption or catastrophe—but we can control how we respond
to these challenges, how we absorb the shocks of our world, and how quickly we spring
back after a blow. In other words, we can control how resilient our institutions,
communities, and people are against these disruptions. We must avoid the unmanageable
and manage the unavoidable. (n.p.)
As Wakefield and Braun (2014; see also Braun 2014) argue, resilience is best understood as a
new urban dispositif, an ad hoc assemblage of diverse practices, architectures, and policies that
are being stitched together in order to govern cities in an age of climate change.53 By definition,
resilience is a form of government that, far from the project of a single institution or policy, can
53

For other perspectives on the relationship between resilience and ‘government,’ see Dillon &
Reid 2009; Lundberg & Vaughn-Williams 2011. On this topic, Walker and Cooper (2011) have
traced a genealogy of the convergence of 1970s resilience theory with neoliberal economics in
the contemporary crisis management doctrine of resilience. Lindseth (2011) has traced the
naturalization of ‘systems thinking’ in resilience literature. Lentos and Rose (2009) suggestively
outlined a ‘logic of resilience’ in advanced liberal societies. While the ‘resilience government’
literature makes important steps beyond the celebratory nature of most resilience writing (e.g.,
Rockström et al. 2009; Walker & Salt 2006), it remains problematically focused largely on the
September 11-inflected practices and policies of city, state, and national governments, as well as
governmental agencies or international governmental organizations (Coaffee 2008; Dillon 2007;
Dillon & Reid 2009; Adey and Anderson 2012; but cf. Braun, 2014). This same critique applies
to the much-larger body of literature on eco-urbanism (e.g., Davidson 2010; Hodson & Marvin
2010; Coaffee 2008), much of which operates at the technical, evaluative, or economic level,
thereby missing the profound transformations of life, government, nature, and technology that
are underway, and the fact that above all, climate resilient urbanism constitutes a dispositif of
government.
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be done only through the drawing together of myriad practices, discourses, architectures, and
infrastructures. In the aftermath of Sandy, the imperative to become resilient facilitated the
gathering together and arranging of many preexistent elements —urban farms, white and green
roofs, ‘preppers,’ and marshes— as well as others that are brand new—such as smart grids and
municipal task forces— coding and recoding them. While many of the practices and techniques
being drawn together existed previously, the resilience dispositive, I argue, can be best
understood as having emerged in response to the event of Hurricane Sandy, as an effort to
govern that event and the future implications it unveiled.54 From this perspective, not only did
New York, in Sandy’s wake, became a ‘climate change first responder’ (Rosenzweig & Solecki,
2016) in a technical sense, but was also opened up as a future test lab where new techniques of
governing the city in an age o f climate change could be tested out.55 Billions of dollars were
poured into the search for new methods: commissions were organized, expert panels held at
places like the New School and SoHo galleries, reports drafted, newspapers’ think pieces, with
the search for new forms of management forefronted as the key imperative of the future and to
‘never let a good crisis go to waste’ (Rodin quoted in Moss, 2015, n.p.) (See Figure 3.6).56
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Resilience may be the new ‘consensus,’ but it is one that, as Amin (2013) has noted far from
operating as a single ideology or strategy, is based on the piecing together of many in a
pragmatic, ad hoc fashion, taking the city as the terrain.
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For more on NYC’s long history of being a site for experimentation with forms of design,
government, and thought that would later be exported globally, see Koolhaus, 1997. On urban
experimentation and urban government, see Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013; Karvonen, et al.,
2014.
56
There is certainly a parallel here with what Naomi Klein (2008) has called the capitalist ‘shock
doctrine.’ The drive to ‘Fix&Fortify’ New York, as the city’s campaign is called, was equally an
investment opportunity, and ‘the rush to resilience’ brought the city’s wealthiest forces out en
masse, each seeking a piece of the opportunity posed by crisis as ‘the new normal’ (Moss, 2015,
n.p.). While outside the bounds of this dissertation, tracing the emergence of the Rockefellerbased ‘resilience elite’ that emerged to profit post-Sandy would be an interesting topic for a
further paper.
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More than ever, to ‘secure’ the city became synonymous with securing, renovating and
creating new infrastructures. “We have a new reality and old infrastructures and old systems,”
Governor Cuomo (2012) intoned, adding that the city’s electrical utilities seemed like vinyl
records in the age of the iPod: “antiquated, 1950s-style institutions that don’t serve our current
needs” (n.p.). To this end, massive investments were laid out to retrofit and overlay Con
Edison’s grid. The NYT summed up the new mantra: “the era of big infrastructure is over”
(Feuer, 2012b, n.p.). Alongside new codes or laws, the focus was on infrastructure, both as
object to protect and a means of protection, with a search for new ‘resilient’ infrastructures that
could better 'adapt', 'respond', or 'absorb' risks (Godschalk, 2003, p. 137).

Back to oysters - a new oyster is born
Amidst this gathering together, oysters emerged as emblematic of the new approach, in
which they were now asked to act alongside other proposed ‘resilient’ systems to buffer future
extreme events and act as a “first line of defense for Manhattan against storms as fierce or fiercer
than 2012’s Hurricane Sandy” (Greenberg, 2014b, n.p.).57 Out of this confluence a new proposal
by SCAPE to enroll oysters as ‘living infrastructure’ emerged, as one of six winning entries of a
design competition co-organized by the Rockefeller Foundation, US Department of Housing and
Urban Development, and the Presidential Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force in June 2013
(Figure 3.7). Billed as an effort to ‘drive innovation’ (“innovation has to break rules”) and “to be
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SCAPE’s MOMA Oyster-Tecture exhibition did mention storm surge attenuation, but it was
not forefronted. And while Kate Orff had started getting calls about oyster-tecture even after
Hurricane Irene, according to the architect, it was with Sandy that things really took a new turn
and the project began to be taken seriously (Orff, 2015, interview, n.p.).
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a model for the rest of the world” (Rebuild by Design, 2014, n.p.), the competition, titled
‘Rebuild by Design,’ offered $930 million in a search for innovative, immediately applicable and
replicable urban resilience measures to manage the new risks unveiled in Sandy. Entries ranged,
“from large-scale urban and multi-functional green infrastructure to small-scale distributed flood
protection measures and resilient residential structures” (Rebuild by Design, 2013, p. 1).

Figure 3.7: Rebuild by Design competition announced on June 20, 2013 by U.S. Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development and Chair of Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force
Shaun Donovan (left) and Judith Rodin, President of the Rockefeller Foundation (right), at
New York University, New York. Retrieved from
http://main.aiany.org/eOCULUS/newsletter/#/rebuild-by-design-competition/. Copyright 2013
Rebuild by Design/American Institute of Architects.

In their successful proposal, entitled ‘Living Breakwaters,’ SCAPE imagined the
construction of a ‘necklace’ of oyster reefs as ‘layered lines of defense’ around south Staten
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Island (see Figure 3.8). Unlike their earlier MOMA exhibition, SCAPE’s RBD proposal now
reimagined oysters in terms of ‘disaster preparedness’, in which ‘letting water in’ became less a
matter of reacquainting humans with friendly aquatic surroundings than a new strategy to
manage the changing climate and hostile ocean. The quaintness of SCAPE’s earlier oystertecture proposal was replaced with a focus on the project’s infrastructural function; oyster shacks
and sea kayaks swapped for sharp warnings about ‘wave velocity’ and ‘environmental risk.’
Gone were hopes of eating oysters and boardwalk entertainment. Most importantly, oysters were
reimagined as a ‘living, growing infrastructure’ that through their own life-activity could
‘drastically dissipate destructive wave energy’ (SCAPE, 2014a, n.p.). Backed by cost benefit
analyses and computer models testing oysters’ capacity for wave height reduction, designers
proposed experimenting with new cultivation techniques and attempting to develop reef
structures in which oysters can survive further off shore in ‘high wave action’ areas, with some
entirely submerged and others designed to rise high enough to absorb 16' wave crests. Unlike a
sea wall, whose purpose is to stop flooding, block waves, or eliminate risk, the oyster reefs are
intended to “make those events slower and safer,” to “slow inundation,” and to “take the energy
out of the wave” as it passes over the breakwater (SCAPE, 2014b, n.p,).58
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A video presentation of the Living Breakwaters project can be found online at
http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/project/scape-landscape-architecture-final-proposal/
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Figure 3.8: Rebuild by Design entry by SCAPE, in which the design firm amended their
earlier ‘Oyster-Tecture’ vision to now propose the use of oyster reefs as ‘living, growing
breakwaters’ to defend the city against future storms like Sandy. Retrieved from
http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/SI_IH_3_new923x615.jpg. Copyright 2013 SCAPE/Landscape Architecture PLLC/Rebuild by Design.

The main idea in this new vision was that, in the living of their lives—in ‘doing their oyster
thing’— oysters are infrastructure. “Ecological infrastructure,” SCAPE architect Lauren Elachi
explained, “essentially means understanding that “natural processes have a lot of functions in
terms of whether it’s cleaning water or dunes protecting houses or things like that…Ecological
infrastructure is essentially just being able to recognize that and use that for essentially twenty-
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first century purposes. It could be anything from, oyster reefs to marshes or wetlands, or the stuff
that the living does” (personal communication, October 23, 2015). As SCAPE Team member
Pippa Brashear (personal communication, January 5, 2015) pointed out, technically speaking it is
not the oyster itself that is the infrastructure, but the interconnected and dynamic life of the reef
as a system. As living, growing ‘systems,’ oysters were seen as embodiments of a new form of
management, based on the interaction of their life processes with their natural surrounds. In
living their lives, in ‘drinking’ and in agglomerating onto each other, in giving birth and in
connection to other processes (waves, sedimentation, sewage dumping), the biological life
processes of oysters were now imagined as infrastructure. In this new role, oysters were asked to
broker a new relation between New York and the sea, “mov[ing] beyond the impossible scenario
of enclosing 'dry' from 'wet'” towards “managed, calmer, and non-disastrous inundation events”
in which flooding will be “slower, cleaner, and safer, and less prone to catastrophic failure”
(SCAPE, 2014, p.14). Whereas traditional breakwaters will be less effective as sea levels rise, in
SCAPE’s design oysters will grow on top of each other, layering onto and strengthening the
assemblage to which they’re attached, rising ‘elegantly’ with the seas. This, Orff says, is the
"core concept, of ‘growing’ climate-change infrastructure biologically now rather than relying on
capital-intensive big construction projects in the distant future” (2011, p. 98).

Conclusion
What I have argued in this chapter is that, at least for now, the ‘truth’ of Sandy as an ‘event’
lies with the dispositif that was drawn together in the storm’s wake to govern the already hypersecuritized city, to continue its way of life by new means, and to prevent the emergence of
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others. This resilience dispositif is not that of a preconceived or coherent plan, but rather is an
‘ad hoc’ arrangement of new and previously existing management techniques that ‘congealed’
after the storm. What this chapter has also shown is that, in the ‘gelling’ of this new dispositif, a
revolution in the idea of infrastructure also emerged. ‘Living infrastructure,’ a new vision of
oysters born in the post-Sandy ‘rush to resilience,’ is not something that has been studied by the
critical infrastructure literature. As discussed, the paradox of the security city is that while its
infrastructures are seen as a threat to the maintenance of urban order, it is also critical
infrastructures that are increasingly deployed to maintain the city and its order (Lundborg &
Vaughan-Williams, 2011). The proposal to use oysters as infrastructure represents a new
development of this logic: at the moment when natural systems have appeared as a threat, nature
is also being asked to manage that threat. Nature, that is, being asked to become ‘critical
infrastructure,’ incorporated into a larger meshwork of security to contain or absorb risk, in this
case the risks of climate change, rising sea levels, and the threat of catastrophic floods. By
mobilizing oysters’ natural processes (i.e. attaching themselves to each other and developing
reefs that adapt to changing sea levels), the hope is to cancel out other natural processes (i.e.
hurricanes and storm surges). Oyster infrastructure is however still only a vision of nature as
infrastructure. Making that vision a reality requires a lot of additional work—by humans and
oysters. It is to that work that I now turn.
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Chapter 4: Making Nature into Infrastructure
This project will make Staten Island the model for resiliency and innovation, using state
of the art techniques. (New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo, cited in New York
State Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, 2015, April 30, n.p.)
I get asked two questions about this project. One is: why isn't it happening now? And the
second one is: when can we eat the oysters? And the answer is: not yet, they're working.
(Orff, 2010, 09:12)

Composing nature as infrastructure
In Chapter 3, I discussed the assembling of a new dispositif in the post-Sandy search for new
ways to govern urban risk. In that assembling, I also noted the emergence of a new thinking of
infrastructure that seeks to work through nature, with the idea of using oysters to attenuate storm
breakwaters that would be but a piece of the resilience dispositif being stitched. This new oyster
imaginary has now been transformed into a serious engineering project led by New York State
(NYS), which has pronounced the design paradigmatic of the resiliency measures needed in New
York and a model for other coastal cities. On April 30, 2015, New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo announced the project’s official kickoff, and henceforth the NYS Governor’s Office of
Storm Recovery (GOSR) would be the implementing body moving the design forward into its
concrete realization (see Figure 4.1). NYS has scheduled Living Breakwaters to be the first of
the six Rebuild by Design (RBD) winning projects completed, with a projected due date of 2019.
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In keeping with the RBD mission, the Tottenville pilot is designed to be completed quickly –the
funds must be spent by 2019—so as to experiment in real time and to produce replicable
solutions that can be expanded to further sites in Staten Island as well as other sites regionally
and nationally (Rockefeller Foundation, 2016, n.p.). "This thing is ready to go as any Rebuild by
Design winner is, and the budget is right, the political will is there, and I know the state's excited
about it," said John Boule, resiliency director for Parson Brinckerhoff, and former Colonel and
Commander of the Army Corp of Engineers in New York City (Lavis, 2014).

Figure 4.1: Senator Schumer announces support for the Living Breakwaters project in
Tottenville, Staten Island, February 28, 2014. Also pictured are Borough President James
Oddo, New York State Senator Andrew Lanza, Assemblyman Joe Borelli, Councilman Vincent
Ignizio and NYC Parks First Deputy Commissioner Liam Kavanagh. Retrieved rom
http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/selected_update/sen-schumer-press-conference-tottenvillebreakwaters/. Copyright 2014 Rebuild by Design.
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How did this happen? How did nature ‘become’ infrastructure? As Foucault has shown,
‘government’ today does not reside exclusively or even primarily in political offices, the White
House or city halls. Rather, Foucault’s concept of dispositif as discussed in the previous chapter
sees government as an ad hoc assemblage of discourses, technologies, designs, laws, and actions.
These assemblages are powerful, not least because often they do not appear to be doing
anything! Architectures and infrastructures make up the built environment we walk through
every day, for example. But even though these assemblages in retrospect come to seem ‘natural,’
as if just ‘there,’ in reality this is simply part of their ‘magic.’ The ‘magic’ of government is that
it works in such a way that its ad hoc and deeply grounded nature is rendered invisible, such that
it appears natural and eternal, an abstract or natural, alien power in the eyes of the governed. By
contrast, the power of the ‘dispositif’ concept is that it demystifies government, helping us to
grasp the earthly, practical, and reactive nature of the regimes and techniques through which
populations are governed. As Foucault emphasized, dispositifs are not natural or eternal. They
arise, rather, in response to a crisis, through efforts to govern this or that situation. Far from
abstract plan or the seamless enacted intention of political actors alone, the concept shows that
situations and realities are governed in practice, enacted in specific ways in specific places and
time, through nonhuman things as much as human actors.
Further extending the Foucaultian insight regarding government as an ad hoc assemblage,
this chapter addresses how an ‘assemblage’ is ‘assembled.’ More specifically, building on the
information in Chapter 3 on how nature emerged as a security technique after Hurricane Sandy,
this chapter follows the work required to make nature into infrastructure –work by humans and
oysters. And as we will see, political figures such as Bloomberg, Schumer and Cuomo may be a
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part of the ‘assembling’ of this assemblage, but they are not its single source. They just hold the
signs, as it were. How, then, did oysters become infrastructure?
A 2015 article published by geographers Pauline McGuirk, Harriet Bulkeley and Robyn
Dowling provides a helpful framework here, which allows us to flesh out and make concrete the
notion of ‘ad hoc assemblages’ in Foucault that may seem rather abstract. The authors do not use
Foucault, but they do provide a way of thinking about ‘dispositifs’ and more specifically how
they are made. Extending work by one of the authors (Bulkeley & Betsill 2013) on how efforts to
govern carbon in cities today is enacted less through policy or formal law and more through
‘experimentation,’ McGuirk et al. put forward the concept of ‘configuration’ to get at how
alignments of diverse elements that come to constitute ‘government’ are achieved and
maintained. This work of configuration, I argue, is the flipside to the themes of discontinuity and
‘being in the world’ that I have discussed in previous chapters. If ‘being’ is without a single telos
—a predetermined purpose or way of being— what ‘government’ tends to do is make it seem as
if the opposite is the case. The work of government, that is, is to transform reality in accordance
with its telos, its ‘works,’ and to present that reality as the sole, only, reality. Accomplishing this
feat takes a lot of work. And as McGuirk et al. note, this work is ongoing (2015, p. 4).
For McGuirk et al., government is neither a ‘seamless fiat’ nor a product of chance. It is the
result of extensive work and experimentation. Instead of focusing on the ‘things themselves’ –
i.e., the elements of a ‘dispositif’— McGuirk et al. direct our attention to the concrete processes
of ‘configuring’ or ‘composing’ all the work required to “conjoin these diverse elements and
gather, arrange, order, and hold them together such that they cohere as an identifiable coalition”
(2015, p. 4). “Why, by whom, and by what,” ask the authors, “are diverse elements drawn
together and held together in the exercise of urban carbon governance and, crucially, how does
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this occur?” (p. 2). It may take a lot of investigation, but there are always concrete answers to
these questions: specific practices and efforts that can be identified, traced, and understood.
Required are ideas and visions of a plan or reality, as well as the concrete steps to implement
those ideas. While theory and practice are in reality intertwined, to make things clear McGuirk et
al. suggest working with two distinct categories: forms of ‘narration,’ and forms of ‘ordering.’
The former refers to the use and repetition of certain storylines that frame problems or issues so
as to also imply and embed the solutions considered desirable or appropriate (p. 5). The latter, on
the other hand, entails the “deploy[ment of] particular devices to channel and discipline relations
and establish the appropriate sociomaterial arrangements that hold together the relational
configuration” (p. 3). Key to this process, they argue, is securing certain configurations of
humans as well as nonhumans, discourses as well as representations.59

‘Storying’ nature as infrastructure
Later on, I will suggest changes to McGuirk et al.’s framework. For now I will return to the
question of how nature became infrastructure. What is required to assemble this new assemblage,
both to stabilize it and make it ‘gel’ as a ‘respectable’ idea that diverse actors would agree
‘makes sense,’ –as well as to build it in reality? After all, this idea of oysters as infrastructure or
that, in general, nature as infrastructure would emerge as a dominant or even credible option
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That is, “specific devices, such as partner engagement and calculation, that (re)enroll project
elements into particular roles and subject positions, operating to secure ongoing performances
that cohere project relations” (McGuirk, 2015, p. 19). Making an idea is not only about stating it,
but also about who states it (and when, where, and how). “Practices and devices of building
consensus and partnership,” McGuirk, et al. (2015) surmise from their research, “might be just as
important to ordering as more controlling, disciplinary devices of calculation” (p. 14).
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after the storm was by no means a sure thing. After the storm more ‘traditional’ approaches such
as storm walls, were advocated as an option to govern risk, but through repetition of the
‘resilience’/’we need new infrastructure’ discourse, these traditional approaches were quickly
dismissed as inadequate and outdated, while others, such as living breakwaters came to seem
exemplary, and were recast as ‘appropriate.’ In Sandy’s wake, as discussed in Chapter 3, a set of
forces came together to identify a new set of urgencies: the threats of climate change and its
effects, as well as systems disruption more generally. This ‘problematization,’ to use a term
McGuirk et al. borrow from Foucault (Foucault, 1998, 1980; 1985a), implied the set of solutions
considered appropriate: old infrastructures are outdated and the source of the problem, and we
therefore need to experiment with new infrastructures.60 As we saw in Chapter 3, the
infrastructure-imbued perspective was repeated by newspapers, reports, speeches, and so on,
quickly producing and naturalizing the new sense of crisis, as well as helping set in motion a
(well-funded) search for the kinds of solutions we were told were required (new infrastructures,
systems).
The emergence of this new ‘wisdom’ was crucial to the success of living breakwaters, and it
provided the opportunity for SCAPE to bring their idea to a new level. As Orff recounts, the firm
had started getting calls about oyster-tecture even after Hurricane Irene, but according to the
architect it was with Sandy that things really took a new turn and the project began to be taken
seriously. SCAPE were able to take advantage of the crisis and search for new techniques, “able
to translate both the problem and its proposed solutions in their own … strategic interests and
ambitions” (McGuirk et al., 2015, p. 9), and to pose oysters as infrastructure as an appropriate
solution to the new problems. Through the use of narration and ordering across myriad venues,
60

For Foucault (1998), ‘problematization’ referred to the study of how some phenomena
‘become a problem’ and an ‘object of concern’ (see also Baachi, 2012; Larner, 2011).
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SCAPE further refined the ‘problematization’ set up after Sandy, and posed oysters as a
quintessential, unquestionable solution on a newly official and legitimated scale.
But the narratives used by Orff and SCAPE did not only impose an existing option as ‘the’
option. They created a new one (‘living, growing infrastructure,’ a phrase that did not preexist
the construction) that came to be perceived as the best option. A large part of SCAPE’s success
in doing so was in reframing oysters as infrastructure in a serious and legitimate way with the
right people and in the right place and time. In what is perhaps one of the most significant postSandy turns, SCAPE was invited to participate in the City’s first large-scale response to the
storm, the Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency commission on improving the
strength and resilience of citywide infrastructure, convened by Bloomberg to discuss how to
prepare the state and city for the coming effects of climate change.61 The commission, composed
of an interdisciplinary team of planners, biologists, ecologists, CEOs, engineers and city
politicians, was charged to model coastal protection strategies for a range of sea level rise and
storm scenarios (City of New York, 2016). In this context, SCAPE contributed a vision of soft
coastal infrastructures, via
the exploration of integrating natural systems as risk-reduction infrastructure, layering
strategies for enhanced coastal protection and ecosystem health. Hard engineering and
natural systems were overlaid to develop hybrid solutions adaptive to specific
neighborhood and ecological contexts. Attention was paid to the particular
geomorphologic conditions of the proposed sites, financial and ecological sustainability
of the system as a whole, and the viability of strategies within the regulatory and political
framework of New York City. (SCAPE, 2016, n.p.)
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For more info and a video description of the SIRR, see City of New York, 2016.
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At the end of the process, SCAPE architects helped draft a 400+ page report entitled
‘PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York,’ in which a synthesized version of the ‘new’
New York was depicted. The report reflected a city composed of manifold and interlocking
infrastructural systems—broken down into three types: regular or ‘technical infrastructure,’
‘green infrastructure,’ and ‘social infrastructure’— inundated by risks coming from every place
and every scale: hurricanes, rising seas, heat waves, technical failures, knowns and unknowns,
each threatening to cascade into other systems. Alongside standard proposals for how to manage
this system, wave-absorbing oyster reefs now appeared seamlessly situated along smart grids to
redirect energy flows, backup generators, and social media networks to supplement official
channels and maintain connections (not to mention ‘social infrastructure’ which referred to the
capacities of citizens and communities to communicate, act as responders, assess damage, and
share information during crises). Thus, in this, the first and most comprehensive official poststorm plan, oysters and nature were imagined as one risk reduction system alongside others,
normalized as one technology of management within a broader self-healing, resilient city.
At the same time, other forces, including the Rockefeller Foundation and their $100 million
resilience investment, the federal government storm recovery initiative, the same ones pushing
most intensely for resilience as the new security watchword (see discussion of Judith Rodin,
Chapter 3)— came together in 2013 to launch the Rebuild by Design (RBD) competition.62
SCAPE submitted a concept proposal to that competition, further pushing oysters into this new
crisis management context and refining the imaginary of ‘nature as infrastructure.’ To craft their
proposal, SCAPE put together a team of eight consultants, bringing many of the city’s already
62

For more on the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities Challenge, which the
organization calls a “$100 million effort to build urban resilience around the world,” see
Rockefeller Foundation, 2016, n.p.
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public figures associated with oysters or oyster restoration together into a single ‘powerhouse’
coalition. Throughout the competition, this coalition worked together to promote something
actually different from what they’d done before – a sobered, credible reconceptualization of
oysters as ‘living infrastructure,’ something that could be taken serious and be funded. Among
these were public proponents like Greenberg (2012), a popular food journalist who had been an
early promoter of oysters as infrastructure, and even published an editorial in the New York
Times hours before Hurricane Sandy struck New York City in which he lamented,
Down here at the end of Manhattan, on the border between evacuation zones B and C,
I’m prepared, mostly. My bathtub is full of water, as is every container I own. My
flashlights are battery-ed up, the pantry is crammed with canned goods and I even roasted
a pork shoulder that I plan to gnaw on in the darkness if ConEd shuts down the power.
But as I confidently tick off all the things that Governor Andrew M. Cuomo recommends
for my defense as Hurricane Sandy bears down on me, I find I’m desperately missing one
thing. I wish I had some oysters. (n.p.)
Also included on the team were many oyster restoration organizations in the city, including
Harbor School and Billion Oyster Project, as well as other unlikely groups whose expertise was,
as we will see, crucial to ‘branding’ the project.63
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According to Orff (2015),
There were a few carry overs - Pete Malinowksi, for one, and Glen Cummings MTWTF
graphic design, but I suppose the point was that we did an assessment of what was
missing after Oyster-tecture to make it a real world project, to come out of the white
walls of museum and into the world and after the exhibit, and began independently to
advance the work on our own with Philip Orton hydrodynamic modeling, SeArc. Then
for HUD we also invited Marine engineers Ocean & Coastal, and geotech Parsons
Brinckerhoff for the HUD submission. (personal communication, May 31, 2015)
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Throughout the competition, the team wove together a series of ‘narrative threads’ and told a
new story of how oysters are, and have always been, infrastructure. Central to this story was the
deployment of metaphors, vocabulary, and visual cues that redefined oysters in terms of their
functions (and reeducated New Yorkers on how they should be seen): “It’s more like an
engineering partner than something that will be on our dinner plate anytime soon," clarified Orff
to SI Live (cited in Lavis, 2014). Imaginaries from the firm’s MOMA exhibition were reprised
but instead of ‘glamorous’ (Orff, 2010, n.p) bivalves waiting to be eaten, new terms like ‘living
infrastructure,’ ‘physical-biological infrastructure’ and ‘ecological infrastructure,’ were used
(Orff, 2014a; SCAPE, 2013b; Greenberg, 2014a, p. 28).64 These statements were confirmed on
the team’s project boards and cross-sectional diagrams, designed by Manhattan-based graphic
design studio MTWTF, which transposed a series of feedback loops onto the body of the oyster,
so that the oyster's ‘eating’ was reduced to a simple series of arrows and lines to describe the
unique process of how oysters filter water as they ‘feed’ (SCAPE, 2013b). In sum, the process
involves the upper valve rising, as ciliated gills pump water in and water passes through gills;
then microalgae and phytoplankton are separated and retained; in turn clean water is then
released back into the water). In this way the oyster ‘filtration system’ is not only situated as a
participant in a larger but closed cycle (as it was imagined in the pre-Sandy MOMA exhibition
(Bergdoll, 2011, p. 90). In the images promoting the Living Breakwaters project, visualized reefs
as systems interconnected with their surrounds—ocean currents, waves, energies, fish— whose
force they are shown to accept and modulate (see Figure 4.2).
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According to Elachi (personal communication, October 23, 2015), the idea of ‘ecological
infrastructure’ is rooted in part in landscape architecture. For more on recent developments in the
latter, see Del Tredici, 2001, 2010; Odum, 1953; Belanger, 2009; Forman, 1986.
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Figure 4.2: Rebuild by Design early proposal boards proposing oysters as wave-attenuating
infrastructure. Retrieved from http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/SI_IH_2_new.jpg. Copyright: 2013 SCAPE/RBD.

In the team’s narratives, oysters’ new infrastructural ‘nature’ was naturalized and projected
into the past, as something that ‘we’ ‘moderns’ destroyed: “two centuries ago, reefs composed of
3 trillion oysters were a ‘natural seawall’ that created shallower bays and served as a “first line of
defense for Manhattan against storms as fierce or fiercer than 2012’s Hurricane Sandy,’” asserted
Greenberg (cited in Kane, 2014, n.p.). “We know,” SCAPE’s report to RBD confirmed, “that in
addition to being beloved fishing and recreational grounds, bay landscapes are crucial absorptive
ecological infrastructure that help reduce risk for communities located along the water's edge”
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(IP, p. 15). Statements of fact like these were followed by the repetition of those facts in other
venues: “oysters,” business magazine Fast Company explained in a 2013 article, “were once one
of Manhattan's defenses against coastal erosion and storms sweeping up the Long Island Sound”
(a claim accompanied by an Editor’s Note that stated, “if the oysters don't work, there is also this
plan to build a massive sea wall to protect New York harbor”) (Coren, 2013, n.p.). Pundits like
Greenberg (2014b) decried the absence of oysters during Sandy, noting how they would have
helped protect the city and should be the city’s ‘natural allies for the next sandy’ (Fountain,
2013, n.p.). Each of these worked to naturalize the claim that oysters are infrastructure by stating
that oysters have always been infrastructure.
This narrative was extended further when the team’s initial proposal –submitted alongside
148 other team flood prevention ‘concepts’— was selected by the RBD jury as one of ten
finalists. Finalists were given three months to develop more serious proposals, with Orff’s
SCAPE directed to zero in on Staten Island’s Sandy-impacted south shore. In their second
proposal, SCAPE narrated their assigned ‘site’ like they had previously narrated the oysters, now
using oysters to ‘stor[y]’ (McGuirk, et al., p. 7) the south shore as the site for the experiment, and
to persuade local as well as RBD jury members to support it. Over old-timey paintings of oyster
tongers and vintage postcards of beach-goers in seemingly simpler times (see Figure 4),
SCAPE’s (2014b) proposal video reminded viewers of the region’s oyster past –“Tottenville…
was once known as ‘the town the oyster built!’” Viewers were also reminded of Staten Island's
“deep cultural connection to the water” (SCAPE, 2013b, pp. 3-4). Bringing together statements
and images of this nature, SCAPE’s materials painted an image of better, simpler times based on
a lost environmental connection (see Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3: ‘Ye Olde Bay Back in the Day’: retro images of Staten Island used in SCAPE’s
RBD proposal. From SCAPE 2013c, p. 4. Copyright SCAPE/RBD.

These storylines did something we may not necessarily think about when it comes to
infrastructure: evoke feelings. In narrating the site and the project, SCAPE drew on a broader
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feeling that afflicts many New Yorkers, that of living in an environment that has become
fundamentally alien, so removed from life as to be invisible. Figure 4.4 shows a page from the
RBD proposal, featuring empty benches facing deserted beaches, with an outline of a couple
holding a baby next to the remark, “kids don’t use our beaches because they are cut off.”65
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Far from just a marketing strategy, in my various interviews and conversations with SCAPE
team members, this feeling was expressed repeatedly by team members themselves. As Elachi
spoke more generally:
You just like have no connection to a lot of the ecosystems that we’re surrounded by
anymore. Wakefield: It’s so crazy. Elachi: Yeah. Wakefield: It’s like we’re here, but
we’re like not really actually here. Elachi: We could be anywhere… (2015, personal
communication, October 23, 2015)
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Figure 4.4: SCAPE’s RBD proposal depicting south Staten Island as a place of destruction
and loss. From SCAPE, 2013c, p. 18. Copyright SCAPE/RBD.

The materials presented play on a nostalgic sentiment and longing to ‘reconnect’ to a nature,
while simultaneously conjuring nature as a present threat. "Wave... energy is deadly," Orff (cited
in Lavis, 2014, n.p.) explained with a phrase she often repeats in interviews. Instead of a
remediated, albeit watery, world (as in the 2010 MOMA exhibition), the Living Breakwaters
proposal deployed a series of presentations, booklets and videos that, according to SCAPE,
“aim[ed] to make risk legible and part of everyday life” (2013c, p. 14). In them, the bay was
reconceptualized as a threat facing the city, depicted in dark red waves moving in on the island
(see Figure 4.5). In a revised TED talk video, Orff (2014a) begins with a map of NYC featuring
an array of arrows all listing ‘THREATS,’ describing a relationship that is “changing fast.”
Wave energy conveyed in metrics of kinetic force, numbers deployed to show us the intensity
being discussed. “You are here,” a second chart shows 2014 at the cusp of rapidly rising levels
of storm intensity, urban population, temperature, and seas (See Figure 4.6, from Orff, 2014a; a
similar chart appears in SCAPE, 2013c, p. 14-15). Warning that “New York City faces a high
degree of potential risk,” (SCAPE, 2013c, p. 8), the report emphasized the even higher
concentration of risk on Staten Island, and reminded viewers of the devastation and lives lost
there during Sandy.
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Figure 4.5: The deadly effects of waves and flooding, as depicted in SCAPE’s RBD
proposal. From SCAPE, 2013c, p. 6. Copyright SCAPE/RBD.
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Figure 4.6: ‘You are here.’ Chart depicting potential climate change risks facing NYC,
included in SCAPE’s RBD proposal. From SCAPE, 2013c, pp. 14-15. Copyright SCAPE/RBD.

Of course south Staten Island is not just an abstract vessel for displaced feelings – or a set of
statistics. Known as the ‘wetland bowl,’ it is also a place where 23 people drowned during Sandy
—the largest number of deaths citywide— and where residents continue to live, feel vulnerable,
and search for answers (City of New York, 2013). And not all of those answers will be found by
getting back to the water. As Billion Oyster Program manager at New York Harbor School Sam
Janis acknowledges, the lower half of SI is indifferent to the water (personal communication,
April 17, 2015). Others meanwhile never lost their relation to the water –many Staten Islanders
still harvest clams, run kayak clubs and even grow oysters. The storm ruined many lives, and
when the Governor’s office of Storm Recovery launched their program to buy out residents
living along the coasts —land they are now told ‘never should have been inhabited’— many
accepted the offer, while other neighborhoods actually launched campaigns asking to be bought
out together (Kensinger, 2015; one such SI resident who accepted the buyout is pictured in
Figure 4.7).66 For those who continue to live on the south shore, many feel neglected, scared, or
enraged by the government’s response, or lack thereof.
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For more on the Buyout and Acquisition Program, see NYSGOSR, 2016. For the story of how
Oakland Beach, Staten Island residents organized to ask the federal government to buy their
whole neighborhood out together, see Rush, 2015.
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Figure 4.7: A resident of Oakwood Beach looks out on his home, destroyed by Sandy.
November 20, 2012. The neighborhood was included in the state’s buyout program. Retrieved
from https://www.yahoo.com/news/staten-island-area-hit-sandy-130908081.html?ref=gs.
Copyright AP/Seth Wenig.

Taking into account loss and longing, fear and crisis, the search for new forms of urban
government as well as investment opportunities, SCAPE reiterated this broad consensus that
became dominant after Sandy, while translating their project into its framework, posing oysters
as the perfect, inevitable solution for many otherwise different ‘constituencies.’67 These
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In short, to win RBD, there were many ‘criteria’ that had to be met, many ‘constituencies’ had
to be appeased, and SCAPE put a lot of energy into generating this support. According to Elachi
(personal communication, October 23, 2015), this entailed lots of meetings with area residents,
council members and schools to generate project support (personal communication, October 23).
Out of these efforts came a series of programming and outreach to educate and bring residents in
on the project. As Elachi elaborated, it was important to illustrate how the project would not hurt
the area’s clams, nor were these going to be the oysters that area residents’ grandparents talked
about. These new oysters, rather, would be helping the shoreline and protecting houses. The
water hub component of the team’s successful RBD entry, which I discuss in Chapter 5, were a
part of this strategy. By providing this narrative, and the promise of other add on improvements,
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potentially confusing threads were brought together and made sensible through the oyster, a
‘configuring device,’ a ‘cohering force’ able to configure existing needs into an implementable
project (McGuirk et al., 2015, p. 11). For all of these ‘constituencies,’ the project stepped in with
a concrete plan, crafted to convince. The result was the creation of a moral imperative: those
with the need to survive or looking for a safe investment should support this effort, as oysters are
the answer. The longing for the world conflated with the construction of this new infrastructure,
the materials promise a return ‘back to the good ol’ days.’ The ‘cute oyster’ gloss works to help
us forget that what is being called and created here is not the same oysters once scooped up by
the nineteenth century tongs pictured in SCAPE’s materials. Yet, SCAPE wants us to believe
that they are. SCAPE's designs play on the past, deploying an edited version of it to ground their
designs.

Proving that nature ‘works’
To legitimate oysters as a ‘real answer,’ SCAPE translated their proposed solution to those it
would serve, to show those seeking solutions that oyster-tecture was in fact what they needed and
in their favor (cost beneficial, technically feasible, and cutting edge). Equally for others like
SeArc, it was a chance to test their techniques in real time, with the aquatic architecture a
pathway into a ‘living laboratory.’ Finally for the city, eager to avoid conflicts with communities

the project has proven “sufficiently persuasive to induce actors to associate and participate
collaboratively across the life of the project, without the need for more directive or forceful
forms of power and authority” (McGuirk, et al., 2015, p. 11).
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over development and to demonstrate its ‘participatoryness,’ the project provided a community
that could support the project.
For investors (and many residents), the question repeatedly asked was: “but how do we know
if these systems work and how do they perform?” (Orff, 2014a, 04:05). As Orff recounts (2015),
ever since an architecture critic had called SCAPE’s 2010 Rising Currents proposal ‘utopian,’
her ambition had been to make people take the project seriously, so that it could be taken to the
next level (out of museums and into the water) (personal communication, May 29, 2015). Data
and measurements help in legitimizing and funding a project (Orff, 2011). In this vein,
responding to the question “What aspects of your project would you develop or change,” Orff
mused, “I’d also like to model the hydrodynamics of our proposed reef and develop its form
relative to protecting the inner harbor from storm events… incorporating data to describe the reef
as essential to New York’s new infrastructure would help fund the project and move it forward”
(cited in Bergdoll, 2011, p. 98). It is one thing to call oyster reefs infrastructure, but it is another
thing to prove that they ‘are’ infrastructure. Infrastructure, after all, is supposed to work. And for
all the claims that oysters have always been in the process of working as infrastructure, “the
science and modeling and information needed to fully understand how these work and provide
risk reduction benefits isn’t there yet, that’s the big hurdle, understanding that. From an
infrastructure point of view this is what’s critical. We had to prove it was infrastructure!”
(Brashear, personal communication, January 5, 2015).
To move beyond the realm of representation and design, “it was imperative that the team
tested [breakwater] performance using the latest scientific tools” (SCAPE, 2013c, p. 26). In
collaboration with oceanographer Philip Orton at the Stevens Institute of Technology at the
College of Staten Island, SCAPE’s hypothetical models were tested using the ADCIRC/SWAN
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computerized storm surge and wave modeling system, to see what kind of wave height reduction
and other risk management the reefs might achieve (Brashear, 2015; SCAPE, 2013b, 2013c).68 In
a summary of their findings in the Living Breakwaters promotional video available on RBD’s
website (SCAPE 2014b), viewers are shown two charts, the first titled “Wave Height during
Sandy - No Intervention” with waves cresting at up to 6.2', represented in bright yellow and red;
next to a second chart, “Wave Height during Sandy - With Intervention” still red but projecting
wave height decreases between 2'-4.7', as Orton intones: “a benefit of computer models is that …
they give us an objective answer… many people have an opinion or even political viewpoints
driving what they think we should do about coastal flooding and sea level rise, but computer
models actually give us an objective answer based on available science” (SCAPE, 2014b; see
Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.8: Stevens Institute diagram modeling the ability of oyster reefs to reduce wave
impact along SI’s coast. From SCAPE, 2013c, p. 27. Copyright SCAPE/RBD.
68

For more specific information on their modeling inputs, see SCAPE, 2013a, pp. 56-62.
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To communicate the value of said risk reduction, SCAPE brought self-described “global
consulting firm assisting public and private clients to plan, develop, design, construct, operate
and maintain critical infrastructure” Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB) onto their team. PB is run by the
former regulatory department of the Army Corp of Engineers and helped spearhead the SIRR.
Their previous work in New York was on coastal protection engineering, however for Living
Breakwaters their role was to analyze cost benefits, work on new ways of thinking about
‘ecosystem services,’ and in particular to test and measure the potential effectiveness of reefs as
ecological infrastructure in order to present them to regulators. The firm’s calculations, based on
a 100 year storm ‘event’, which they advertised in the proposal booklet and to stakeholders at the
projects’ various meetings, yielded a final monetized estimate of risk reduction benefits for the
Tottenville Phase 1 Pilot at “$263 million in damages avoided, 52 acres of habitat created, 32+
species supported by the breakwaters, $15 million of potential economic generation annually,
550 students engaged directly annually, and 23,500 students engaged island-wide annually”
(SCAPE 2013c, p. 33).69
Beyond convincing potential stakeholders, what was effectively generated here in these
efforts to prove oysters ‘work,’ was a story in which measure provided a solid layer of
legitimacy to the idea of nature as infrastructure.70 This ‘abstraction’ of oysters as living beings
into inches of storm surge attenuated or not, buildings and property protected or not, gallons of
water filtered was essential to ‘proving’ that, in doing its nature thing, nature would function
69

More detailed cost-benefit analysis on SCAPE 2013c, pp. 100-101.
It is possible to draw a parallel here with the process of ‘real abstraction’ described by Karl
Marx (1990/1867). Whereas in the 19th century oyster industry, money was the general
equivalent that made oysters comparable with baskets or bricks, today function and risk also act
as equivalents allowing comparison of oysters to cement sea walls or water filtration plants.
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infrastructurally. If successful, as noted previously, NY State intends the reefs to be a ‘replicable
resiliency strategy’ (New York State Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, 2015, n.p.), to be
reproduced around the country, “replicable in other waterfront communities faced with the
similar duality of risk and opportunity presented by their connection to the water” (SCAPE,
2016, n.p.).71

Making nature ‘do its nature thing’
At this point, the project encounters the fact that, despite all the work to say oysters have
always been infrastructure, in reality, they have not. At least not ‘infrastructure’ as it is now
envisioned and being built. Oysters have existed on earth since the Carboniferous period of the
late Paleozoic Era (US Geological Survey, 2015; see also Mann, 2013, p. 323). According to
Kurlansky (2007),
The earliest oyster species by far predate man. Fossils of tiny, barely visible oysters have
been dated to the Cambrian period 520 million years ago. During the Permian period, 250
million years ago, before mammals or dinosaurs appeared, there was a sweeping shapeup in marine life that left many species extinct. Oysters, however, not only survived but
became bigger and more numerous. They continued to prosper in the flowering
71

The joining, in September 2015, of RBD with another Rockefeller-funded organization, the
100 Resilient Cities network, recently enhanced the prospect of replicating oyster infrastructure
in other regions. According to the 100 Resilient Cities-RBD merger announcement: “One of the
keys to building urban resilience is to take the most effective tools – tools that have worked in
other places — and export them. That's what will happen through this partnership. By joining
100 Resilient Cities, Rebuild by Design will bring the successful model developed in conjunction
with U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the Hurricane Sandy region to cities
around the world, carrying the resilience movement forward together in this new chapter”
(Rockefeller Foundation, 2016, n.p.).
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Cretaceous period, the lush epoch when dinosaurs mysteriously vanished from 144
million to 65 million years ago. About 65 million years ago, when humans first began
developing oysters started evolving into the species that exist today. Although modern
species have significant differences from their ancestors, the fossil of a prehistoric oyster
looks remarkably similar to a contemporary oyster shell. (p. 15)
During the early Holocene, around 10,000 B.C., following much the same cycle as their
ancestors hundreds of millions of years prior, oysters began to grow in the waters around what is
now New York, beginning life as one of millions of eggs released into the areas estuaries (see a
diagram of oysters’ life cycle in Figure 4.9). Not all of the eggs survive and transform into
oysters— much depends on the first few days of their lives. As a newborn, the oyster is a tiny
mobile blob of larva, nourished only by the nutrients from the egg. Within a few days, as it
extracts the calcium carbonate from the area’s lime-rich waters –calcium carbonate is the main
source of energy for the oyster, the ‘building blocks’ of its life— the baby develops organs able
to process food, and begins to grow a thick, hard shell (Brooks, 1996/1891, pp. 23-25; University
of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, 2016, n.p.).72 Having reached this point, the
baby oyster swims until it reaches a stable surface, where it attaches and remains for the rest of
its life. Unlike clams, which burrow in the mud, or mussels, which attach to outcropping of
rocks, the substrate to which wild oysters attach is usually other adult oysters, or the shells of
dead oysters. The hardening and layering of shells individually and together constitute what we
refer to as a bed or a reef (Brooks, p. 23). The oyster matures and releases millions more eggs at
spawn, which perpetuate the cycle. Upon death, the oyster’s shell collects on the oyster reef and
72

For a rich and more detailed description of oyster baby growth, see Brooks, 1996/1891, pp. 2325. See also University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, 2016; New York-New
Jersey Harbor Estuary Program, 2009.
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becomes a point for the cycle to continue. Over time, in the course of their individual and
collective lives and beyond into death, reefs grow prolifically in an ever-expanding selfagglomeration, stuck together like glue, growing up and out, with older oysters inside and
younger on the exterior, forming immense reefs. By the 1600s, immense reefs stretched through
the Raritan Bay and its tributaries, the East River, along the Hudson River as far north as
Ossining, NY, as well as throughout Arthur Kill, Jamaica Bay, and south Newark Bay
(MacKenzie, 1984, p. 38; MacKenzie, 1992, p. 8).

Figure 4.9: Oyster life cycle diagram. Retrieved from
http://score.dnr.sc.gov/deep.php?subject=2&topic=15. Copyright Karen R.
Swanson/COSEE/NSF.
Living, growing infrastructure
As we saw in Chapter 2, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rapid harvesting by
European colonists for the sale of oysters left those reefs completely barren only to be replanted
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for a brief oyster industry. Oysters were planted, harvested, and planted again, in a mass
production process that had no regard for the oysters’ lifeworld, or the cycle needed for it to
grow, and eventually led to the abandonment of the process altogether. In contrast, the designers
of the city’s new ‘oyster breakwaters’ are actually trying to recreate that lifeworld, seeing in it a
productivity and emergent potential to be ‘harnessed’ (Orff, 2010), as the very basis of its design.
SCAPE team member Greenberg (2014a) has conveyed his amazement at oyster fecundity
numerically, typing out the nearly-unreadable estimated annual spawn of oyster larvae of the 3
trillion oysters thought to exist in colonial New York—“300,000,000,000,000,000,000 (three
hundred quintillion)” (2014a, p. 28). "Layer by layer,” marvels Greenberg, “the reef builds
vertically, each new oyster generation building on the last... no other bivalve builds in 3
dimensions with such architectural zeal” (p. 28). Orff echoes the amazement, stating “albeit a
very small creature and very modest, this creature is incredible, because it can agglomerate into
these mega-reef structures. It can grow; you can grow it...” (2010, n.p.). Whereas traditional
breakwaters will grow deeper and be less effective as sea levels rise, according to designers “this
incredibly exciting animal can attenuate and agglomerate onto each other and form these
amazing natural reef structures. They really become nature's wave attenuators” (Orff 2010, n.p.,
our emphasis). To reiterate one of Orff’s (2011) important statements, this is her firm’s "core
concept, of ‘growing’ climate-change infrastructure biologically now rather than relying on
capital-intensive big construction projects in the distant future” (p. 98).
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Harnessing the ‘liveliness’ of nonhumans
This view of nature bears resemblance to the ‘vital materialism’ that has in recent years
become popular in geography and social theory. In this diverse literature, nature and nonhuman
things are celebrated as being inventive, emergent, and so full of life. As a corrective to
anthropocentric modern thinking, these literatures reeducate readers to understand that far from
inert objects, the nonhuman world does things. Animals, computer systems or viruses alike are
construed in these literatures as surprising, funny absolutely amazing (or horrific) actors with
agency in their own right (Amin & Thrift, 2002; Braun & Whatmore, 2010; Callon, 1986;
Heynen, Kaika & Swyngedouw, 1996; Latour, 1993, 1999; Mitchell, 2002; Stiegler, 1998;
Thrift, 2004; Whatmore, 2002). As Bruce Braun (2008) notes in his survey of this literature, the
‘neo-vitalism’ taken up by these thinkers offers an important contribution to creating different
ethical political orientations toward the world, in which humans and other living beings exist in
and with a world of things that exceed our capacity to predict or to control. Indeed, this is an
orientation that becomes clear in construction process, and also one I return to in Chapter 6.73
Orff and her team however are not just interested in marveling at the ‘fecundity of
bivalvency’ (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 46) – they want to ‘harness’ it (Orff, 2010, n.p.). Here the
project of making oysters into infrastructure puts us in the realm of the neoliberalization of
nature, ecosystems services, and biomimicry. Efforts to ‘capitalize’ on nature and to extract its
‘services’ have proliferated in recent decades, and there is an extensive literature around this
73

Regarding the ways these ‘neo-vitalisms’ have been taken up in geographical research, I am in
some ways agreeing here with Braun (2008) who suggests that research in this vein is too often
this “new ‘romance’ of matter,” marked by a tendency to prove the same point, that things are
not given, that emergence defines everything, that things are unpredictable, lively, inventive.
“Once this claim has been made,” Braun (2008) asks, “then what? Isn’t it equally important to
attend to how organization occurs?” (p. 675).
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subject (Bakker, 2010; Katz, 1998; Braun, 2008; Robertson, 2004, 2006; Heynen & Robbins,
2005; Heynen, et al., 2007; Mansfield, 2008; Castree, 2008a, 2008b, 2010). Many contemporary
views on oysters fall under this rubric, specifically in that oysters are seen as providing
ecosystems services like water filtration (Jones et al., 1994; Beck, 2011). Yet, while our specific
case here of oyster infrastructure does aim to ‘harness’ the ‘services’ provided by oysters’ life
processes, it does so in a way that is somewhat different from the majority of the aforementioned
instances. Oyster infrastructure is not primarily about making profit off of nature’s services or
harnessing ‘natural capital’ (Costanza, 1997). It is, rather, aimed toward making nature ‘do its
nature thing,’ in order to manage other natural processes, namely wave impact, so as to protect
and preserve life on land. As such the project is an experiment in a new kind of oyster ‘farming,’
in which what the city will harvest from reefs is no longer oysters, but capacities, that is, the
living of the oyster itself. Unlike biomimicry, such as those that aim to replicate living processes
in military technologies (Johnson, 2015), NYS’s oyster infrastructure endeavor does not seek to
mimic life processes, but rather to produce —and enhance— actual oysters’ life cycles, including
into and beyond their deaths.
To do so, NYS must make oysters live. Making nature do its ‘nature thing’, making it
perform in the way imagined actually takes a lot of work, by both nature and humans. Coming
back to the ‘vital natures’ literature, this work is something that authors in this literature have not
addressed enough. Implementing the idea of ‘nature as infrastructure’ involves a kind of
biopolitics (Foucault, 2008), in which it is humans trying to make nature live in a particular way
–not according to a social norm, but in the way they imagine is natural to the oyster.
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‘Wild’ experimentation in the Anthropocene
It is at this point that our study of oyster-tecture’s ‘configuration’ takes us beyond the
framework provided by McGuirk et al. (2015). For all the emphasis they place on the importance
of nonhuman things in governmental assemblages, McGuirk et al.’s analysis is focused entirely
on the work done by humans to work with, move around, talk about, imagine, or manipulate
other humans or other things. Put simply, McGuirk et al.’s analysis of ‘configuration’ is
anthropocentric. Perhaps, in an effort to demystify ‘government,’ they have inadvertently
rendered it too simple. There is a complexity in the concept of ‘nature as infrastructure,’ as it
requires work done not only on the part of those seeking to realize the concept, but also the
actual work done by nature. Stranger still, this ‘work’ is not work in the classic sense of the
word, but nature simply ‘being,’ ‘nature doing its nature thing.’ In this project, the tasks of
‘configuration’ or ‘assembling’ involve ‘partnerships’ with humans and nonhumans, underwater
and on land.
To construct the reefs in Raritan Bay, we might say that what is required is akin to
‘rewilding.’ A term that has recently grown in popularity, rewilding refers to efforts to increase
biodiversity by reintroducing species or systems destroyed by humans (Lorimer, et al., 2015, p.
41; see also Monbiot, 2014). Inclusive of diverse efforts across the world, in the United States
rewilding is most commonly associated with the reintroduction of ‘keystone species’ –and more
specifically often targets ‘charismatic flagship animals’ (Lorimer, et al., 2015, p. 49) — to
ecosystems where they are seen as missing. For example, an effort is currently underway to
reintroduce wolves in Yellowstone Park, as a means of instigating the return and flourishing of
other forms of life such has bison, trees, and beaver (Monbiot, 2014; see also Lorimer, 2015, p.
43). Just as the living breakwaters concept is based on the idea of recreating the way oysters are
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believed to have existed for millennia, rewilding often relies on a discourse of pristine past
nature, often taking the form creating ecosystems through human effort in the present based on
notions of how they worked in the past, in places and times prior to or with less human
intervention, untouched or prehuman idea of nature (Lorimer, et al., 2015, pp. 45, 46; Katz,
1998; Smith, 1996; see also Cronon, 1995; Jørgensen, 2015; Lorimer & Driessen, 2016). But as
geographer Fraser MacDonald (2013) has shown in his work on the Scottish Highlands, much
human work is required to maintain supposedly ‘pristine wilds,’ the latter being in reality a
romanticized, idealized nature. As geographers Lorimer and Driessen (2016) show, in contrast to
most conservation efforts, which try to plan and manage nature, rewilding is more like a ‘wild
experiment’ involving “open-ended, uncertain and political negotiations between people and
wildlife… in inhabited places and involve[ing] multiple forms of expertise, not all of which are
human” (p. 169). As such, rewilding experiments do not reproduce or save a previously existing
version of nature. Rather, they produce new and unexpected configurations, generated through
the interaction of multiple forms of life. The ‘lab’ in which these configurations are generated are
neither pristine untouched nature, nor a perfectly controlled space of a typical scientific
laboratory. Rather the laboratory in which rewilding experiments take place is the “inhabited and
thus political landscapes and ecologies of the Anthropocene” (Lorimer & Driessen, 2016, pp. 4849). A lab in which nothing is certain, and nothing is ‘neat and clean.’ What is required is often
making life live in environments that are practically speaking dead, as much as inserting life into
now-existing political or legal meshworks.
While Living Breakwaters is not a rewilding project, the spirit and methodology represented
by each are in some respects analogous. Both projects share a fundamentally experimental
nature. Both take place in the world in which the past is still present. Both generate new
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encounters between nature and life, and in so doing generate new patterns and forms of life. In
the case of oyster infrastructure, we do not know if it will succeed, or exactly what kind of
'nature' will emerge, in part because of all the inherited contexts and conditions that, as we will
see shortly, are involved.
Drawing on this analogy, I suggest a further addition to McGuirk et al.’s (2015) framework
of ‘configuration.’ While McGuirk et al.’s concept emphasizes the experimental and uncertain
nature of ‘configuration,’ their framework does not sufficiently attend to the role played by
context in which configuring takes place. The concept of ‘configuration’ can be enriched if we
understand it as always occurring in, and influenced by, a specific historical, geographical and
social context. This context is itself constructed of existing forces and discourses, past actions
and interactions, problems and aporias within which any efforts to ‘configure’ must work.
Configuration, as discussed, is achieved through the coming together of disparate forces and
processes, and this coming together has much to do with chance—the right time, the right place,
the mood—as it does the deliberate efforts of actors to seize that chance, and put a form to it.
Human actors can play a part in that, but cannot ever fully control or predict it. Configuration is
always done in a world into which one is thrown, a world that however hard one tries to make it
conform to their intentions, exceeds and at times confounds those intentions. Looking at the
remaining work required to make oyster infrastructure will help clarify this point.
The context of Raritan Bay presents a number of challenges to growing oyster infrastructure,
not least of which is getting permission to put oysters in the water in the first place. According to
SCAPE project designer Lauren Elachi (personal communication, October 23, 2015), this was
one of the biggest and earliest questions the firm had to deal with, as New York City waters are
strictly regulated. Since the 1940s, industrialization of the NYC metropolitan region transformed
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Raritan Bay —which receives every major waterway connected to the New York City
metropolitan area, and therefore a significant portion of its waste— into what was effectively an
open dump for trash, sewage, untreated raw waste, chemical runoff, petroleum (Greenberg, p.
35-37). The Clean Water Act was passed in 1977 in response to this, making dumping raw
sewage illegal, but also makes putting anything in the water difficult. Raritan Bay and all other
waters around New York City are under the jurisdiction of New York’s Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC), which prohibits filling in the water and decides whether or
not something can be put in the water and what type of controls or restrictions putting something
in the water requires (Elachi, personal communication, October 23, 2015).
The Raritan Bay is directly in the path of one of the main channels used to enter NY Harbor
and the petrochemical industrial region of New Jersey, and so is regularly dredged at everdeepening depths to make room for the ever-larger container ships and oil tankers (pictured in
Figure 4.10) that come through the area. Any vessels heading for New Jersey’s ‘chemical coast’
or the New York Port cross the estuary via the Ambrose Channel and Sandy Hook Channel.
According to Orff (personal communication, May 29, 2015), the Army Corps of Engineers
(ACE) flagged the shipping channel that runs through the bay as a key issue, out of concern for
disrupting transportation to the oil plants on the other side in New Jersey. Designers have since
received certification that the project will have ‘no effect’ on ACE infrastructures, and an ACE
permit to work in the area (Orff, personal communication, May 29, 2015; see also New York
State Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (NYSGOSR), 2015). A powerful reminder of the
way in which infrastructures to manage the effects of climate change actually, literally, sit side
by side massive infrastructures apparatus that continue to produce those effects, in ever greater
proportions. The area has now been designated as suitable for oyster restoration by ACE and
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oyster restoration (NYSGOSR, 2015). A report has been put together by the Comprehensive
Restoration Plan by ACE with the Hudson River Estuary program (NYSGOSR, 2015). The
project Environmental Impact Statement Draft Scope of Work projects that much of 2016 will be
devoted to further design, testing, modeling, talking to government, and getting the necessary
permits, as well as completing an Environmental Impact Statement for the site (NYSGOSR,
2015). In addition, time will be spent sending out ships to map and sample bottom sediments,
check for obstructions, make it through the environmental impact statement review, and obtain
all federal and state permits (See SCAPE, 2015; NYSGOSR, 2015).

Figure 4.10: One of the world’s largest cargo shipping container companies, German line
Hapag-Lloyd, crossing New York Harbor. Retrieved from https://basilkaratzas.com/2014/08/17/mv-frankfurt-express/. Copyright 2013/2014 Basil M Karatzas &
Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

In our conversations, SCAPE architects and Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB) representatives
repeatedly emphasized that securing the structures is actually one of the project’s biggest
challenges (see SCAPE team member and PB employee Pippa Brashear explain the project to

117

DEC, Figure 4.11). As indicated, getting permission to put things in NYC waters is a challenge,
and in the case of shellfish it is even more so. From the perspective of New York State and the
DEC, bringing oysters back to the bay—or any New York City waters— to manage risk is itself
seen as a risk. Oyster restoration was outlawed across the Raritan in New Jersey in 2010, leading
to a story that still enrages oyster restoration people — the state forced them to remove a huge
reef of oysters they had been growing there and throw it in a dumpster (NY/NJ Baykeeper,.
2016, n.p.). Today the only place oysters are allowed to grow in NJ is on a Navy pier, where
Rutgers scientist Beth Ravit and NY/NJ Baykeeper are allowed a small monitoring site because
it is totally restricted and already subject to 24-hour Department of Homeland Security
surveillance (Parry, 2011, n.p.). Across the bay on the New York side of jurisdiction, oysters
themselves have also been recategorized as a risk, with oysters living in waters bordering NYC
classified by NY State law as a ‘beneficial nuisance’ and laws against oyster harvesting and sale
on markets strictly enforced (Elachi, personal communication, October 23, 2015). Terrified that
its oyster past (see Chapter 2) will come back to haunt it, the fear is that people will ‘poach’
oysters, sell them on markets, cause public health crises, and disrupt the current oyster market
(which is entirely based on oysters shipped in from elsewhere) (Allison Fitzgerald, personal
communication, November 13, 2014).74
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As SCAPE team member Greenberg recounts, after weeks searching for a single living oyster
in New York's polluted water, when he finally found one in the water, he ate it immediately
(2014a p. 79).
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Figure 4.11: At a Staten Island public outreach meeting for Living Breakwaters, SCAPE
Team member Pippa Brashear explaining the project to NYS Department of
Environmental Conservation Region 2 Deputy Director Steve Zahn.
http://bulletin.pbworld.com/volumes/2014_07/living_breakwaters_plan_protect_new_york_city_
coast_wins_hud_funding.aspx. Copyright SCAPE/LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE.

“This is one of our biggest hurdles in the NYC area, getting the parties in power to see how
our oysters will not be poached!” (Allison Fitzgerald, NY/NJ Baykeeper, personal
communication, November 13, 2014). According to Elachi (personal communication, October
23, 2015) back in the proposal stage SCAPE’s large-scale vision of oyster beds surrounding
south Staten Island raised alarms with the city and the DEC. To this end, as the SCAPE team
moved into the more serious development of oyster-tecture, one of their main concerns was
crafting ways of securing the oysters and keeping people away from them so as to appease
regulators. The team worked extensively with the DEC to create a program for monitoring that
would be acceptable to the regulators at DEC (Elachi, personal communication, October 23,
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2015). In order to reassure the regulators, it was necessary to formulate a program that consisted
of,
patrolling and monitoring, having eyes there, video surveillance that would limit
manpower, someone watching cameras to make sure no one’s going out there, their
location relative to shore, oysters are in cages or substrate being very large blocks under
water, impossible for someone to go move a giant block underground. Physical
interventions that make it harder for someone to get at the oysters themselves…
(Brashear, personal communication, January 5, 2015)

Making oysters live
The legal and regulatory challenges are still minor compared to the much larger challenge of
getting an oyster reef to take hold again in the first place. Oysters today, as noted, are
functionally extinct throughout much of their original habitat (Beck, et al., 2011, p. 107). Long
gone are the conditions that historically made their life in the Raritan and other waters possible: a
rocky substrate, non-toxic waters, wide shallow bathymetric shelves that once provided good
habitat, and so on (New York-New Jersey Harbor Estuary Program, et al., 2009, pp. 10-13;
Sanderson, 2005; Coen & Luckenbach, 2000). In their place, what one finds is a deserted ocean
floor covered in toxic black goo, ten feet deep in some places, cut through by shipping channels,
bottom sediments and water laden with PCBs and heavy metals, algae blooms and the accretion
of the 1.1 billion gallons of wastewater poured into the harbor daily (Sam Janis, personal
communication, April 17, 2015; Waldman, 1999; Greenberg, New York City Department of
Environmental Protection, 2004). The south shore of Staten Island is a classic story of ecosystem
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decline in urban areas, and of the disastrous outcome of industrialism. Whenever it rains too
much, New York’s water treatment plants are overwhelmed and massive amounts of sewage
overflows into the city’s waterways (Gibbons & Yuhas. 2005). Waste from factories along the
New Jersey side of the bay, which among other industries has a high concentration of
petrochemical processing facilities, has been steadily discharged through sewage lines or
dumped directly into the water. “Container ships steam in for Port Elizabeth and Port Newark,
while garbage scows, sludge barges, dredgers and acid-waste barges go both ways. Smaller
barges laden with petroleum products—gasoline, kerosene, and fuel oil— head out of the harbor
and up and down the East coast,” describes MacKenzie (1984) eloquently (p. 3). Between the
1940s and 1960s, large oil slicks were visible on the bay’s surface due to the frequency of oil
spills there. There were eight major oil spills in NY Harbor in the 1990s alone (Greenberg,
2014a, p.47). According to MacKenzie (1984), “from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the
estimated annual pollutant loading to the Hudson-Raritan Estuary from all sources was 710,000
tons of suspended solids, 49,000 tons of oil and grease, 13,000 tons of petrol eon hydrocarbons,
5,360 tons of trace metals, and sixteen tons of chlorinated hydrocarbons” (p. 63). Nitrate and
phosphate runoff from nearby industry and treatment plants regularly create dense recurring
algae blooms on the bay’s surface (Waldman, 1999, p. 56-57).75
Designer Orff is aware of the challenges:
Being conservationists, and being people who are observing the world around us, what
we’re trying to find is the regenerative cycle back up. What is that spark–what is the series
of combinations, what are the scales at which we have to work? In my mind, there are two
75

For a lengthier survey of existing conditions in Raritan Bay, see New York-New Jersey Harbor
Estuary Program, et al., 2009, pp. 8-34.
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aspects: One is the concept of increased monitoring of a scientific feedback loop that now
has to come back in and be reflective of this sort of action moving forward. And the
second one is…knowing that there are multiple levels of tinkering–you can’t restore
nature to 1600s-era Manhattan. But you can try to reinvent the conditions under which
things can take hold… (quoted in Cohen, 2015)
These questions asked by Orff are familiar to the many groups and individuals engaged in oyster
restoration across the city, simple attempts to rekindle oyster life and bring reefs back to the
waters where they historically grew. In these efforts —carried out by a mix of high school
science teachers, conservationists, and regular people with a love of oysters— reefs are built
according to simple methods, common amongst which is the Billion Oyster Project’s (BOP)
‘oyster gardening’ (pictured in Figure 4.12). Much like the method envisioned in SCAPE’s
MOMA exhibition, oyster gardening entails the placement of oyster shells (retrieved by BOP
employees from city restaurants) and mesh bags filled with remotely set larvae (called spat-onshell) into handmade cages that they tie to the edge of piers and marinas around the city and
monitored to see if they grow and reproduce (New York Harbor School & New York Harbor
Foundation, 2014). Other larger scale methods, such as those used by the Oyster Restoration
Research Project, place a layer of rocks, a layer of shell, on which oyster spat is spread on by
hand (Oyster Restoration Research Project, 2013, pp. 3-5). The resulting oysters are often not the
reefs imagined by conservationists, as some are found attached to bridge bottoms, on shoes or
bottles. And while some reefs have been successful, many attempts have not (ORRP, 2013; see
also New York-New Jersey Harbor Estuary Program, et al., 2009, p. 54).
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Figure 4.12: 9th graders from NY Harbor school oyster gardening, using Billion Oyster
Project restoration station method. Retrieved from http://billionoysterproject.org/restorationstation/. Copyright Billion Oyster Project.

While oyster restoration experiments are taking place in low wave climates, where water
movement is minimal and oysters stand the best chance of taking hold and starting a reef, NYS’s
project pushes the challenge further. In contrast to traditional restoration, the living breakwaters
are the first experiment utilizing reefs for their ‘protective function’ rather than just restoration,
and are therefore being designed along a different ‘biopolitical’ criteria: they need to function, be
efficient, maximize capacity, be sturdy, and able to confront ‘aggressive’ waves. As a result, the
construction site is to be situated further off coast, directly in the midst of dangerous high wave
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climates. Even in low wave waters, starting a reef is not easy, and the depths of the Raritan
targeted for reef construction are especially unfavorable for oyster development, as shells or spat
can just blow away with currents and waves before getting a chance to start a reef. Indeed, as
reported by the Oyster Restoration Research Project (2013), most of the oyster mortality reported
on their reefs was actually due to this (p. 2).76 As an employee at BOP said, there is a real
possibility that NYS will just end up with a bunch of old shells washing up on shore (personal
communication, February 21, 2016). Furthermore, as there are no existing oyster reefs in the
Raritan Bay, and despite the ‘fecundity of bivalency’ heralded by the project’s materials and
supporters, starting now from oysters alone, it would take a long time for reefs sizable enough to
‘function’ to form. Writes SCAPE consultant Greenberg,
If it is difficult to imagine oysters actually forming islands, consider the timescale:
oysters in a wild environment reach maturity at about three years, after which they spawn
and generate young that will in turn form another later of oysters. Repeat this process
over the course of thousands of years, and the vertical accretion is considerable. (2014a p.
29)
This is no small consideration, as reefs are intended to address crises happening now. Not only
then is oyster life itself to be enhanced, but so too will its timescale need to be sped up.
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For this reason, the Oyster Restoration Research Project.(2013) uses the term ‘apparent
mortality’ in their report, to signify that their numbers do not indicate actual oysters that died
(from disease, or predators, etc.) but spat that was blown away before taking hold (p. 8).
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Enhancing nature, enhancing infrastructure
Titled the ‘Tottenville Reach,’ the reefs that NY State will be building in the coming years
will be on a ‘pilot’ site, seen by designers as a large-scale experiment in real time providing both
opportunity for different firms engage in new live trial methods devised for these new demands,
but moreover to see whether or not the project even ‘works’ (SCAPE, 2013a). RBD funding
covers only this first test phase, which consists of an approximately 2.46-mile section of reefs
around the southernmost part of Staten Island’s Tottenville neighborhood (SCAPE, 2013c, p.
10).
While SCAPE's MOMA design had imagined traditional methods similar to those described
here, the RBD project is centered on new techniques and materials developed specifically for the
demands of the high wave-action breakwater context. To create the materials for this part of the
proposal, the SCAPE team worked with SeArc, a Tel Aviv-based coastal engineering firm that,
according to their website, specializes in “worldwide ecological consulting in designing and
retrofitting coastal/marine infrastructures in order to increase their ecological value and
biological productivity” (SeArc - Ecological Marine Consulting, n.d.). For the RBD proposal, the
firm designed ‘Ecological Armoring Units’ –one meter by one meter, multi-ton “modular
building blocks of marine infrastructure, which provide coastal defense against hydrodynamic
forces” (ECOncrete, n.d.a) (see Figure 4.13). Unlike traditional breakwaters —big flat stone
walls situated either above water, where they knock down waves, or under water, where they
help bring down wave height— SeArc’s units are designed as a support base for oyster life, and
mimic the makeup of wild reefs in terms of the composition, texture, and three-dimensional
design of concrete, to ‘target and match biological needs’ by ‘provid[ing desired biological
parameters’ (ECOncrete, n.d.b). Most coastal infrastructures are built using Portland cement,
125

which, due to its high surface alkalinity (pH ~13 compared to ~8 of seawater) and inclusion of
elements toxic to ocean life, are considered so hostile to marine life that industrialized urban
coastal areas are accepted as underwater deserts, “sacrificed zones in relation to environmental
activity” (Perkol-Finkel & Sella, 2014, p. 1). In contrast, SeArc’s armoring units are made of the
company’s ecologically engineering concrete produced called ECOncrete ®, composed with
additives like recycled glass and engineered to have a reduced alkalinity to mimic the chemical
signals of old oyster shells that attracted oysters to attach and settle, in hopes of maximizing the
biogenic buildup of calcium carbonate (CaCO3) from the attached shells, and other sea life like
barnacles and worms, to make the concrete “more hospitable to marine life” (Perkol-Finkel and
Sella, 2014, p. 2).77 According to the RBD design, armoring units will be placed amidst piles of
rocks at different intervals along the 2-mile span, some fully submerged, others rising above the
current sea level, where they will form the basic building blocks of the reefs. Some armoring
units will hold a box of mesh with oyster shells inside, seeded either with larvae from spat
sanctuaries in nearby marinas or equipped with a rod onto which donut-shaped ECOncrete discs,
another product designed by SeArc, seeded with spat will be loaded and locked in place SCAPE,
2013c, pp. 60-61).78
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For more information on ECOncrete, see SeArc, n.d.; Perkol-Finkel, S. & Sella, I., 2014;
ECOncrete, n.d.a, n.d.b.
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The Tottenville site may also employ experimental tankless setting, releasing spat into the
water column, and work in conjunction with spat sanctuaries at nearby parks, marinas, and
schools (Elachi, personal communication, October 23, 2015; SCAPE, 2013c, pp. 60-61).
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Figure 4.13: ECOncrete ® armoring units mockup for Living Breakwaters. From
http://www.econcretech.com. Copyright SeArc/ECOncrete.

According to the firm’s director, Shimrit Perkol-Finkel (personal communication, April 16,
2015), SeArc’s research is being done by a group of biogeomorphologists at the University of
Exeter on what they call ‘bioprotection,’ referring to the ways in which living organisms
‘protect’ the abiotic geological surfaces on or in which they live from other geological or
meteorological processes. For example, Perkol-Finkel explains (personal communication, April
16, 2015), as when plant roots strengthen soil or barnacles protect concrete coastal structures
from erosion caused by waves and salt.79 Like the Exeter group, whose interest is to use
‘bioprotection’ to ‘enhance’ and ‘protect’ hard coastal infrastructures (Biogeomorphology. n.d.,
n.p.), SeArc is trying to harness the ‘bioprotective value’ generated by biogenic build up to
79

Biogeomorphology is a relatively new field, dating from the 1980s. For more information, see
Viles, 1888. On the Exeter group’s research, see
http://www.biogeomorph.org/coastal/bioprotection/index.html
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create stronger infrastructure for New York by 'manipulat[ing] nature to make it more
‘ecologically valuable,’’ and enhance its ‘ecological efficiency’ (SeArc - Ecological Marine
Consulting, n.d.). This build up is designed not only to help oyster life take hold, but also in turn
to increase the size, weight, and stability of the whole structure—armoring unit + oyster shells—
in the ‘aggressive marine environments’ where they are being built (Perkol-Finkel & Sella, 2014,
pp. 2-3; see also Risinger, 2012). According to SeArc, biogenic buildup acts like ‘biological
glue,’ strengthening the connections between units, making them more stable, and decreasing
their vulnerability to breakage (SeArc-consulting.com, n.p.; see also Jones et al., 2012; PerkolFinkel & Stella, 2014, pp. 2-3). While the concept has not been tested with oysters in real oceans
—making the Tottenville Reach its first live trial— Perkol-Finkel and Sella (2014) are confident.
Based on testing done in the Mediterranean Sea, Key West, and Haifa laboratories (see Figure
4.14), according to Perkol-Finkel and Sella, ECOncrete retains significantly more buildup than
Portland cement infrastructures (2014, p. 9). If biogenic recruitment works according to plan in
Tottenville, the reefs are projected to increase in stability and operational life span (which for a
traditional breakwater is less than 100 years), as well as in weight and height, making them more
robust over time against the impact of strong waves, while also cutting down on the need for
maintenance (SCAPE, 2013c, p. 62). Whereas the rocks in traditional breakwaters have to be
shuffled yearly to maintain height with larger scale maintenance every fifty years, and, whereas,
according to Parsons Brinckerhoff (personal communication, January 5, 2015), half a million
dollars is spent each year maintaining barges, equipment, other off shore work, laboratory
modeling, with biogenic build up yearly maintenance will be reduced by 1-2% (Perkol-Finkel &
Sella, 2014). Growing with sea level rise, growing with concrete, the hoped for result is that
oysters’ development will enact a recursive, self-reinforcing process that strengthens its own
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base. And, as the SCAPE consultants repeatedly mention, to protect ‘ecological value,’ the size
of armoring units will also help secure the reefs against theft or removal (it is hard to ‘steal’ a
massive underwater concrete blocks 200 meters off shore) (Elachi, personal communication,
October 23, 2015).

Figure 4.14: SeArc direector Perkol-Finkel and colleague Ido Sella test ECOncrete’s
biogenic recruitment in an Israeli laboratory. Retrieved from
http://www.econcretetech.com/technology/research-and-development. Copyright
ECOncrete/SeArc.

According to the project team, securing reefs to make sure nothing brings harm to or
interferes with the project’s success is of paramount importance (Elachi, personal
communication, October 23, 2015).80 While details of how the reefs will be secured are still
80

As we saw, NYS regulations require reefs to be monitored on a frequent basis, whether that is
by a person in a boat out near the reefs monitoring them, or a live video feed, as well as
something like the armoring units, to “make it so big that people couldn’t get at the structure
because it’s like two tons and you wouldn’t be able to lift it, or for smaller structures this might
entail pounding a spike down three or four feet into the ocean floor or other structure, with the
reef structure chained to the spike” (Elachi, personal communication, October 23, 2015).
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being worked out, noteworthy is how methods under discussion overlap with other aspects of the
design. Alongside ECOncrete armoring units that blend biogenic recruitment with security
(doubling the meaning of ‘bioprotection’), 24/7 video surveillance will be integrated as part of a
Verizon Innovation Center and Powerful Answers Campaign-funded ‘Oyster Reef and Science
Platform’ (Verizon, 2014, n.p.; billionoysterproject.org, n.p.). The platform, designed for the
Harbor School and in testing stages there since 2014, will be attached to a 1200lb submerged
cement block, and equipped with a water quality sensor, current profiler measuring water
velocity and direction, and a live streaming HD video camera with pan/tilt/zoom and full
spectrum lighting controls (Verizon, 2014, n.p.; Janis, personal communication, April 17, 2015).
Attached to land by thick underwater fiber optic cables, Verizon’s 4GLTE wireless network will
transmit reef live-feed to lab computers onshore and public online interface (Verizon, 2014,
n.p.). According to the Harbor School, “the platform will also include an interactive website that
explains the components, visualizes the data and allows users to drive the camera, create
experiments, and analyze results” (Verizon, 2014, n.p.; billionoysterproject.org, n.p.). Finally, as
an even greater precaution, reef armoring units may also be bolted and chained to the ocean floor
(Elachi, personal communication, October 23, 2015).

Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated how oyster infrastructure, as a part of the resilience ‘assemblage,’
is being assembled. As presented here, oyster infrastructure is a precarious achievement, rather
than the logical unfolding of a teleological process. What I have shown is that making nature
‘be’ infrastructure requires a lot of work. The mere reimagining of oysters as infrastructure
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involved extensive effort itself: the deployment of expert metrics, tugging on our heart strings,
the right price tag, good connections, well-chosen terminology and a lot of affective weight. In
addition, all of this is promoted through public discourse, graphic designs, cartoons, old
photographs, newspaper articles, expert statements, charts and models, forms of measure,
education, the deployment of feelings, partnership with politicians and state bodies, reports,
videos, and TED talks. Examining these diverse narratives and forms of ordering shows how the
new infrastructural imaginary of oysters is not a coherent unitary, but works precisely through
the drawing together of diverse and often seemingly contradictory visions: cuteness and toxicity,
longing and fear, emergence and functionality, reality and imagination.
For all the modeling, we saw that the ‘function’ of reefs is contingent on their being ‘built’ –
itself dependent on oysters living out their lives, an ‘assembling’ that can only take place in
reality and in time. But making nature into infrastructure also requires securing a specific version
of life’s living. From actually securing oyster reefs with video surveillance and chains (against
‘theft’ and eating) and bringing back certain neighbor species (and not other undesired ones), to
making sure that living functions as modeled (actually creates reefs, that actually break waves)
and preventing it from going in unpredictable directions (oysters growing outside designated site,
new human-oyster or oyster-fish relations), securing a single infrastructural telos for oyster life
takes a great deal of work. What this suggests is not only that the coming together of a dispositif
or ‘assemblage’ the product of great effort in and against a world of chance. Also suggested is
that, because of this, what is configured today is always at risk of coming apart, or being
reconfigured, tomorrow (McGuirk et al., 2015, p.4). What is configured, therefore, must be
maintained –and in this case, in the making of a governmental dispositif, that means governed
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and managed (Bulkley et al., 2013; McFarlane, 2009; Agamben, 2009).81 24/7 surveillance
cameras to make sure no one touches the oysters; underwater cameras to make sure oysters
perform their function as planned; teams to make sure they grow only where expected and within
desired parameters.
And there are no guarantees, however, that any of this will work.82 Even with all the ‘pieces’
in place, the reefs might not ‘function.’ This may be so for many reasons. Why would we, for
example, imagine that oysters will simply submit to the governmental role in which they are
being enrolled? Might they also go in other directions and explore their own possibilities?
Oysters tend, after all, to affix themselves to all manner of surfaces, conforming to the shapes of
whatever surface they happened to attach to as larvae. Writes Brooks (1996), “an oyster growing
in the neck of a bottle takes the smooth, regular curve of the glass, and on the claw of a crab an
oyster shell sometimes follows all the angles and ridges and spines, as if it were made of wax
instead of inflexible stone” (p. 21). Just as the introduction of wolves into Yellowstone Park set
in motion unexpected effects, so too might this experimental effort to bring oysters back to the
Raritan produce surprising results (Lorimer, 2015).83
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On importance of continued maintenance in the operation of ‘government,’ see Agamben,
2011; see also McFarlane, 2009.
82
Who is to say that oyster infrastructure will not turn out like Aramis, an automated train
system designed for Paris in the 1960s, that, despite being “technologically superb but also
politically impeccable” (Latour, 1993, p. ix), after twenty-four years of planning and
development, was scrapped and never actually built? Latour’s study of the train system’s failure
to materialize outlines the many elements necessary to bring the object together, and how the
disappearance or lack of sustained commitment and will of some can lead to the end of the
whole. Like Aramis, it is still possible that oyster infrastructure just might not come together.
83
“Although rewilding may sometimes be presented as an attempt to recreate past ecosystems
from the early Holocene or Pleistocene,” notes Lorimer (2015, “in practice all such projects will
be moving toward some new future-natural state” (p. 48-49).
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But if oysters may not ‘function,’ it is not only because they have no regard for the purposes
of government, but because it may simply be impossible to make them live.84 “What we’re
looking for,” Kate Orff has explained, “is a spark, a critical mass enough to jumpstart life again
in a place that is practically speaking dead” (personal communication, May 29, 2015). According
to one commentator, the whole thing might be a $60 million dollar failed experiment (Janis,
personal communication, April 17, 2015). For the first few years the reefs will have to be
completely replenished with a whole new round of 500,000 spat each year, at a cost of $30
million per year in oysters alone (Janis, personal communication, April 17, 2015). And with
threats of ocean acidification looming, it may be too late to get the ecosystems off the ground
and able to reproduce on their own. Because of a growing sense of urgency—increasing ocean
acidification and warming oceans—Tottenville pilot is on a fast track to be completed quickly.
The funds must be spent by 2019. SCAPE hopes oysters will grow on each other, layering onto
and strengthening the assemblage to which they’re attached, and growing more effective and
rising ‘elegantly’ with the seas, but there is a good chance that all the security cameras will
capture is a bunch of shells washing up on the beach (Elachi, personal communication, October
23, 2015). No amount of security can make life live.

84

I imagine this possibility in further details in the Coda.
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Segue from Part I to Part II

Figure 4.5.1: The future. Opening image from Living Breakwaters proposal. From SCAPE
2013c, p. iii. Copyright SCAPE/RBD.
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Until now, the dissertation has focused on the emergence of oyster infrastructure as a
solution to environmental risk. Whereas Chapters 2, 3, and 4 in Part I were highly empirical, and
looked at how nature is being reimagined and reconstructed so that it may become infrastructure,
Part II changes gears and becomes more philosophical. In Chapters 5, 6, and the Coda, I am
interested in what the turn to oyster infrastructure helps us see about our historical moment, and
the way in which urban government and life are being transformed in the age of global climate
change. Specifically, in Chapter 5, I look at how enrolling nature as infrastructure represents a
significant shift in the meaning of infrastructure, as well as a new relationship between time,
being, and government in the age of global climate change. Through oyster infrastructure, I also
examine the forms of life and futures imagined by resilience as a mode of government.
Why is this important? The historical moment that we are living in is a turbulent and
changing one. Many of the certainties that once grounded thought and action are collapsing, and
as the story of oysters has already shown, the future looks uncertain. It is important to understand
this historical moment in which we are living, so that we may begin to imagine other possibilities
for life and political transformation therein. To do so, in Chapter 6 and the Coda I strike out in a
more speculative and normative direction, to imagine a ‘divergent trajectory’ from that mapped
in Chapter 5 in the form of a politics adequate to the Anthropocene. Oysters, I argue, actually
help us imagine such a politics. To conclude the dissertation and enrich the discussion in Chapter
6, I imagine two speculative vignettes from possible futures on Staten Island’s south shore.
These vignettes are speculative fiction. Their purpose is not to ‘predict’ the future nor provide a
‘blueprint’ for politics. After all, the politics I outline is based in experimentation, and therefore
one that can only be discovered in practice. Rather the role of the vignettes is to insist that other
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futures beyond ‘governing apocalypse’ are possible, but also that making them happens in a
world that is not firmly within human control.
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Chapter 5: Living Infrastructure: Crisis without End
This project will make Staten Island the model for resiliency and innovation, using state
of the art techniques. (Governor Cuomo, cited in Dredging Today, 2015, n.p.)

‘Modern’ infrastructure
When we think of infrastructure, the images that often come to mind are dams or bridges,
massive in scale and composed of thousands of tons of concrete and tempered steel.85 Such
infrastructures, along with the architects who built them, were once hailed as triumphant
evidence of Mankind’s power to order and shape an ‘external’ nature, because of their ability not
only to seemingly control powerful natural forces but also to transform said forces into usable
flows (see Castree & Braun, 2001; Gandy, 2003; Kaika, 2004; Smith, 1996). Such infrastructures
brought the modernist ethos of Promethean mastery, stability and rational ordering to bear on
New York City, from its water supply system, in which ‘an entire hydrological cycle [was]
harnessed to supply NYC” (Gandy, 2003, p. 23), to local power utility Con Edison’s popular Big
Allis plant, the world’s first million kilowatt generator. According to geographer Matthew
Gandy, for New York City planners behind these engineering feats, among them Robert Moses,
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According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘infrastructure’ is a loan word from French,
where it originated around the turn of the twentieth century as railroad engineering jargon: “the
tunnels, bridges, culverts, and ‘infrastructure’ work generally of the Ax to Bourg-Madame line
have been completed.” In the United States, as elsewhere, the word developed greater usage in
postwar civil defense and urban planning, appearing as military logistics language in NATO’s
1950s ‘common infrastructure programs,’ in which member countries pooled their money to
construct the various military installations—communications, airfields, war centers and training
facilities, fuel supply systems, pipelines, radar systems, ports, etc.—necessary for modern,
omnipresent warfare (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2001).
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“the beauty of public works surpassed that of nature” (2003, p. 141). Their beauty and order was
accompanied by a promise to the future.

Based in a conception of an unlimited planet filled with vast reserves of natural resources,
there to be shaped by Man, modern infrastructures were seen as embodiments of the project of
technical progress, human mastery over nature, and the notion that both would lead to a brighter
future. From dams to highways, these large-scale engineering works provided evidence of
humanity’s power to order and shape an ‘external’ nature, and to improve quality of life. This
was of course a certain idea of progress, one in which fossil fuels power a society founded on
wage work, a strict separation between humans and nature, and the commodification of nearly all
things on earth (Cohen, 2004, pp. 112-129; see also Cohen, 2015; Patterson, 1996). In short, in
the twentieth century, infrastructure was deeply tied to creating the liberal capitalist way of life.
In the face of the class conflict that this way of life produced, modern infrastructures were
intimately tied to the redefinition of what ‘success’ or ‘happiness’ could and would mean, as
much as they reshaped how humans ate, traveled, and communicated.86 Throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the expanding networks of electrical power, large dams, and
highways transformed human lives in ways analogous to those we saw exerted upon oysters in
Chapter 2, managing workers and creating docile liberal subjects (Gandy, 2004; Kaika &
Swyngedouw, 2000; see also Latour, 1988, p. 38; McFarlane, 2008; Star, 1999; Winner, 1980).87

86

In this way infrastructure helped create certain kinds of life —suburban family, inner city
project, working class, civilized bourgeoisie, etc.— while extinguishing others, including
indigenous communities across the world. This transformation is a story unto itself, told from
different places and experiences by diverse writers. See Boyer, 1986; Dillon & Reid, 2009;
Joyce, 2003; Mitchell, 1988; Osborne, 1996; Otter, 2002.
87
As Latour (1988) argues, infrastructures and technologies are not neutral, but “politics pursued
by other means” (Latour, p. 38; see also Winner, 1980; McFarlane 2008).
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From clothes irons, radios, and refrigerators, to air conditionings, televisions, and dryers in the
domestic sphere, to factories, industrial farms, and international air travel, the western way of
life, and its promise of progress, was deeply tied with infrastructure (on the ‘liberal way of life,’
see Dillon & Reid, 2009; see also Cohen, 2015; Patterson, 1996).

However embedded infrastructure’s promise of the future was in the management of docile
liberal subjects and the expansion of capitalist space-time, its promise was real. Energy
infrastructures, with their offering of warmth, energy, and power, actually delivered. And even if
the mastery and happiness promised was a fiction —because the happy future never quite
seemed to arrive— it was a fiction that functioned. Think of the opening of the Brooklyn Bridge
in 1883, which brought crowds out to the coasts of Brooklyn and Manhattan to celebrate while,
as seen in Figure 5.1, fireworks rained down overhead in celebration. In the 1950s it was
common for working class American families to take vacations to visit infrastructures, and inside
shoeboxes somewhere many of us probably have Polaroids of our grandparents smiling in front
of dams or bridges. In those photographs, there is a sense, seemingly believable at the time
despite much evidence to the contrary, of being a part of an order that was going somewhere
better. Notes historian James Patterson (1996), “those who became parents —a commonplace
experience in the baby boom era—came to expect that their children would enjoy a better world
than the one they themselves had grown up in during the ‘bad old days,’ relatively speaking, of
the 1930s” (p. 323). As folksinger Woody Guthrie (1998) sang in 1941 of the Grand Couleee
Dam on the Columbia River in the Pacific Northwest,
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Your power is turning our darkness to dawn… And on up the river is Grand
Coulee Dam, The mightiest thing ever built by a man, To run these great factories
and water the land, It's roll on, Columbia, roll on.
The temporality implied in modern infrastructures like the Grand Coulee or Hoover dams was
teleological, traveling along a linear line of progress, going toward a future promised to be
different, and better.88

Figure 5.1: Fireworks celebrating opening night of the Brooklyn Bridge in New York, May
24, 1883. Copyright Brooklyn Museum, Brooklyn Museum Collection, X897.

88

For all the talk of order, claims of humanity’s capacity for order were very often
contemporaneous with a reality that increasingly showed the opposite. Infrastructures like the
New Deal’s public works, Central Park, or New York’s water system were in fact built in
response to crises —economic depression and unemployment, class tensions, disease outbreaks
— to which the latter promised to manage. For more on infrastructure as response to crisis, see
Belanger, 2009.
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Figure 5.2: Vintage postcard sending Greetings from Hoover Dam. Back of postcard reads:
“Looking towards the outlet tunnels and huge powerhouse below the world's highest Dam This
125,000,000 project is one of man's greatest engineering achievements.” Retrieved from
http://bad-postcards.tumblr.com/post/64299818718/heres-your-dam-postcard-greetings-fromhoover
The new normal: crisis without end
Today this is no longer the dominant perspective. From the disaster at the Fukushima-Daiichi
reactor (pictured in Figure 5.3) to the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, every day there seems to be
a new disaster, born of modern infrastructure itself and with global implications. “Crisis is… the
new normal,” Rockefeller Foundation president and NYC-based resilience advocate Judith
Rodin recently asserted (cited in Moss, 2015, n.p.). Writes French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy
(2015), western efforts at mastery over nature have themselves become dominated by the
machine they sought to produce. The West, he writes, has become
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a civilization of war against ourselves and against the world…mastery coils back
on itself subjecting us to ever-increasing constraints as we try to escape the
previous ones, replacing every kind of progress with an aggravation of our
condition….(p. 19).

Figure 5.3: Explosion at Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant. Japan, March 12, 2011. Retrieved
from http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2011/mar/15/japan-nuclear-plantfukushima#img-35. Copyright: Reuters TV/Reuters.

In the past, infrastructure worked best when it was unobtrusive and went unnoticed –when it
was ‘ready-to-hand,’ as Heidegger (2008) would say. It quietly worked in the everyday textures
of our lives. Today, infrastructure is increasingly coming to the fore because of the growing
frequency of its failures and disastrous effects (see Adey & Anderson 2012; Aradau 2010;
Bennett, 2007; Grove, 2010; 2012b; Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams, 2011). Today, there is
growing acknowledgement that the very idea of making things ‘present to hand’ now results in
world that is, as geographer Elizabeth Johnson put it, simply ‘out-of-hand’ (personal
communication, April 22, 2015; see also Latour, 2013). As discussed in Chapter 3, this once
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‘glorious’ notion of order is now derided as an artifact of an exhausted and imploding humanist
era. And modern twentieth century infrastructure, once thought the pinnacle of era, is now seen
as epitomizing an erroneous idea of hubristic human mastery and the cause of Sandy’s cascading
damage, the latter a sign of what is to come, a future in which crises are projected to worsen in
scope and severity as climate change and its effects worsen (Reinhardt, 2012). Modern
infrastructures are now seen not only as vulnerable to outside threats such as terrorism, but also
as a threat themselves, responsible for cascading network failures, the release of greenhouse
gasses, toxic waste, and ecological devastation (Zalasiewicz, 2008; Crutzen & Stoermer, 2008).
Dams, to take an example, are responsible for one sixth of global electricity and irrigate one
seventh of industrial agriculture worldwide, but also obliterate fisheries, displace populations,
destroy fresh water, and possibly cause earthquakes (Pirestani, 2011; Chen & Talwani, 1998). As
global transformations in earth systems caused by industrial infrastructures and processes have
now come to center stage, appearing in our present in the form of heat waves, shifting rainfall
patterns, stronger storms, and rising sea levels, the notion of modern humanist order and progress
looks more catastrophic every day.
In the face of these disasters, the world’s governments, scientists and wealthy elite are now
joining together in a new chorus that deems the humanist idea of order and mastery a failure.89
According to political theorists Brad Evans and Julian Reid (2009), western liberal societies have
now entered into a new political era based on a belief that life is inherently insecure, dangerous,
and catastrophic (see also Beck, 1992, 2002; Coaffee et al., 2008; see also Agamben, 2013). At
the same time that it is becoming clear that these crises are caused directly by western attempts
89

“Liberal societies,” write Evans and Reid (2009), “are besieged by their own narcissistic
impulses, which, having failed to realize the limits to their rule, has led them to a willful
abandonment of their foundational truth claims, such that their very own normative bases for rule
are now riddled with self-doubt” (p. 7).
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to order —and are therefore not at all natural— a new discourse has emerged to naturalize crisis
and catastrophe.90 Against western ontological belief in the possibility of ‘security’ or of order,
according to Evans and Reid, we are now expected to accept a new story: humans, it turns out,
are not masters, and the world is not masterable. Instead, disorder and insecurity are natural, and
the world is complex and interconnected, finite and volatile. In fact, trying to stamp disorder out
was a mistake, and has actually created the catastrophes we now face. “We are victims of the
post-Enlightenment view that the world functions like a sophisticated machine,” wrote Nassim
Taleb (2012) weeks after Sandy, in an op-ed epitomizing this new narrative. “This is,” he
continued, “the costliest mistake that we have made in modern times” (n.p.). According to Evans
and Reid (2009), the ‘moral’ of this narrative is that if we want to survive, our only choice is to
embrace a new world of systemic risk, disorder, and catastrophe, and to accept this as ‘natural’
now. As discussed in Chapter 3, this discourse of crisis and risk is at the heart of the new
‘resilience dispositif.’

Managing crisis without end
For Evans and Reid, this new view of life implicitly demands that we become ‘resilient,’ by
which they mean willing and able to accept a life of inherent vulnerability and precarity. The
authors express the sensibility of such a life well: wracked by anxiety, trigger warnings, and
crisis alerts, a resilient life is “always in crisis… has no chance for a reprieve…no possibility for
respite” (2009, p. 100; see also Massumi, 2009). As political philosopher Mark Neocleous
90

For sociologist Ulrick Beck, ‘risk society’ is not ‘natural,’ but rather "a systematic way of
dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself (Beck
1992, p. 21). On how natural disasters are not ‘natural,’ but rather economically and politicallyproduced phenomena, see Smith, 2006; see also Hartman & Squires, 2006.
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(2013) suggests, resilience is a cover for the extension of neoliberal individual precariousness.
Evans and Reid extend this insight, showing that the ‘precarity’ created by resilience is much
more profound, based in the “shift from the homely comforts of the Holocene” into the
Anthropocene new normal of ‘planetary endangerment’ in which “humanity is bound to a
formative logic that is lethally supplemented by its potential ruination” (2009, p. 4). What is
implicitly at stake for ‘resilient life’ is both individually ‘getting by’ –making rent, paying
bills— and surviving, as individuals and as a planet (Katz, 2004, 2010). With this threat held
over them, populations are taught “to live in a terrifying yet normal state of affairs that suspends
us in petrified awe” (p. 16; see also see Chandler, 2012; Lentzos & Rose, 2009; Reid, 2010,
2012; Cooper & Walker, 2011).
Evans and Reid (2009) give a sensitive and compelling account of how life is being redefined
as crisis. But, in response to this new worldview of life as irreversible catastrophe, what they do
not discuss is how government is itself being redefined as permanent crisis management. These
two shifts are intertwined, and must be understood together.91 The former, naturalizing life as
crisis, is deployed to authorize the latter, the development of ever-new forms of government to
manage crisis. As I discuss in previous chapters, efforts to secure New York City against the
‘new normal’ of climate change suggest that urban government is undergoing a transformation in
which crisis, resilience, and infrastructure are becoming the main keywords. Here it is not only
that urban populations are made more insecure, but also that government of the urban is being
extended and altered. Our oysters are part of this. As presented, in Chapter 3, against the
backdrop of the post-Sandy state of emergency, new areas of life were enrolled in urban
91

The logic entailed by this mode of government is similar to what Foucault and later Agamben
called ‘security.’ As the latter philosopher describes it, “in a word, discipline wants to produce
order, while security wants to guide disorder” (Agamben, 2001, p. 1). See also Agamben 2014a;
Massumi, 2009.
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government, and asked to manage the risks of climate change, rising sea levels, and flooding. In
the gathering together of this ‘resilience dispositif,’ an entirely new vision of oysters as
infrastructure emerged that, in contrast to the ‘objectification’ entailed by the oyster industry,
now has the State of New York trying to recreate oysters’ lifeworld as a emergent potential and
productivity to be ‘harnessed.’ By mobilizing what oysters do, the hope is now that risk can be
attenuated and managed. As Chapters 3 and 4 show, designers were able to successfully redefine
oysters’ value in these terms had much to do with the prior supposition of nature as crisis and the
urgency that provided. The result was a new idea of infrastructure, in which nature conceived as
management (oysters building reefs) would be used to manage another version of nature
conceived as crisis (hurricanes and storm surge).
What should we make of this new infrastructure and the governmental dispositif of which it
is a part? In previous chapters, I traced the emergence of nature as infrastructure, and all the
work required to ‘construct’ it as such. What I want to do now is to ask what this infrastructure
and its construction tells us. I chose to study oyster infrastructure for this dissertation because,
far from an anomaly, the project is paradigmatic of the governmental response to the new crisis
worldview, and as such offers an image of resilient government at its ‘cutting edge.’ Perhaps we
might say that ‘oyster infrastructure’ is to the ‘Anthropocene’ what the Hoover Dam was to
twentieth century liberal life. But if oyster infrastructure is paradigmatic today, this is not only
for technical reasons, but also because of the transformed relationship to being, time, and
government that it entails. As I argue in the coming section, comparing oyster infrastructure to
modern infrastructure will allow us to bring these transformations out. My hypothesis is that
understanding the novelty that oyster infrastructure introduces in all three will help us see
something further about life and politics in the Anthropocene: what kind of being and time are
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created by resilience as a mode of government, but also the possibility of a political response to
it.92

Emergent infrastructure
Being enrolled as an infrastructure of government is something new for oysters. And being
infrastructure is arguably new for nature. But enrolling nature as infrastructure is also
transforming the meaning of infrastructure. “The era of big infrastructure is over... We need
new stories, new heroes and new tools,” pronounced Kate Orff in a TED talk on oyster-tecture
(2010, 01:07). As the designer continued, “I want to introduce you to my new hero in the global
climate change war, and that is the eastern oyster (2010, 02:05).93 On the basis of the same
worldview described by Evans and Reid (2009) –systemic crisis is natural, order is impossible—
nature is also being heralded, albeit for its ordering capacities. With ‘Man’ and humanist
metaphysics now seen as the cause of current disasters, the new wisdom of resilience is based on
reversing the formation: instead of ‘Man,’ nature is now the master, more capable than humanity
in crisis.

92

I say more about the concept of the ‘Anthropocene,’ and a possible politics of it, in Chapter 6.
The contrast between this perspective and that of ‘modern infrastructure’ is even clearer if we
pair Orff’s statement with that of controversial planner Robert Moses (1966):

93

Natural beauty we understand, but what is man-made beauty?... The greatest
structural beauty man has created is the spiderlike, bare, unencrusted,
unornamented suspension bridge, held aloft by cunningly woven wires, spanning
the endless procession of ships carrying traffic from shore to shore (p. 1).
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In the Living Breakwaters project, infrastructure is reconceived as the living of life itself. As
we saw in Chapter 4, what constitutes this infrastructure is the life activity of the oyster itself.
From birth, through its life, and even into its death, what is imagined is an infrastructure that
builds itself. As discussed, what designers hope is that oysters will grow on each other, layering
onto and strengthening the assemblage to which they’re attached. Instead of a master architect
bringing matter to final form, the life of the oyster itself is matter and form, creator and creation,
imagined as a new, ‘autopoetic’ form of building summarized by Orff’s the term ‘oyster-tecture.’
While, at times, SCAPE’s designs portray oysters as miniature construction workers, the socalled work being hailed is not that of an architect producing an object, but is conceived as
happening in and through what SCAPE imagines as life world of the ‘oystertect’ itself. The
process —consisting of the releasing of millions of eggs, the floating of billions larvae in the
Raritan, the attachment of larvae to shells and ECOncrete units, the secretion of mother of pearl
inside each set of shells, the hardening and layering of shells both dead and living— taken
together constitutes the building of the infrastructure and the infrastructure itself.
Where once there was an ‘end’ to infrastructure –either the object itself, or the life it
facilitated or crises it prevented— in oyster infrastructure there is now the idea of a becoming
with no such ‘end’ anticipated. Instead of an object in the field, a great ‘Work,’ oyster is not
something ‘constituted’ at all, if by ‘constituted’ we understand the achievement of a stable
object or final form. Rather a living breakwater is a becoming –“they really become nature’s
wave attenuators” (Orff, 2010)— a series of emergent processes integrated with other processes,
other species, an infrastructure composed of mollusks, waves, calcium carbonate, one that has a
birth, a life, and a death. Such infrastructure is one that grows ‘three-dimensionally,’ telescoping
horizontally and vertically in space and time. That is, what is hoped is that nature will work on
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the effects of the past in the present, and project into the future, with which it is hoped they will
vertically and horizontally grow with sea-level rise. “Designed as living systems,” SCAPE’s IP
report explains, “they build up biogenically in parallel with future sea level rise” and “with the
threat of climate change to increase the strength of the protective breakwater system” (2013c, p.
23, 56).
Rising seas, catastrophic storms: these are not easy to face. The hope of many —especially
those who lived through Sandy’s destruction— is that things might still be okay. In many ways,
oyster infrastructure addresses this sentiment, and from some angles promises salvation. Oysters
could save lives. But they are also seen as promising redemption from the ‘metaphysical’
disaster of western ontology itself, in the form of demoting Man and raising nature to the highest
value. Based explicitly on a rejection of the humanist paradigms of Man vs. world, big, top-down
modern infrastructures, a city disconnected from nature, the project only offers a revolutionary
and ecological-sounding solution. Complex emergent systems that adapt along with crisis,
oysters are quintessentially resilient in nature. As oceans rise, so too do they continue to grow
and provide their services. This in part explains why the reefs are so heralded today as
paradigmatic of the new design model, and why designers like Orff refer to oysters as ‘heroic’
(n.p.). If oysters are heroic, it is because they are seen to promise a new, ‘proper’ way of
managing other natural systems now deemed at risk. As ‘wave attenuators,’ oysters are nature’s
antidote to nature’s threats. What is more, as ‘emergent systems,’ they adapt with other emergent
processes, specifically rising sea levels.
In some ways, as we’ve seen so far, similar to twentieth century infrastructures, there is a
fantasy being built around the Living Breakwaters project that works on the pervasive hope held
by many urban dwellers to reconnect with nature, to get their hands wet in the water or dirty in
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the soil. When New Yorkers show up in droves to shovel oyster shells on the weekend (Janis,
personal communication, April 17, 2015), it is as if, through oysters, the city itself could be
cleansed, purified of its smoke, filth, expensive rent and stress, to start afresh. As if imagining a
fully interconnected nature could somehow soothe the volatility of the systems around the city.
The power of this promise is evident in the words and actions of New Yorkers. Think here of the
volunteer described in Chapter 1, who showed up on Governor’s Island to learn oyster
restoration because doing it full time ‘just sounds peaceful.’ Or, to take another example, witness
the woman pictured below in Figure 5.4, who showed up at an oyster-tecture festival wearing an
oyster hat she had made for herself out of papier-mâché. The woman was from St. George, a
north shore Staten Island neighborhood impacted heavily by Hurricane Sandy. She made the hat
in an effort to get peoples’ attention about oysters’ useful capacities (Leslie Brown, personal
communication, April 20, 2016). In short, for many it does seem that oysters are here to save the
city.
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Figure 5.4: Woman wearing homemade papier-mâché oyster hat listens expectantly as Kate
Orff explains resilience and plans for building oyster infrastructure. RBD Oyster-tecture
community event, Staten Island, 2014. Retrieved from
http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/selected_update/scale-it-up-staten-island/. Copyright Rebuild by
Design.

Governing apocalypse
‘Oysters to the rescue,’ as the NYT headline put it, seems to offer a multitude of meanings
(Feuer, 2012b). Salvation, however, is exactly what the project tells us is impossible. Rather than
promising us the future understood in terms of progress and improvement, oyster infrastructure
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assumes a future that is only getting worse, and functions specifically to ward off that future.
“Don’t fight forces –work with them,” as Orff has put it (2014b, n.p.). The project assumes the
inevitability of catastrophe, and seeks only to minimize its effects. The reefs are intended to
manage crises that will never end, and will, as projected, only grow in scope and severity. In this
orientation to crisis, oyster-tecture is paradigmatic of the new brand of resilient infrastructures
being developed across America’s cities. But resilient infrastructures have by no means replaced
modern infrastructures. In fact, that is the point. Resilient infrastructures like the oyster reefs are
designed to manage crises caused by modern infrastructures like pipelines, mines, power plants
generate. Is this not what makes resilience so different from sustainability, the fact that, whereas
sustainability implied an effort to make things better, for resilience nothing needs to —or can—
be changed? Technologies like oyster infrastructure, for all their pleasing ecological appearance,
sit alongside the continuation and deepening of ‘modern infrastructures’ that, along with their
promise of liberal living standards, also deliver destruction and disaster (thereby confirming
predictions of future catastrophe). As seen in Chapter 4, the Raritan Bay construction site where
the breakwaters will be built is crisscrossed by some of the most important shipping channels in
the Northeast for oil tankers, and will share the water with a massive ‘chemical coast’ of
petrochemical facilities on the New Jersey side of the bay. As we also saw in Chapter 4,
SCAPE’s designers had to be sure not to interrupt these with their plans. Not only can these
infrastructures can coexist – they must coexist, as it is the latter (modern infrastructure) that calls
for and requires the former (resilient infrastructure). The deepening of extractive processes into
new methods like hydraulic fracking, the building of pipelines like Keystone XL or new nuclear
plants: these infrastructures are necessary to western life as it is now lived and its extension into
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the future,94 while resilience projects like oyster reefs are being built to protect that way of life,
to keep it going amidst the very disasters it itself generates.
Katechon
How can we understand this? We might say that oyster infrastructure and the resilience
dispositif in which it is enrolled today play the role of what jurist and political theorist Carl
Schmitt (2003) called the katechon. Schmitt derived this concept from Apostle Paul’s Second
Epistle, in which Paul warned the Thessalonians against becoming too agitated thinking the End
day was near. Cautioned Paul, the apocalypse would not come until ‘he or what withholds’ –
what Paul called the katechon –would be ‘taken out of the way’ (2 Thessalonians 2:1-12, spec.
2:6-7).95 Referred to in Paul’s letter ambiguously as a ‘who’ and a ‘what’ (‘he’ and ‘what’
withholds), the concept of the katechon has since Paul’s time come to mean something quite
different from its original context.96 Early Church theologian Tertullian, writing in the third
century, saw the role of katechon as that of the Roman Empire – which was seen to play the role
of managing the earthly world, maintaining order and preventing chaos, and thus, by warding off
disorder and catastrophe, postponing the end of days until its appointed time. Although the
coming of the Antichrist also signified the arrival of the kingdom of heaven—and thus would
seem a good thing— Tertullian, like many others, saw the trials and tribulations of the end days
94

The importance of infrastructures in this regard is clear in post-war reconstruction efforts in a
place like Iraq, where the ability to get them up and running was the litmus test not only of U.S.
power but also of the form of life it promises. In these scenarios, as Eric Schmidt and Jared
Cohen (2014) of Google argue, a “communications first, or mobile-first, mentality” has emerged
wherein the reestablishment of communications infrastructure has become the first priority in the
long process of rebuilding entire societies, providing a “new cement” that is not only a strategic
objective but also a method of counterinsurgency (p. 218).
95
Translation is that of Patricia Dailey, from Agamben, 2005, p. 109.
96
I return to the possible ‘original’ meaning of the term in the following chapter’s discussion of
use.
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as so horrific and so undesirable that it would in fact be better to hold off the end at all costs, at
least until the appointed time, whenever that would be. Similarly for Schmitt, the katechon was a
positive thing (Schmitt, 2003, pp. 59-60). Wrote Schmitt in a 1947 diary entry, "I believe in the
katechon: it is for me the only possible way to understand Christian history and to find it
meaningful" (cited in Meier, 1998, p. 162).
To understand the significance of the katechon for Schmitt requires understanding the
relationship between Christianity and earthly government. To be Christian means believing in
the End, and the second coming of Christ. But problematic for government, this belief could lead
to a number of problems for earthly political powers—that subjects would lose faith in worldly
politics, being focused exclusively on the eschatological event, or loss of faith due to the fact that
the End just never seemed to come. Or, more simply, they might revolt against the political
regimes that ruled over them. According to Meier (1998), for Schmitt the katechon explains the
delay of the End, as well as the continued existence of political empires like that of Rome
(Meier, 1998). Thus the Church came to see itself as there to guide the ‘flock,’ and within it,
each soul, along their way in this unidirectional movement toward an End that never seemed to
arrive. This is what Foucault (1981) called ‘pastoral power,’ which was instituted concretely by
laws, techniques, and rules of the Church. While at the end of the line is redemption, the
shepherd or pastor would be the intermediary towards that end, on the part of the well-being of
the population and on the part of a broader cosmological order. Of course, one of the biggest
challenges to this pastoral guidance came from the tensions Christianity sets up, wherein the
Kingdom of Heaven is to be found in the sky or perhaps inside of you, but never around you.
And they had to stop people from getting the idea that perhaps kingdom was here, now.
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For this tradition that runs from Tertullian through Schmitt in which katechon is a political,
and positive role, the force that ‘defers’ the end was seen as the only possible source of sense and
order in the world (albeit, as we will see in the following section, by separating people from their
capacity to make their own worlds). According to this perspective, as long as the katechon is in
place, there is no confrontation with the Antichrist, and no real possibility of redemption –
although this promise of redemption is integral to the katechon by definition.
For Schmitt (2003), many political authorities occupied the place of the katechon during their
time: the Holy Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, and individual authorities such as Emperor
Rudolf II of Hapsburg. Giorgio Agamben (2005; 1998), who has written extensively on this
tradition of katechon, expands the range of the role further. For him, “every theory of the State,
including Hobbes’s—which thinks of it as a power destined to block or delay catastrophe—can
be taken as a secularization of this interpretation of 2 Thessalonians 2” (Agamben, 2005, p,
110).97 From this perspective, beyond their differences what each of these powers shared was
their representation of themselves as the sole bulwark against the End, and the sole guarantor of
order on earth.

Governing apocalypse: now
Let us return now to oysters. In so far as oysters are today charged with helping to maintain
capitalist life on land while also warding off apocalypse, could we not see oyster infrastructure,
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I will return to Agamben’s reading of katechon in the following chapter.
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and the resilience dispositif of which it a part, as fulfilling the function of katechon today? Yet, if
we do so, we see that this is a katechon that is significantly transformed from its prior Christian
and secular variants. There is something apocalyptic about these reefs, but where Christian
apocalypse refers to an end point that will someday come at the end of a line, now that ‘point’
that once punctuated the end of linear, western time has disappeared. As discussed, with oyster
infrastructure, there is no ‘better future’ to come —not a career, not a house, not a safe planet,
not a kingdom of God. What oyster infrastructure actually tells us is that there may instead be
simply no future at all.
Indeed, while we could understand nature as infrastructure as a technology for ‘warding off
the end,’ from another angle it is a technology deployed for an already post-apocalyptic world.
Whereas modern infrastructures once ‘justified’ the destruction and ordering of the world
through the idea of a theological 'blueprint' or humanist mission, in both cases giving a telos to
being, resilient infrastructures like oysters today no long promises either.98 Indeed, while we
could understand nature as infrastructure as a technology for ‘warding off the end,’ from another
angle it is a technology deployed for an already post-apocalyptic world. The story of Sandy is
important, because it reminds us how much this is not a hubristic effort to order nature in service
of a future vision, but rather emerged in response to a crisis in which the city has found itself out
of control. Unlike the early design displayed at MOMA, this new idea of oysters —as the hope
for actually stopping disaster, of making the world better or even healing it— that emerged postSandy were rerouted into a vision of a world in which there is nothing left but crisis and crisis
management, a self-perpetuating cycle without ‘end.’ Unlike the last judgment, in this vision of
life there is literally no sense and no hope of redemption. Our lady in the oyster hat will not be
98

The temporality of modern infrastructure has what Jacob Taubes (2009) called an ‘apocalyptic
structure.’
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seeing or touching any oysters, because what is in fact being built is a large security apparatus
meant to be positioned out of the range of human contact, save for that offered by cables and
internet feeds.99 What is more, this is a technology that denies salvation or a better world. Instead
of a coming apocalypse, the reefs are there to manage an apocalypse that is ongoing in the
present, to ‘slow inundation’ (SCAPE, 2015, n.p.). As for the future, there is only a future of
more crisis and actions on that crisis, one feeding into the other. As SCAPE architects repeat,
‘we remind people, if you don’t want to get wet, you should probably move” (Elachi, personal
communication, April 19, 2016).

The being and time of the resilience dispositif
If oyster infrastructure is paradigmatic of the new vision of urban resilience, it is not unique.
Oysters infrastructure is but part of a much larger effort to transform New York into a resilient
eco-technical-social system of systems able to get ‘hit,’ reorder, and keep going amidst crisis
(City of New York, 2013, p. 5-6). In many iterations of the ‘resilient city’ vision, for example the
report by the post-Sandy commission on infrastructural resilience discussed in Chapter 3,
disaster management systems is the dominant rubric through which all spheres of the urban are
depicted as connected to human communities (families, neighborhoods, friend groups) which are
integrated without pause alongside wetlands and smart grids, and valued as a crucial part of the
city’s resilience. In addition to Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) trainings and
other community emergency response programs, the city’s post-Sandy Special Initiative for
Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR, discussed in Chapter 3 and 4) also proposed the creation of
99

As such, oyster infrastructure in some ways offers what Lauren Berlant (2011) calls ‘cruel
optimism.’
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hybrid disaster preparedness/jobs training program for low-income youth (City of New York,
2013, pp. 158-159). The report is not unique, as in much resilience policy and programming, city
residents are instructed in preparedness: neighbors with backyard gardens and ‘disaster go-bags’
are called on to shovel out, clean up, and rebuild, taught to be knowledgeable in first aid and
search and rescue —and, as importantly, ready to transmit data to city agencies (p. 157).
Residents trained as such are increasingly referred to as what the Federal Emergency
Management Association (FEMA) now calls the ‘social infrastructure’ crucial to resilient cities.
This is because, as the Homeland Security agency itself agrees, prepared and connected
neighbors add to a city’s ability to ‘bounce back,’ while isolated and helpless citizens subtract
from it. Among a host of related emergency preparedness initiatives, the City of New York’s
Office of Emergency Management (NYCOEM) has launched a campaign called ‘Ready New
York,’ that encourages New Yorkers to see themselves as integral to the city’s preparedness and
response efforts, and offers educational videos and guides to a litany of disasters, a ‘Ready Girl’
superhero (shown in Figure 5.5), ‘Choose Your Own Survival Story’ ‘tween’ stories, and guide
to building a Go-Bag (“everyone in your household should have a Go Bag”) (NYCOEM, 2016,
n.p.). This expectation is not only after disasters, but extends to ‘non-disaster’ time as well. “Of
course, community involvement should not be limited to disaster response. It also must extend to
disaster preparedness” (City of New York, 2013, p. 157). To understand this, we need only refer
to other winning designs from the RBD competition. The aerial view of a ‘resilient Manhattan’ is
one fringed in peaceful green (Figure 5.7), but zoom in and we find REM Koolhaas design firm
OMA’s RBD-winning vision of a new normal day lounging in Central Park, now with airdrops
of Flood Alerts and Flood zone maps (Adams, 2014, p. 137) . Or, perhaps more telling, take the
‘Reverse Aquarium’ envisioned in another of the six RBD winning designs. Part of a proposal by

158

design firm BIG Bjarke Ingels Group BIG for a flood attenuating structure around lower
Manhattan glass, the reverse aquarium, the project’s ‘signature building,’ is imagined as a
museum located on the ground floor of the project’s flood protection structure, featuring as seen
in Figure 5.8, a glass window looking out onto New York’s waters, which museum goers can
watch rise in real-time from behind plated glass (BIG Bjarke Ingels Group, 2014).

Figure 5.5: Part of the NYC Office of Emergency Management’s ‘Ready New York’
campaign, ‘Ready Girl’ teaches Brooklyn grade school students from how to prepare for
myriad disasters. Retrieved from https://readygirlnyc.wordpress.com/page/3/. Copyright 2015
New York City Office of Emergence Management.

Figure 5.6: The resilient city? A commonly used depiction in peaceful green. From Feuer,
2012b. Copyright 2012, Architecture Research Office and dlandstudio.
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Figure 5.7: Mockup of ‘The Reverse Aquarium.’ Mockup for a ‘signature building’ to be
included in another winning RBD design titled The Big U. Located on the ground floor of the
project’s flood protection structure, the building will include this glass window view of sea level
rise in real time. Retrieved from http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/project/big-team-finalproposal/. Copyright RBD.

This is the resilience dispositif. On one hand, the continuation of a catastrophic relation to the
world, and the crises it generates. On the other, the development of new ‘resilient’ infrastructures
to manage those effects, and to ensure the continuation of the former. Like previous historical
forces that played the role of katechon, the resilience dispositif relies on a sort of blackmail, in
which any other kind of existence is portrayed as chaos, and government as the only force
capable of maintaining order. The last rampart between life and chaos, katechon is portrayed as
the lesser of two evils. Yet where the End referenced by previous katechons originated from an
exterior force (the Antichrist, Armageddon), today the Apocalypse is generated by the same
political order that claims to hold it back. In the same way that the risks brought on by modern
infrastructure and capitalism are naturalized as ‘the new normal’ –and therefore impossible to
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stop or change—the new view is that the only thing left to do is manage them. Detached from
any version of redemption or salvation, what resilience tells us is to accept a world in which any
other form of life is now impossible, and in which “a meaningful life beyond the biophysical”
has become unimaginable (Evans & Reid, 2009, p. 14). Unlike Schmitt’s katechon –which for
him at least provided meaning in this world— the resilience dispositif seems to offer no such
thing. We are ‘reconnected’ to the world, in so far as there is no more beyond to believe in. But,
at the same time, the world, we are told, is but apocalypse and apocalypse management, a selfperpetuating cycle without ‘end.’ Even government itself is besieged by this, as seen by the fact
that one of its most heralded new infrastructures may not even live. Hostages to a way of life
determined to take us down with it, huddled together amidst the assembling of a citywide regime
whose only aim is to keep going, to keep things and beings circulating in a permanent present,
urban dwellers are now expected to wait, anxiously, for nothing, because as they are told,
nothing is coming, only a future of more disaster, which will only get worse.100 It is as if, with
the end of the western idea of order and meaning, our governments are now insisting that there
can be no other order or meaning. In the absence of any other way of defining our forms of life
other than in reaction to catastrophe, we are told that survival is the horizon of our lives. There is
no better or other future to come, only the endless management of crisis. And even this may be
precarious.
As intimated, the oysters might not even live. Oyster-tecture demotes Man and replaces him
with nature as the true master planner. But this nature is also an idealized, fictional nature, one
100

“Resilience,” notes geographer Cindi Katz (2010), “is a means of getting by and recuperating
one’s self, community, or resources in the face of dominant social forces” (p. 318). My
understanding of resilience as a way of life created by the resilience dispositif is consistent with
Katz’s definition, but it is also one in which the ‘forces’ populations now face include climate
change and extinction—in addition to the already powerful forces of capitalist exploitation!
161

derived from a world that no longer exists. As discussed in Chapter 4, the attempt to make
oysters live is coincident with the sixth great extinction, and oysters themselves are functionally
extinct, as are the conditions that historically made their life in the Raritan and other waters
possible. While oyster-tecture in many ways appears as a biopolitical effort to make oysters live
again, to come back and perform feats we ourselves cannot, it also appears yet more desperate. If
the state of New York is deploying the project to try to maintain a certain way of life on land,
those building it are trying to see if oyster life under water is possible in present day conditions.
To reiterate a statement by Orff, “What we’re looking for is a spark, a critical mass enough to
jumpstart life again in a place that is practically speaking dead.” Oysters may be the ‘living unit
of the project,’ but it is not even certain that they are going to live. With threats of ocean
acidification also looming, in part the project is on a fast track not only because of budgeting but
also to try to buy time, to try to get the ecosystems off the ground and able to reproduce on their
own before it is too late.
In a sense, what is now asked is that oysters live the same ‘precarious’ and ‘stressed out’ life
of perpetual work and circulation that defines capitalist life, only under water. In the first 48
hours of their lives, baby oyster larvae go through an intense growth spurt, from tiny shell-less
larval speck to a creature with a digestive tract, organs, and 70% of a mature shell (Waldbusser,
et al., 2013; Oregon State University, 2013; NOA, 2015). The ‘energy’ required for this growth
and the creation of their shells comes from calcium carbonate rich waters. But as world’s oceans
absorb growing amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, they are becoming increasingly
acidic a process that decreases the available calcium carbonate present (Grossman, 2011; NOAA
2011; Scigliano, 2011; Gobler, & Talmage, 2014). When this happens, acidic water either kills
oyster larvae outright, or makes it so that they have to work even harder in those first 48 hours to
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grow, which can be too stressful on them (Waldbusser, et al., 2013) (see Figure 5.8). According
to George Waldbusser, biologist at Oregon State University, “it becomes a death race of sorts.
Can the oyster build its shell quickly enough to allow its feeding mechanisms to develop before
it runs out of energy from the egg?” (cited in Floyd, 2013, n.p.). If they are unable to do so, they
die. Indeed, with continued climate change, Orff expects oyster-tecture to eventually fail. The
project is far from a utopian plan. Rather, as the designer explained, it is “a way of buying a little
time” until climate change and its effects force more drastic changes. When asked to imagine the
longer-term future of Staten Island, Orff replied, “towers, walls, and jellyfish” (personal
communication, Orff, May 29, 2015).

Figure 5.8: Microscopic images of 21-day-old Eastern oysters grown in different levels of
CO2. As CO2 levels increase, oyster shells become smaller, more fragile, and at some point
disintegrate or fail to form at all. From Gobler, & Talmage, 2014, p. 10.
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“If you build the Hoover Dam,” said Orff, “you know if it will be there or not” (personal
communication, May 29, 2015). The same cannot be said of oyster-tecture. Despite the language
of ‘emergence’ and ‘self-growing,’ this infrastructure will actually require a lot of monitoring,
managing, and restocking (Elachi, personal communication, October 23, 2015). Even making
nature live at all, not to mention to make it work for us, will actually require extensive and
ongoing endless management. For this, oyster-tecture also imagines a new role for humans.
Instead of the great Master of Nature, alongside self-structuring infrastructure Orff (2014b)
reimagines humans as “future stewards of the built environment” (n.p.). In their budget proposal
to the city SCAPE included only a handful of jobs—around five— for such stewards, “sort of
like a combination of just someone out in a boat, just checking [reefs] out making sure
everything’s okay, doing monitoring on the oyster population, and then also someone who could
essentially kind of act in the role of park ranger in a way, so help to spearhead educational
opportunities along the shoreline, give tours, that sort of thing, and just help with the general
maintenance upkeep, sort of like the community relations side of things” (Elachi, 2014,
November,19). Like the small team left to manage Con Edison during a strike or blackout, here
an ongoing process of management and monitoring replaces the possibility of an ethical relation
to nature that ‘environmental stewardship’ may, however faintly, have once suggested. Much
stewarding will be done via integrated monitoring units (see Chapter 4, on Verizon monitoring
unit).
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Conclusion
In sum, what is being demanded of New Yorkers today in the resilience dispositif is that we
accept the idea of life projected by a dying order. ‘Resilience,’ as it is deployed in this dispositif
today, represents a debased, anxious view of the world in which the latter composed of crisis and
its management. Rather than promising a different or better future, resilience cancels the future
altogether. The goal of this dispositif is to continue down the same catastrophic path, albeit with
any and all new means. Oyster-tecture offers a clear image of this path. In the future imagined by
the project, the oceans and air continue warming, the Arctic and Antarctic continue their
irreversible melting, and the water surrounding New York continues rising in step, storms and
waves rising as well, reefs growing with them. The disaster continues seamlessly. Life above
water does not change. The reefs are there to ensure that it does not. The reefs are there to
capture human hope and grief, and to hold an attenuated existence—without design, without
justification— in place. The implicit demand by this vision is that urban dwellers accept the end
of the world, and live as survivors, whose sole prospect is to manage and be managed. In this
vision, human beings, like oysters, become ‘living infrastructure.’

Chapter 6: Dwelling in the Ruins of the World
What assembling could we invent? How can we assemble the pieces of a world,
of various worlds, of existences that cross through them? (Jean-Luc Nancy, 2014,
p. 36)
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We have always lived in slums and holes in the wall…you must not forget, we
also know how to build. It is we the workers who built these palaces and cities,
here in Spain and in America, and everywhere. We, the workers, can build others
to take their place, and better ones! We are not in the least afraid of ruins. We are
going to inherit the earth, there is not the slightest doubt about that. The
bourgeoisie might blast and ruin its own world before it leaves the stage of
history. We carry a new world, here, in our hearts. That world is growing this
minute. (Buenventura Durruti, cited in Paz, 2007, p. 478)

The Anthropocene
In recent years the term the Anthropocene has come to the fore as a name for our epoch, a
time of deep devastation and profound uncertainty — to which efforts like our oysters reefs are
being devised to respond. The term—which literally means ‘new Epoch of Man’ (Crutzen, 2000)
— was first used when a Dutch atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen, formerly most famous for his
Nobel Prize-winning research on the depletion of the ozone layer, and biologist Eugene F.
Stoermer in 2000 in a newsletter of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme/Global
Change to signify the fact that ‘human activity’ is now the most powerful force shaping the
planet’s stratigraphy, thus becoming what scientist Naomi Oreskes (2014) has called ‘geological
agents,’ stratigraphically more powerful than the oceans’ tides or the movement of mountains
(Crutzen, 2000; Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000; see also Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen & McNeill,
2011). Though in many popular accounts the Anthropocene is often reduced to the impacts of
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global warming or other processes contributing to climate change, geologists have focused on a
series of metrics in addition to these such as deforestation, ocean acidification, mass extinction,
urbanization, biosphere reshuffling, and environmental homogenization, which collectively pose
a direct challenge to the continuation of human life on this planet (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000;
Steffen, et al., 2011; Zalasiewicz, et al., 2008).
While the term has not yet been accepted into the official geological time scale, the
Anthropocene has been taken up widely in recent years, providing a name for a crisis that many
had previously felt but which remained without a name. The Anthropocene graced the covers of
both The Economist and National Geographic in 2011, was featured in 2012 as one of Time’s
“10 Ideas That Will Change the World,” and has become the topic of sustained popular media
coverage with Elizabeth Kolbert’s (2006; 2011; 2013) many pieces. Especially after Sandy, the
term has become a major trend in art and academia, filling in as the latest buzzword to which
nearly any concept or form can be attached (for an example of this, see Klingan, Sepahvand,
Rosol, & Scherer). Certainly it has been like a game to see who can attach the term to existing
disciplines the fastest –gender, race, class, and children in the Anthropocene, Anthropocene
painting, music, or video. This however does not take away from the serious weight the word
carries, or the way that it helps us understand our present historical moment.

Periodizing the ‘Epoch of Man’
As the terms usage spreads, more and more agree that we are now living in the
Anthropocene, making the primary question a matter of when the Epoch of Man began. While at
the time of the term’s first proposal in 2000, attempts to measure or understand the chronology
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of the Anthropocene’s stratigraphic signature did not yet exist, today geoscientists are heavily
focused on that question. In 2009, an Anthropocene Working Group (AWG) of the
Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy (SQS) was established to consider this question, to
produce a proposal providing evidence of its environmental signature. For geologists like Jan
Zalasiewicz, Chair of the AWG, who is preparing the group’s proposal for its inclusion in the
International Commission on Stratigraphy’s official geological time scale, the question is about
finding a date, when changes began appearing in the earth’s strata that would be so significant as
to constitute a beginning ‘boundary line’ marking the end of the Holocene and beginning of the
Anthropocene. The question is not only of past beginnings, but of the long lasting traces that will
be detected in the deep future (Zalasiewicz, 2009). Whereas in all previous geological epochs,
such changes have been caused by erupting volcanoes, the movement of rivers and their silt
deposits, ocean tides, earthquakes, the AWG is looking at the technologies created by human
beings during the eighteenth through twentieth centuries –bottles and ballpoint pens, fly ash
particles, aluminum metal, mines, or whole megacities— whose examination is the object of the
new ‘technostratigraphy’ field Zalasiewicz has established (Zalasiewicz, et al., 2014).
This is a significant decision and one that would hold great meaning, a fact that has led to an
outpouring of proposals for ‘when the end began’ (Sullivan, 2015). The common consensus
thinks the Anthropocene began mid-to-late eighteenth century, with the beginnings of
industrialization and the combustion of fossil fuels in England (see Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016;
Mitchell, 2013; Moore, 2014a). Others have proposed that it began in 1610 with the
extermination of Native peoples in the Americas (Lewis & Maslin, 2015; see also Schlanger,
2015, n.p.) while still others argue for the more recent post-WWII ‘Great Acceleration (Steffen,
et al., 2015). While the ‘technofossils’ (Zalasiewicz, et al., 2014) being studied to mark this date
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are either from the recent past or present, what matters chronostratigraphically speaking is how
long and how deep they will last into the earth’s future. As a result there is a confusing
temporality in the efforts to periodize the Anthropocene. As cultural theorist Daniel Hartley
(2015) has noted in an insightful essay on the subject, “the temporality of the Anthropocene as a
periodising category is bizarre indeed, shifting as it does between the present, a retroactively
posited past and an imagined future” (n.p.).
Each of the Anthropocene periodization proposals are important in their own right: to
forefront the extermination of indigenous forms of life, or to focus on the burning of fossil fuels
points to a larger process of industrialization and capitalism, each placing topics once reserved
for the ‘politically inclined’ onto the front page of the newspaper —an important shift in and of
itself. That said, each of the proposed datings share the search for an origin, a localizable point in
time that would mark the beginning of the epoch, or its continuation into the future —and thus
more fundamentally they all adhere to a linear, chronological conception of time. ‘When did it
begin?’ ‘How long will it last?’ ‘Can we measure that?’ These questions, I argue, do not fully
capture what the Anthropocene has the potential to convey for us.
Perhaps, I argue, the ‘bizarre’ temporality that Hartley notices is precisely what makes the
Anthropocene so powerful both as a conceptual lens and as a historical moment. Instead of trying
to clear the confusion, perhaps we should sit with it — try to make sense in it, rather than of it.
Toward this end, in what follows I propose a different periodization of the Epoch of Man, one
that takes this confusing temporality and meaning into account. In what follows, I propose that
we can think of the Anthropocene as a concrete and metaphysical epoch, one broken into three
different ‘periods’ (A1, A2, 3), with the understanding that ‘periods’ are a construction, a
heuristic that helps us think of things (and not a scientific marker). I am not arguing for or against
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the chronologies currently debated.101 Rather what I am doing is proposing a different
temporality than that sought in the aforementioned proposals. What I understand by the
Anthropocene is a concrete relation to being, the different forms of life and earth it produced,
and the strange effects these are generating today. This is irreducible to a set of a dates, but
manifests in the confusing, overlapping time that is our present: a Janus-faced moment, at once
looking back to a past that is not at all past, but now emerging catastrophically in the present and
transforming the future in previously unimaginable ways.

Anthropocene 1 – ‘Man’ as ground
Looking backward, true to its literal meaning of the ‘Epoch of Man,’ Anthropocene 1 refers
to the time during which the human was understood as the transcendent ‘ground’ of being, the
center around whom the world was arrayed and for which it existed (Wakefield, 2014; Brogan,
2012, p. 41; Heidegger, 1962, 1977, 2003; Nietzsche, 1989/1887; Schürmann, 1987; Brogan,
2012). As Jason Moore (2014a) has argued, the beginning of the Anthropocene coincides with
“the rise of capitalist civilization after 1450, with its audacious strategies of global conquest,
endless commodification, and relentless rationalization” (p. 5), processes that constituted “a
turning point in the history of humanity’s relation with the rest of nature, greater than any
watershed since the rise of agriculture and the first cities” (p. 17). Moore is not wrong, however,
Anthropocene helps us see something about capitalism that is often overlooked, that is, the
metaphysical transformations necessary for capitalism to exist, including wringing the earth of
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The debates around Anthropocene dating are important and bring up a number of important
questions. I am not trying to intervene in them. For overviews of current debates surrounding
dating the Anthropocene, see Monastersky, 2015; see also Sullivan, 2015
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every last drop of profit. This contrasts the well-trodden modes of thought that could not help but
reduce the Anthropocene back to the ‘capitalocene,’ in which the devastating transformations the
term encompasses would be explainable by the sole logic of capital.
As geographer Neil Smith (1984/1990) explained with force, capitalism relies upon an idea
of the world split in two, with humans on one side and nature on the other, the former conceived
as the indivisible center of existence, and the latter transformed into an inert and disposable
object. This dualist metaphysics is underwritten by a belief in total order, certitude, and stability,
the accomplishment of which is the task of ‘Man’ (Heidegger, 2003). 102 This relation to the
world is a strange anomaly, a blip on the radar, an exotic construction that would seem bizarre to
the rest of human existence –and it did not come to cover the earth out of nowhere (Descola,
2013, p. 63). A1 refers to the time —still ongoing— of the enforcement of this metaphysics
across the globe, carved in steel and brick, blood and rebar, enclosures, genocide and factories:
etching differently in space and time a humanist metaphysics, into, across, and above the earth,
the destruction of which was ‘justified’ to people by promises of a better future, improving
standards of life, and notions of ‘civilization.’ The result of such a metaphysics is a world split in
two: on one side, human beings detached from their conditions of existence and made to identify
freedom and happiness with that detachment; on the other, the rest of the world turned into a
standing reserve, an inert, orderable supplier now surrounding but never touching humans
102

Writes Heidegger (2003),
What is in fact the driving force of the subject-object dichotomy? It is the quest for
absolute certainty. Such a quest, which is born out of an interpretation of truth as
certainty, appears historically with Descartes’ first Meditation…Henceforth, nature only
appears as an Object for a Subject. As a historical prelude to this advent, one can note
that the quest for certainty appears first in the domain of faith, as the search for the
certainty of salvation (Luther), then in the domain of physics as the search for the
mathematical certainty of nature (Galileo) (p. 13).
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(Heidegger, 1977; Harvey, 2005; Smith, 1996). To illustrate A1, we can think of the oyster
bushels, oyster millionaires, and oceans filled with raw sewage discussed in Chapter 2. We can
also think of the Hoover Dam, domestic applications, and the working class lives they support
discussed in Chapter 5. In short, A1 points back to the time of ‘nature as object,’ ‘humans as
subjects,’ and the ‘modern infrastructures’ discussed in those chapters. Brought together under
the heading of A1, the sum is a recursive global machine within which mountains were turned
into coal providers along with the plants and distribution networks they powered and in turn
these infrastructures interconnect to the lives they sustain.103 The construction of A1 is what
geologists are trying to measure, fittingly by identifying which of all the planetary scars will be
most catastrophic and long-lasting.

Anthropocene 2 – the ‘end’ of ‘Man’
Crucially, however, the Anthropocene has emerged as a concept not to celebrate A1’s
humanist order but rather to call it a catastrophic failure, with Man’s ‘ascendency’ now
producing ever-amassing ruins. Indeed across the board the Anthropocene is not used as a
designation meant to herald Man or to celebrate an era, but to warn, to lament, to prompt action.
Across its various proposed datings and meanings, one thing stands out: the perceptible triumph
of man and his civilization, Man’s coming to the fore as the most powerful force on earth can
best be measured in a catastrophic impact, with the actions that constituted A1 re-emerging in all
kinds of previously unimaginable ways in the present, with perhaps the biggest testament to the
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From biopolitics (Foucault, 2008), alienation (Marx, 1987), and humanism (X), to Gestell
(Heidegger, 1977) or enframing (Mitchell, 1988), the way of life produced in A1 that I refer to
here as ‘liberal life’ has been given many names. Each of these concepts draws attention to
different aspects of A1’s metaphysics, and the way it was produced.
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catastrophic impact of A1’s ‘order’ being its eruption in our present in the form of climate
change, melting ice, acidifying oceans, extinction, and human misery. That is, A1’s celebration
of Man and perception of power that produced the industrial revolution ushered in A2 and the
catastrophic natural events we must now live with. Feedbacks begun in eighteenth century
English factories are now appearing in New York’s present as unprecendented heat waves,
shifting rainfall patterns, stronger storms, and rising sea levels (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000;
Crutzen, 2002; Zalasiewicz, et al., 2011; Rignot, et al., 2014). As for the future, where mention
of past civilizations usually conjures images of ancient Greece or Rome, El Tajin or
Tenochtitlán, long gone civilizations which nevertheless still project a legacy of temples or
agoras, plazas or cults, the geologists archiving Man’s epoch can only point to a growing list of
catastrophic scars: 80% of the earth’s natural forests have been destroyed, half of the world’s
tropical forests have been cut, most of North America has been logged, to name but a few of the
residual effects of A1 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2010). And
while it may not be measurable in the strata, the other ‘half’ of A1’s metaphysics—its
‘subjective,’ human side— is in equally grave condition: we are told that human beings are
individuals, utterly alone in the world (from other people, from lands, from techniques), expulsed
from themselves and others. Increasingly distressed, 13 percent of the American population is
currently prescribed antidepressants, including one in four women between the ages of 50 to 64
(Mayo Clinic News Network, 2013, n.p.). And new balms are now emerging to soothe
environmentally related ‘mental disorders’ such ‘Solastalgia’ –the psychic or existential distress
produced by environmental devastation of one’s own home or land— ‘ecoanxiety,’ and
‘ecoparalysis,’ which ‘ecopsychologists’ are diagnosing in greater numbers every day (Albrecht,
2005; Smith, 2010). A1’s fiction of a masterable world and of self-contained individuals is now
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perishing faster each day in psychiatric waiting rooms. Surrounded by a world that has become
foreign, and that is dying more with each day, populations face a new normal of fear, anxiety,
insecurity and devastation. The claims to human mastery over the world are being literally
washed away by rising seas, while terminal diagnoses of western civilization proliferate as
quickly as fantasies of the end (New York Post, 2014; Scranton, 2013; Totten, 2014). As Brad
Evans and Julien Reid (2009) sum it up, “we are living out the final scenes of the liberal
nightmare in all its catastrophic permutations” (p. 203)
This situation is what I call Anthropocene 2. Anthropocene 2 is our present, the moment of
the naming of the Anthropocene (as a failure), in which the past (A1) has not disappeared, like
points trailing behind us on a line, but is erupting in unpredictable ways in the present. A2 is the
Epoch of Man in all its schizophrenia. The very pieces that made A1 possible –stable climates,
clean water and air, sun, docile subjects, humanist metaphysics— are now in question. Perhaps
the NYT summed it up best when they said, “we are living in a civilization that is already dead”
(Scranton, 2013, n.p.).

A1 as event
The Anthropocene, I argue, is not one option amongst many, or a fashion to either like or
dislike. It is simply a word (there could be others) for an objective situation in which we as
human beings find ourselves thrown.104 Not a big punctual event like Sandy or Fukushima, but
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And certainly the local conditions of the Anthropocene in which diverse populations are
thrown are uneven and geographically distinct. Populations living in New York face different
forms of climate change, for example, than those living in Los Angeles. So too within New York
will different populations have different capacities to face those changes, depending on their
class, race, gender, and so on.
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something slow and ongoing, almost imperceptible event, making it hard to get a handle on. This
event lacks a language or a coherence (Berlant, 2011). It is not linear; it involves feedbacks from
the past in the present. But rather than an ‘end’ (of history, of Man, of the world), A2 is better
thought of as a threshold time, where we live on an uncertain boundary line that separates one
world from another.105 The term refers to our threshold moment, in which almost all the
principles and certainties that grounded Anthropocene 1 have given way or are being
transformed. Thinking back to my discussion of genealogy in Chapter 2, perhaps this is how an
‘end’ actually happens— things once thought stable come undone, they start to lose their hold,
while other forces try to maintain that hold. In our uncertain present, the one certainty is that the
future will not, cannot, look the same. Above all the question that defines A2 is, how will the
future look?
Like Sandy but less punctuated, A2 is a time that calls for a response, and a decision on this
question. As if we are at a crossroads, with a choice to make, we might ask ourselves: do we
allow this same catastrophic course to continue? Or do we begin charting out another path? How
this might be done and if it is possible depends on human action, but also on a world that is
beyond human control, and that will be changing extensively in coming decades (Povenelli,
2014). A2 points forward to a future that is still a question mark.
This ‘future’ is currently being made primarily by the world’s governments and wealthy elite,
with A2 currently dominated by forces whose aim is to maintain this catastrophic course. This is
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The ‘end of history’ is a philosophical concept that was much-discussed by critical theorists
in the 1990s and 2000s. According to this idea, contemporary capitalism constitutes the final
form of human civilization, with no other rivals or alternatives. History ends –not the world—
meaning that time marches forward, while capitalist civilization remains the same. For some of
the diverse perspectives on this idea, see Kojève, 1980; Fukuyama, 1992; Fisher, 2009; see also
Featherstone, 1993.
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the ‘resilience dispositif’ that we saw in Chapter 5, which tells us that the only thing left is to
govern the apocalypse. Jettisoning the metaphysical framework that governed A1 to maintain the
western way of life stripped of the pretext, promise, and future it once offered: A2 is a
civilization on life support. Even Man has been ‘dethroned,’ and along with it the now
discredited idea of nature as separate object, in favor of a new eco-cybernetic urban meshwork in
which infrastructure increasingly occupies the place of orderer, albeit one that is immanent to life
itself. In a final hope of keeping the catastrophe within human control, new swathes of life –such
as oysters— are being enrolled as techniques of government for this new ‘katechonic’ force. As I
discussed at length in Chapter 5, within this regime of governing, a new vision of human life is
also being forwarded, with an expectation that humans adopt the same mentality as resilient
government: survival, a life in which we are told nothing else is possible, so we may as well keep
going, and be thankful to get by. Paradoxically, oyster infrastructure offers a clear image of A2
at present, with nature’s ‘dynamism’ and ‘liveliness’ harnessed to preserve a seemingly frozen,
postmortem present. Oil tankers alongside oyster infrastructures: this incoherence is the only
‘coherence’ that can be claimed for A2, dominated as it is by a mode of government geared
toward governing crisis while also generating it, in an ongoing apocalypse that reveals nothing,
only more crisis.

Anthropocene 3: a divergent trajectory
Could it not actually be the case that there is more to life than this ongoing
survival? (Evans and Reid, 2009, p. 167)
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The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seeing those rules…
to replace those who had used them, invert their meaning, redirect them against
those who imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it
function so as to overcome the rules through their own rules. (Foucault, 1984, p.
86).
There can be no taking hold without surprise. (Althusser, 2006, p. 196)

The affinity between classical politics, government, and A1 metaphysics
A2 is the response to the event of the Anthropocene that currently dominates. But might it be
that there is not only one response to an event, but rather many possible responses –not all of
which are compatible? Thinking back to our discussion of Badiou’s event in Chapter 3, could we
say that an event’s meaning and definition may also result from a struggle between conflicting
responses to the possibilities opened by the event? If the event of the Anthropocene is going to
mean something other than apocalypse and its management, required is the creation of another
trajectory, an ‘other’ Anthropocene based in forms of existence other than government. How
might this occur? What is to be done?
Answers to these questions traditionally come from the realm of ‘politics’ (Agamben, 2013,
2014). But politics itself is firmly anchored in the metaphysics of A1, often reproducing its
relation to the world and to time (Schürmann, 1987). As such, opening an ‘other’ trajectory, an
‘A3,’ may require a new approach to the world, respectful of but untethered from the being and
time of A1. Understanding this requires looking briefly at the being and time of politics.

177

As Jacob Taubes (2009) has shown, the same teleological time that imbued A1—an order
moving along a unidirectional and irreversible line going toward a better future, the very
meaning of the present ultimately defined by and given sense through this movement towards the
end point— also imbues western politics. Like the end of the world or the Kingdom of God,
according to Taubes revolution has been conceived as something that would come someday, in
effect happening to us, but that would never be brought about here and now, with our own hands.
Like Christians waiting for the end days, this way of thinking about political transformation
leaves populations waiting, situated between two eternities, of creation, of the Garden of Eden,
and the end of time itself, of redemption, in a present, the earthly time of sin, that is geared
towards the future, with little regard for what is present, which can only ever seem inferior to
that which is coming. With regard to politics, the implicit assertion becomes such that the
moment of true transformation is not what goes on here, but what is always to come and can
only come at some point always in the future. For which we wait, and which never quite seems
to arrive.
Similarly, mirroring A1’s metaphysics is also the way that politics is often oriented toward
activity in this world. As anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (2008) has demonstrated, behind every
form of western politics, from the most ‘conservative’ to the most ‘radical,’ there lies a similar
metaphysical assumption (the same one that grounds A1), which is that reality (human beings,
nature) is in need of being governed (pp. 83-97). This dualistic metaphysics, Sahlins (2008)
argues, erases the fact that for the majority of human existence people were capable of deciding
for themselves how to live and organizing their worlds accordingly (pp. 97-102). Consistent with
western imagination, in much politics the world is posed as a problem to be managed, a problem
that is then answered through one form of government or another, which is itself set up as an
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exterior plane of existence (pp. 83-97). Following this approach, politics gives beings a specific
function or telos, only now one coming from the ‘left’ (Negri; 1999; 2003). This, Sahlins (2008)
writes, is true as much for totalitarianism as democracy or even many kinds of anarchism, in so
far as each posit a plane of being separate from being itself, which will then govern or manage
being (p. 83).106
Philosopher Giorgio Agamben draws on the tradition of thinking of which Sahlins and
Taubes are a part, while taking it further. For Agamben, classical western politics itself is a form
of government, in that it seeks to order the world, rather than dwelling in it (2015; 2011). In fact,
for him, the relation to life that they set into motion unites all the historical role of the katechon,
government, and classical politics. What is most important to understand how this arrangement
necessarily entails the loss of the collective and individual ability to determine one’s own life
and future. Thinking back to Chapter 5’s discussion of the political function of the katechon,
historically one of the biggest challenges to pastoral government come from the tensions
Christianity sets up, wherein the Kingdom of Heaven is to be found in the sky or perhaps inside
of you, but never around you. The role of the katechon was also to prevent populations from
getting the idea that perhaps kingdom was here, now –or that it could be made by their own
hands (Agamben, p. 108; Foucault, 1999, p. 145). According to Agamben, the result of
government is such that populations lose –are expropriated or alienated from— our capacity to
believe in our own capacities to construct worlds. Put in language used more recently by
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Following Agamben (1998), we could trace the roots of this conception of politics to ancient
Greece, wherein, as formalized in the philosophy of Aristotle, politics came to be understood as
something which requires human beings leave their heads and stomachs, ears and eyes at the
door of the polis, to enter the latter’s purely ‘political’ realm. If Agamben is abstract, histories of
‘enclosures’ and continuous ‘primitive accumulation’ give a sense of how much work was
required to actually make this metaphysic a reality (see, e.g., Linebaugh, 2014; Federici, 2003).
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Agamben (2014b; 2011), we are stripped of our capacity to ‘use’ the world.107 The reverse is also
true. Government also entails ‘removing things from common use,’ putting them to ‘work’ for a
specific end (Agamben, 2014b, pp. 8-9).108 As we have seen with oysters throughout this
dissertation, what each dispositif of government does is to place beings and things in a separate
sphere, that of ‘management,’ with the effect that the environments in which we live, elements of
an apparatus come to be thought of abstractly, as if part of a plan that appears to transcend them
rather than being immanent in their arrangement. With this attitude to the world, we begin to
relate to things as if they were part of a plan that stands apart from, and precedes, them and their
arrangement – and which could never be otherwise (Mitchell, 1988). Akin to the process of ‘real
abstraction’ described by Karl Marx (1990, 1993), in Agamben’s work this is understood as
‘removing’ things from ‘common use.’ Elements of the world are put to ‘work’ for a specific end
(i.e. to govern climate change and make New York City more resilient), with the result that they
come to appear as if they are the elements’ single and only purpose (as if oysters have always
been and will always be infrastructure. The effect is to circumscribe the future in advance, freeze
the present and retroactively redefine the past.
The result, according to Agamben, is to separate us as human beings from our own lives and
futures – from our ability to construct them, and also to believe in our capacity to do so. We tend,
in other words, to internalize government’s own myth. As a result, the world and our
involvement with it becomes hardened up, and we began to conceive the world as a set of
unchangeable, predetermined things that surrounds us and in which we lack any phenomenal
involvement. We might say that Agamben develops Karl Marx’s (1844/1987) theory of
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In answer to the question, “when do we appeal to a ground,” philosopher Gilles Deleuze once
said in a similar vein, “when one no longer relates one’s activity to himself as an agent” (2015, p.
17).
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This and following sections develop ideas in Braun and Wakefield, in review.
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alienation, although here what is ‘alienated’ according to Agamben is not the human being as
laborer, but rather the human capacity for dwelling and world construction. Where commodity
fetishism masks the fact that workers are the true builders of the world, making the elements
appear as commodities and things as linked by money, in Agamben’s story it is the
fundamentally meaningless world, within which beings create meaning in embedded, situated
ways, which comes to appear as though it were always this way, and reducible to a particular
meaning. The result, to perhaps extend the significance of Guy Debord’s (1994) phrase, is a
‘society of spectacle,’ in which beings are abstracted from their worlds, and in doing so the
possibility of creating or transforming the world has also been abdicated.

Returning to the world
We need an ethic or a faith… it is not a need to believe in something else, but a need to
believe in this world... (Deleuze, 2005, p. 167)

Charting a divergent trajectory in the Anthropocene, I argue, requires leaving this
metaphysics behind, and developing a new disposition toward being and action. In shedding the
being and time of A1, in throwing us into the present—in which the end is not to come but
comes, repeatedly, and in which there is ‘no future’ to justify the present — perhaps
paradoxically A2 and its transformed ‘apocalypse’ are already opening up to the door to this
other relation. In this apocalypse without end, perhaps there is actually a ‘revelation’: there never
was another, more ‘true’ world. We are ‘returned’ to the world, here, now, which is the only
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world we will ever have. To borrow a term of Gilles Deleuze (1994, pp. 164-167), we are
‘returned to the world’ or as Bruno Latour (2013) has put it, rendered ‘earthbound.’109 Beyond
all of its devastation, perhaps this is the most important thing the Anthropocene is telling us. The
question then becomes, how to ‘reclaim’ the capacity to dwell in that world?
To understand this further, again Agamben may be able to help us, for he has tried to
conceptualize a politics proper to the time we live in. Taking Heidegger’s (1962) method of
being-in-the-world as fundamental —an orientation I have explored from many angles
throughout this dissertation— Agamben (1998; 2001; 2014; 2016) has formulated a ‘politics of
use.’ In this work, Agamben (2016) imagines that the capacities separated from us by
government can be reclaimed through the making ‘use’ of the worlds into which we are thrown.
In contrast to attempts to affirm a constituent power independent of a relation to constituted
power, which for Agamben both reproduce the governmental structure of the exception and
represent the apex of metaphysics, the ‘politics of use’ he imagines would not aim to ‘constitute’
a new power or order, not a new kind of management (e.g. only now from the ‘left’), but would
be a process of ‘dwelling’ and ‘making worlds’ within the ‘factical’ conditions into which we are
thrown, thereby opening up new relations to the world and new forms of life (Agamben, 1998)
for Agamben’s critique of the concept of ‘constituent power’ in Negri, see Agamben, 1998, p.
31). This affirmative politics is not about governing according to a rule, but ‘dwelling,’ itself
conceived as its own ‘rule.’ “Life”, Agamben writes, “is a form created in living” (2015, p. 155).
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This phrase can be confusing. ‘Return to the world,’ I suggest, means developing a new
disposition that is rooted in and begins from the concrete worlds where we are thrown. As such,
this phrase refers to a political practice based on the methodology used throughout this
dissertation—a politics of ‘being in the world’ (Heidegger, 1962). It does not, for me or for
Deleuze, mean going ‘back’ in time, back to a mythical past, back to a pre-Anthropocene
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Although Agamben writes extensively on government, he does so to emphasize that the
governmental role of things is not inherent to the things in question— a fact that is more than
clear in our story of oysters, which are no more inherently infrastructure than they are a meal.
Rather, the ‘roles’ to which they are put comes from the relations into which they are drawn,
relations that are themselves contingent.110 Ultimately, for Foucault, as for Agamben, dispositifs
are only ad hoc arrangements –or, to recall McGuirk et al.’s (2015) terms, ‘configurations’—
that emerge in relation to an urgent need (e.g. resilience). Is this not what comes across so clearly
in our story of oysters, how, for all its claims to human mastery, incredibly contingent and ad hoc
the Anthropocene is and has always been? All those arrangements so often viewed as
representative of Promethean ordering of nature were in reality the result of a great deal of effort,
to establish nature as a commodity or infrastructure, as much as was needed to make human
beings into laborers or docile subjects.111
For Agamben understanding that government as a contingent and precarious operation is
important, because it is a step toward ‘deactivating’ that same governmental operation. Instead of
the things that make up our worlds as eternal, untouchable, or ‘sacred,’ instead Agamben argues
that we should see the elements of a dispositif as open to many possible ‘uses.’ From this
perspective, rather than understanding the elements of the world abstractly, we can begin to take
our worlds on as ‘handy,’ and ‘useful,’ thereby ‘disrupting’ or ‘detourning’ their governmental
function (Heidegger, 1962; Debord, 1994). In short, we begin to participate in the world, rather
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This is why, for Agamben, a dispositif is not a ‘thing,’ but also an operation (2009).
And despite the epoch’s claims to be capable of ordering nature, nearly all its efforts were
hampered by crises, resistances, or failures—workers going on strike, oysters trying to die— thus
necessitating the invention of techniques to deal with each –promises of liberal life, artificial
oyster seeding, and so on. The epoch that proclaimed its capacity to order the world was in
reality very out of control (on capitalism as a contingent encounter, see Deleuze and Guattari,
2003; Marx, 1993; Althusser, 2006; Braun, 2015.
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than following its apparent order. Crucially, to return to common use – to profane an apparatus –
does not mean to put the elements of an apparatus to their correct or proper use.112 Whereas in
the past, politics in one way or another entailed one or another set of rules or prescriptions for
how to live or what to do, in large part these approaches are as much a part of the ruins that we
live in as anything else. To return to ‘common use’ is instead to deactivate the governmental
ordering of a thing —the ‘work’ toward which it has been put— by constructing a world, in the
world (Agamben, 2009, pp. 16-17).
To make the radical import of Agamben’s ‘politics of use’ explicit, I argue that ‘use’ is a
method, not a solution. With this concept, Agamben’s goal is to free us from the static spacetime of classical politics, and to sketch a political method that begins from the middle of the
worlds we inhabit, in order to see what we can build and do from there. It is not ‘an ontology to
save us’ (Clark, 2011). It is not answer to ‘what is to be done,’ that famous question of twentieth
century politics (Lenin, 1987). Rather it is a reminder that this question is always situated within
a world, and therefore derivative from the world in which it is asked. After all, when Russian
revolutionary Vladimir Lenin famously posed it in 1901, he did not ask abstractly, but was rather
trying to solve the concrete problem of making a working class revolution in the concrete
contexts of Europe and Russia (Lenin, 1987). The context, in other words, is what allows us to
ask and find answers to the question of ‘what.’ There is no answer given in advance.
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While Agamben is deeply philosophical in style, Michel Foucault’s (1990) discussion of the
Greek conception of use (chresis) helps clarify the ‘worldly’ quality of use (cite). For the Greeks,
Foucault wrote, use (or non-use) of a body was governed not by moral interdiction or code—
which would require the institution of a transcendent plane that decides what is to be done in a
situation regardless of the situation itself— but instead determined by a number of ‘strategic’
considerations of the ‘user’s’ specific situation: the time of year, the weather, one’s social
standing and age, in addition to one’s training and ability. ‘Use’ was not prescribed, but neither
was it arbitrary.
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Dwelling in the Anthropocene: an ongoing, pragmatic experiment in worlding
A ‘politics of use’ implies a turn away from A1’s quest for certainty, and toward an ongoing,
pragmatic and experimental ethos of constructing worlds. While Agamben is deeply
philosophical in his description of ‘use,’ if we return to our story of oyster infrastructure we can
bring the concept of ‘use’ and its relevance to building a ‘divergent trajectory’ of the
Anthropocene into greater focus. Indeed, the turn to urban resilience may hold a crucial lesson:
that the concrete, material reconfiguration of the world is on the table as a question not of the
future but of the present. As the case of oyster-tecture shows, even the world's most powerful
bodies understand this. With modern infrastructures like seawalls and floodgates seen as
outdated and implicated in present and future disasters, in the name of 'resilience,’ New York is
increasingly immersed in a broad socio-technical retooling, albeit one whose goal is the
maintenance of existing social and political conditions. A politics of use will be equally
pragmatic, experimental, and technical with the difference that it will not aim to preserve the
existing social and political conditions of A2, but to create new worlds to replace them.
This, I argue, is the political method of the Anthropocene: a process of returning to the
world, of reclaiming our capacity to create and configure our worlds. Instead of the end of the
world, from this perspective, the Anthropocene is simply the end of a world, a certain way of
life. The fact that we are ‘living in a ruin’ leaves everything to be reinvented, expropriated or
rebuilt from the ground up. Seemingly simple, concrete questions emerge as central: how to live?
What about water, food, shelter? If ‘critical infrastructure protection’ has become so heavy a
focus today, it is not only, as Dillon and Reid (2009) explain, “about the mundane protection of
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human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of other human beings, but about a
more profound defense of the combined physical and technological infrastructures which liberal
regimes have come to understand as necessary for their vitality and security in recent years” (p.
130). But as New Yorkers saw during Sandy, urban infrastructures are also, at present, our life
support systems, systems to which we are attached and on which we are dependent.113 This fact
and these connections, all but invisible on a regular day, were, like Heidegger’s (1962/2008, p.
103) broken hammer, brought to the fore during the blackout, as millions of people were made to
realize the connection between the grid and transportation, heat, food, and even access to
drinking water.114 As many noted, had the storm taken a slightly different trajectory and hit
Hunt’s Point, New York City’s main food distribution point would have been knocked out. As
discussed in Chapter 3, Sandy revealed the extreme fragility of these infrastructural systems, and
New York’s dependence on them.
Not just eating and staying warm, more darkly, think of Fukushima, the thousand-year halflife of various radioactive elements now dispersed across the islands of Japan. This very quickly
brought up material questions for people living there, not simply of how to shut down the nuclear
power stations, but, really, how can they live, given the fact of nuclear contamination (Kohso,
2011)? And moreover, against the discourse of resilience dispositif that says the only hope today
is ‘getting by,’ how to create deep and rich worlds that would be more worth living? How to
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…and the ‘uneven’ ability to access or maintain infrastructures during crisis, as seen for
example in the ability of Goldman Sachs and New York University to maintain power during
Sandy, due to their private power plants (Smith, 2014).
114
This importance is more immediately evident in other parts of the world where infrastructural
systems are less ‘consolidated’, or in moments of change when authorities enclose or destroy
infrastructural connections, as Graham, Desai and McFarlane (2015) show in their study of the
‘raids’ by police and government on informal water connections in Mumbai’s slums.
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make use of the world beyond utility?115 How might ‘being resilient’ end up meaning something
much more than just ‘getting by’ (Katz, 2010, p. 318)? Asking these questions opens the
imagination to consider many perhaps surprising subjects, from science, engineering, or
horticulture, to ways of thinking, healing, or hacking (Woodbine, 2014). While the key questions
facing us in the Anthropocene become clearer under this lens – the answers are not given. It is
may not always be pretty or clean. Like oyster infrastructure, dwelling in the Anthropocene is
uncertain, requires experimentation. It might fail, and we do not know where precisely what it
will produce.
What I have outlined here is not just a proscription for what might happen – it is in some way
an attempt to make sense of things that are already happening. The questions posed above are
already being taken up with great passion in New York, in the farming attempts, experimental
urban communes, proliferating hack spaces, or traditional skills practitioners— each of whom
ethically approaches the world and opens up seemingly sedimented tools and practices to entirely
other uses (for an overview of these experiments, see Woodbine, 2013, 2014). Here alongside
ever-growing accounts of colossal earthly transformations that proceed regardless of human
involvement —epitomized in the popular imaginary of a ‘world without us’ (Weisman, 2007)—
the Anthropocene is equally defined by a massive wave of human efforts to break through the
age, to create a new existence from within a world that is passing away. In the last several years,
movements and insurrections in Europe, North Africa, and the Americas have swept away
regimes, generated new forms of organization, and opened up paths that once seemed impossible
(Mason, 2012). Alongside melting ice caps and growing dead zones, here the Anthropocene is
115

As Heideggerian philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1969) argues, one does not first and
foremost ‘use’ a tool for practical purposes. For Levinas, what is also primary when comes to
being-in-the-world is enjoyment (p. 110).
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also marked with the ubiquitous squares and parks filled with thousands of people sleeping in
tents, cooking in massive free kitchens, meeting in absurdly large assemblies, surrounded by
barricades and street battles for months on end (Gerbaudo, 2016).
No less profound than these occupied parks —which they in fact resemble— are the
outpourings of self-organized disaster relief that have spontaneously emerged in the wake of
growing number of disasters, and that in New York City after Sandy, gave rise to ‘pocket
Zuccottis’ across the city as youth on bikes, parents with kids, and political activists alike
showed up in droves to shovel debris and help cook for hundreds in hardest hit areas like Staten
Island or Rockaway, while many others opened their businesses or homes to neighbors as
makeshift organizing centers (Smith, 2014). In the same way that people realized they could just
run the New York City Marathon (and did) even though it was cancelled, making it the best
NYC Marathon to date –no corporate sponsorship, no using the race as content for ad sales, no
tanker loads of discarded Poland spring cups— so many New Yorkers realized they could just
directly take care of each other, without police and without FEMA (pointing to a very different
response to Sandy’s event than the resilience dispositif we saw in Chapter 3). Or, in a different
temporality and at a smaller level, take the outpouring of young people leaving the city to learn
how to farm, the fusion physicist in Missouri who quit his job to build a ‘civilization started kit’
(Eatin, 2013). As with the outpouring of interest in learning how to grow and care for oysters,
what each of these diverse efforts poses in its singularity and what they pose together in their
embryonic consistency is the simple fact that A2 is not a done deal, and that new forms can be
born in history. But just as important is what they are posing: the nascent, material possibility of
not merely surviving but living beyond the pale of the Anthropocene itself. Moreover what these
experiments pose is a fundamental redefinition of politics: not on the pages of a book, but vitally.
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While the resilience dispositif proclaims humanity’s entanglement and dependence upon the
existing order of things too great to overcome, what each of these experiments show is that, in
reality, it is just a matter to be worked out.

Dwelling in a more-than-human world
In the discussion above –and throughout Agamben’s arguably anthropocentric work
(Sinclair, 2011) — ‘use’ seems to be the result of human hands alone. Although those hands may
seek to express a new ‘relation to being,’ ‘use’ nevertheless appears as yet another humanist
story. But here one last time our oysters may help us, in this case to think more soberly about
what it means to dwell in the Anthropocene, in worlds that are dark and getting darker. Oysters
are part of the earth’s inheritance, part of the world into which human worlds have been thrown.
They survived the extinction of dinosaurs (Parkinson, 2010, p. 53). As we have seen, oysters
have had many ways of being. If left alone, oysters may live for up to 20 years and grow to 12
inches in length (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 18). They attach to all kinds of surfaces such as shoes or
tires, and develop diverse shapes and sizes (Brooks, 1996, p. 21). That is, oysters, like humans,
also make ‘use’ of the worlds into which they are thrown. As we saw in Chapter 2 great efforts
were made to prevent this, to make oysters conform to a marketable shape. And, as seen in
Chapter 4, further efforts still are being made to secure undesirable growth of oysters in today’s
Raritan Bay. Oysters live in ways that confound government’s intentions, but they also die. As
discussed in Chapter 5, of the most devastating facts about oyster infrastructure is that oysters
simply may not survive.
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This helps us see something important. Dwelling in the Anthropocene entails not only that
we to allow ourselves to see our environments as open to rearranging by us, but also as rich in
their own right, capable of creating new uses and new worlds on their own terms—which have
nothing to do with ours (Clark & Hird, 2014). The world into which we are thrown is not inert. It
is not just a backdrop to our activity, nor is it a useful resource for us, with no life of its own.
Creating worlds from within the ruins of the Anthropocene therefore means doing so within and
indebted to a more-than-human world that humans have dramatically altered but that always
exceeds humans. In this, ‘dwelling in the Anthropocene’ must be understood as an ongoing and
pragmatic experiment in worlds that humans do not fully control, and to which they are indebted.
Just as for oysters, there is no life without certain conditions, so too without the earth, without
the sun, without clean air there is no human life. These ‘gifts,’ as Nigel Clark (2011) understands
them, along with a stable climate, other human beings, animals, and tools have made human
civilizations possible for 11,000 years. We now face the possible withdrawal of those conditions,
which generations before ours were able to take for granted. Dwelling in the Anthropocene
leaves us in profoundly uncertain territory. Can we bring some forms of life back? Can we stop
some of the destruction? Nothing is certain except that, like all those experimenting with
growing oyster restoration citywide (see Figure 6.1), we can try.
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Figure 6.1: The oyster restoration station training described at the beginning of this
dissertation in Chapter 1. Photo taken by author September 19, 2015, Governor’s Island, New
York.
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Coda

2050 AD: The oyster people at the water hub (Future 1, told from the perspective of
humans)
It didn’t look like the revolutions we’d always imagined (big riots, occupied squares,
storming government buildings). Even back then, only a year after Sandy, handmade traps had
started appearing along the roadside. Wild turkeys caused small roadblocks crossing the streets.
Little signs that other forms of life were emerging.
After the hurricane, the government’s attempt to increase urban resilience led to the creation
of many ‘community resilience hubs,’ including the water hubs built to accompany the
‘protective’ reefs they built along the South Shore (SCAPE, 2013c, p. 8; see Figure 7.1). These
hubs, initially tacked on to the oyster-tecture to please locals and give architects an air of being
participatory, democratic, and grassroots —a valued approach during those decades following
the catastrophic master plans of the twentieth century— once built actually did become centers
of learning and meeting as economic, social, and climatic conditions worsened. They were places
where neighbors met one another for the first time, over a wet lab experiment to test ocean
acidity, or to track changes in bird migration patterns caused by global warming. Taking up the
problem of food, the hubs became points of local distribution for the rice neighbors had begun
growing —based on an exchange they’d held with a Vietnamese neighborhood in New Orleans
(Peck, 2007) — on the uninhabited wetlands created by the government’s buyout of Oakwood
Beach. After the fanfare that came with the oyster reefs’ construction, the water hubs became
less regulated, and neighbors began taking more liberties with them. The city built storage rooms
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to please local kayakers, rooms which by 2050 became home to an increasingly diverse
collective store of goods, machines, equipment, from 3D printers to sewing machines,
woodworking tools and scuba equipment. People just started sharing. It just made sense.

Figure 7.1: Architectural rendering of ‘water hub’ to be built in 2019 in Tottenville, Staten
Island. Retrieved from http://insights.wsp-pb.com/articles/environment/plan-to-create-livingbreakwaters-wins-funding. Copyright 2014 RBD.

It wasn’t like everything changed immediately. Most of the time you drove to the hub a night
or two per week, in your Corolla or SUV, sometimes picking up a stack of pizzas from Towne
Deli, an initial offering. Classes would last a few hours, and then you’d drive back home, to the
prefab mansions in Tottenville, or the apartment complexes further north. Sometimes you’d go
there for meetings on the state of the shore, whose disappearance we were beginning to notice.
One day when we were measuring water toxins on the beach near the hub, people just started
crying. No one said anything, they just cried. It was as if all the years of anxiety and fear, all the
pathos we’d built up, the absurdity of lifetimes spent online and in cubicles and eating baby kale
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out of plastic tubs came welling up in us together, all at once. My parents said it felt a little like
Occupy Wall Street, in the beginning. I still remember the sound, the waves, the sobbing. People
held each other. Some held the oyster cages. The next day, a group of us planted corn in the
abandoned lots at Oakwood Beach.
After time our meetings at the hub became more frequent, and the classes lasted longer into
the night. Maybe we found something in being there together that drew us. Maybe we just
weren’t drawn back home as often. It became more common to see lights on at the hub late into
the night. Men who’d spent their lives working temp security jobs, or who’d been first
responders at the World Trade Center, began learning to fish and sail ships. Women, who until
then had been office workers, waitresses, or housewives, started learning to read the weather, to
trap small animals, to grow crops. It was amazing that you could go in the water without growing
a third eye or a tail —although I always said I wouldn’t mind that, as long as it was a real tail, the
kind that can wrap around stuff and grab things— and as we got more comfortable with that
more of us began learning to dive. Diving makes you insanely tough, we realized. It makes you
able to deal with so much—the cold, the wet—and also how to work together as a team.
But we were especially good with oysters, and frankly, after all of this, we still loved them.
In the beginning, in 2015, when the city government and the Harbor School—which by now had
become more of a living center than a high school per se— started encouraging us to be involved
in growing oysters for their construction project, we thought it was pretty ridiculous and that they
were treating us like grown infants. But a lot of people got into it, and became pretty attached to
the oysters, seeing them grow from larvae to form shells and diving down to visit them out there
on the reefs. We were moved by the way they attach on to each other and never let go. People
said we were weird, that the oysters were poisonous, that we were being irresponsible — but
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whatever - we just liked it. The rough shell, the sand, the smell of salt. At least it was real, or at
least it wasn’t a cubicle.
For the first few years the oyster breakwaters had to be completely replenished with a whole
new round of oyster spat. At $30 million a year in spat alone, people started to say the project
was a failure, a 2-mile waste of money. But at some point the collective historical memory of the
oysters —the rocky bottoms, the salinity, the calcium carbonate— began to kick in, and little by
little reefs took hold. While the architectural team who designed the reefs had, despite calling
them ‘emergent infrastructure,’ imagined them as very static ecosystems—we laugh that it was
like they got their ideas from high school biology book they found at a library sale— the oysters
did not exactly conform to their vision. They settled on the big concrete blocks placed there to
welcome them, but they also placed themselves, well, everywhere. They attached to their
fugitive ancestors, weird long oysters growing quietly underwater since the farms closed in the
twenties. They attached themselves to other ghostly remnants of the industry, the poles and
saplings that once marked out company plots, underwater shipwrecks, old tires, thriving on the
flotsam and jetsam of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Looking back it seems crazy that the state had imagined they would be able to make oysters
live only within their desired parameters. The state tried everything: they passed stricter laws
regulating contact with the oysters. As the oysters spread into ‘New Jersey’s’ waterways, the
state tried to build a fence along the border line. At one point, DEP started dredging undesired
oysters. In reality, the oysters were impossible to control.
Another hurricane hit in 2048. It was a category 3, 2 levels higher than Sandy had been. The
waves were 40 feet high. This time we used the water hub and PS 6 as relief centers. Like they’d
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done to our neighbor Aiman Youssef after Sandy (Moynihan & Maag, 2012, n.p.), a few weeks
after the storm the city told us we had to go home, that the ‘recovery period’ was over. But
somewhere along the line we had seen enough –Katrina, Sandy, Los Angeles in 2025... For a
long time government had this great narrative, “oh look we’re bringing electrification, we’re
going to make it all better!” Now it’s more, “oops, well, actually we can’t.” After all this, how
could we even pretend to believe them anymore? For us, it was as if we just sort of said together,
“you know what? I think you’re done managing us.”
Many things took on new uses. Bob used his crane to drag over the old sea walls that had
been crumbling since Sandy and we made a big barricade across Hylan Boulevard. We used the
solar panels the city had installed on top of Fresh Kills landfill to power our cellphones to stay in
touch.
There was a feeling of great dignity in deciding to continue on our own path. The power to
do it didn’t come out of nowhere, but from all the practice we had of doing stuff together. Me,
personally, in my heart of hearts I knew I would be totally willing to lose my head for this. How
else to approach this end of the world, than to fight like hell, for everything we built?
People are doing similar things in other parts of the city—on North Brother Island, a group
has set up some kind of commune –and we try to help each other, trade things. We often sail to
Governor’s Island, where this old guy known as the Diabolical Anemone of Joy (we’re not sure
where the name came from, but legend has it he once ran an oyster restoration nonprofit there)
gives us new oyster larvae from the tanks he still keeps there. We never tried farming oysters for
food by the way. They were sacred to us, and we cared for them.
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We learned that thinking is not about calculating probabilities. I remember something a
friend said to me, the universe is too vast to be contained in a spreadsheet. We had a lot to learn,
including the most fundamental thing which was how to believe in the world, and not the
representations or rules derived from it that we had grown up with. We learned to say yes to
what is singular and real in life —the black muck, the awkward relations, our lack of
experience— and to take up the possibilities that reside there. What I mean is that we started
playing a role in our lives again, instead of relating to it as spectators. Does that make sense? The
recent past seems very far away now.

2100AD: Towers, walls, and jellyfish (Future 2, told from the perspective of oysters)
The Raritan Bay is a triangular-shaped body of water that juts in between Staten Island and
New Jersey (see Figure 7.2). Today the bay is classified as part of the New York Bight, located
in the south of the Lower New York Bay between New York and New Jersey. At the end of the
last ice age, as the Pleistocene gave way to the Early Holocene, water from the melting
Wisconsin glaciers flooded the valleys left by the ice, creating the Hudson, Raritan, and East
rivers (Bokuneicicz, 1988). The land around the bay transformed from tundra to spruce and pine
forests, while lagoons and bays formed around Sandy Hook (Squires, 1981). 2,500 years ago, the
valley that is now Raritan Bay also filled up (Squires, 1981). The shallows along its coasts have
been our home for a long time. Until the mid-1930s, they were filled with eelgrass beds, which
we shared with killifish, silversides, and bluefish under a sky of sandpipers and hawks
(MacKenzie, 1992, p. 5).
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Figure 7.2: Raritan Bay. Retrieved from http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/news/features/mackenzieaward/irene_sediment_in_new_york_harbor_lg.jpg. Copyright NASA.

It has been a strange few centuries. We have come and gone. When they transferred us into
the Raritan decades ago from the vats to the big blocks we live on now, it wasn’t so bad. The
brackish feeling was still there. So was our memory. The water was dirty, but we started to live.
We had to! They kept dumping more larvae onto us. We were here for them to live, being
cultivated in order to go extinct. Forced to interact with increasingly lethal systems, but it was
fine. We have seen dinosaurs. And unlike them, we survived (Parkinson, 2010, p. 53). We are
the deep history of the earth, a past that extends millions of years before humans existed. Shells
of our ancient ancestors form the limestone strata.
We heard early on that things were harder in other parts of the world. In 2008 shellfish
hatcheries and reefs in the Northwest all failed (NOAA, 2015). As billions of oyster larvae died,
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oceanographers and scientists could not understand what was happening. At first they thought it
was a disease or bacteria, until they realized that this was the beginning of the end: deep, more
acidic water had begun churning up into the surface water where oysters grow, causing their
shells to dissolve or grow malformations (NOAA, 2011, 2015). Eighty percent of oysters out
there died. The companies called it a ‘seed supply crisis’ (Scigliano, 2011, n.p.).
Acidification was slower here, and we came close to beating it. But eventually the same thing
happened. By 2100, the seas around New York had risen five feet (New York State Sea Level
Rise Task Force, 2011). The shore drowning didn’t bother us, but the carbon dioxide did. Our
waters have become five times more acidic than they were even in the first decades of the
twenty-first century. The water has gotten warmer, but also thinner. At the end of our lives, there
is a frantic expenditure of energy, but it is not enough. Our shells are dissolving. We are
exhausted, and we are dying. Along the shore, there are huge cement walls, but it is impossible
to see what, if anything, is living behind them.
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